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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
Philosophers through the ages have analysed most, if not all, of the phenomena we encounter in life.   
One significant area they had all but neglected is technology which has been a huge influence, both 
good and bad, on our lives for the last two centuries at least.   The Greek philosophers, however, noted 
the work of the craftsmen which they referred to as ‘technē’ from which technology got its name. 
Heidegger, who wrote a seminal essay entitled ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in 1954, turned 
to the work of these philosophers to investigate the essence of technology.   A number of other 
philosophers began to address the question also from a different perspective around this time.   With 
the exception of Heidegger, however, most philosophers and scientists, among others, regarded 
technology as applied science.   Heidegger turned this around and insisted that the scientist was 
dependent on technology and technology therefore preceded science.   While the field has advanced 
considerably in recent years, the idea of a philosophy of technology is still greeted with scepticism even 
among university communities.  One of my objectives in undertaking the research for this thesis is to 
contribute in some little way to cultivating an interest in the philosophy of technology.  
 
ICT is replacing many technologies and pervading almost all other technologies at this stage.   It is 
based on the work of the analytic philosopher, George Boole.   The force and speed with which it is 
being implemented makes it very difficult to determine clearly how it is affecting our lives and what 
impact it will have on society in the future.   ICT is the zeitgeist so any questioning of ICT and the 
changes it is imposing on us are largely ignored.   
 
It is understandable that computer scientists would celebrate the phenomenal growth in the volume of 
information we create daily through our information systems but I question the value and use of much 
of this information and would suggest that some of it is, in effect, only data generated from other 
information in order to keep the computers running and this devalues the information.    
 
It is very rarely that the media get to the core of the significant technology issues and that is why I 
believe  information systems specialists, philosophers and public intellectuals have a responsibility to 
society to take on the role of questioning the direction of developments in ICT in order to help us 
distinguish between those advances that are of real value to society from the developments that are 





In the very near future, developments in artificial intelligence and robotics will generate demands on 
philosophy to provide solutions and guidance in relation to issues arising in the area of philosophy of 
mind, and social and cultural issues relating to work, identity, and community development etc.    
Similarly, the ICT community should be in a position to offer solutions that will contribute towards  
stable and enduring democracy.  
 
1.2 Research Overview 
We hear calls for a wider use of ICT in our democratic processes but we seldom, if ever, hear calls for 
more democracy in the development and deployment of ICT.  In my thesis I have challenged some of 
the conventional wisdom about the achievements of ICT and I have highlighted some often overlooked 
facts about democracy. 
Democracy was first implemented in Athens over 2,500 years ago and the principles laid down at that 
time are still relevant today.   In my analysis of democracy, I’ve relied heavily on the work of 
Schumpeter, Luhmann, and Hayek among others.   The significant conclusion from this was that 
democracy represents a delicate balance between anarchy and totalitarianism and it can degenerate to 
one of these if citizen participation is, respectively, very apathetic or over-enthusiastic.   A question on 
which the theorists differ is whether democracy is of instrumental or intrinsic value.  Strong democracy 
is a model recommended by Barber and this would require a strong commitment in the political process 
from citizens although not necessarily in large numbers.   A significant feature is recognition of the 
centrality of conflict in the political process.  
Between the citizen and the government in a democracy lies the bureaucracy which, according to 
Weber, specialises in carrying out the administrative functions objectively and according to “calculable 
rules and without regard for persons.”   This ensures that all citizens are treated fairly and equally.   The 
bureaucracy is protected by its relative independence and can regenerate itself (autopoietically) and 
grow.   Within the bureaucracy is the technocracy which, according to Galbraith, specialises in planning 
and ensuring the sustainability of the organisation.  The bureaucracy is dependent on information and 
records and therefore it relies heavily today on ICT. 
Before considering ICT, I undertake a review of technology generally and the major question arising 
from this is whether technology is neutral, deterministic, or autonomous.   I conclude that we have to 
accept that technology is deterministic - i.e. it drives the course of history and autonomous technology 
is certainly a possibility.   I also provide a review of the history of the development of modern 
technology during the 19th century since there are at least some parallels between the experience of the 
Industrial Revolution and that of the ICT revolution today and these form a pattern which provides the 
basis of Perez’s ‘Model of Technological Revolutions’.   In addition, I have reviewed Heidegger’s 
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seminal essay “The Question Concerning Technology” at some length since it is regarded as such an 
important work by philosophers and historians of technology and it introduced the concept of 
Enframement. 
Unfortunately, ICT has got nowhere near reaching the enormous potential it has to enrich our world 
and the lives we live.   I would have seen ICT as being the instrument to reverse climate change and to 
save our trees.   Instead datacentres and server farms are exceptionally high electricity consumers while 
the production of paper continues to increase.   Borders and time zones are there to protect us but the 
Internet has allowed them to be breached and this has caused considerable security problems and has 
increased the stress levels in many workplaces.     
It is difficult to see how we can avoid security problems when we promulgate concepts such as ‘Big 
Data’ and ‘The Internet of Things’ (anti-definitions).   Management and planning have been made much 
more complex as we try to make sense of huge volumes of data, much of which is generated through 
many cycles from other sets of data/information so it becomes more and more abstract and there may 
be the added danger that the provenance will be lost.  While too little information can impede decision-
making, there is always the possibility that too much could do the same. 
Abstraction strips away context and meaning and the greater the level of abstraction, the more one is 
moved away from the tangible reality as in the financial crash in 2008 when the linkages between 
derivatives and other financial products and the funds supporting them were very difficult to track down. 
Disintermediation represents one of the great advantages for many internet users.   However, it is only 
when the intermediaries or ‘middlemen’ are removed that their contribution is recognised and even 
more so today when many are calling for mediators to oversee the material appearing on social media.  
Carr uses the term hypermediation to indicate the number of intermediaries in internet transactions. 
The overall problem with our use of ICT, however, is that the emphasis is on the means rather than the 
ends  -  i.e. on the technology itself rather than on what we want it to do.    This indicates a lack direction 
on our part; we’re unsure of where we’re going or being taken because we seem incapable of asking 
the right questions.   To quote Luhmann “we can search in vain among the social function systems for 
an a priori.”  Meanwhile we’re allowing ICT to take the social out of society. 
Most of us, at least in the developed world, are connected to the Internet.  It affects various aspects of 
our lives, in many cases transforming them.   Therefore we should ask how democratic were the 
decisions to bring about these transformations?   This thesis is my attempt to address this issue.  It 
comprises an examination of the relationship between ICT and democracy.   More specifically, I provide 




• The development of ICT is one of the two most significant and transformative technological 
revolutions since the invention of the wheel six thousand years ago (the other being the development 
of electricity distribution networks on which ICT is dependent).   But in this development the ICT 
industry has adopted a disingenuous business model which leaves no room for democratic input 
from users. 
 
• There are negative attributes of ICT which are anti-democratic.   The positive attributes can 
contribute much to the peripheral aspects of democracy but achieving consensus in situations of 
conflict in order to steer a middle course between anarchy at one extreme and totalitarianism at the 
other, which is the essence of democracy, requires sagacity which only humans, rather than the cold 
rationality of ICT, can provide. 
 
 
1.3  Research Design 
Initially my plan was to identify, through the literature review, those areas of potential impact or 
influence between systems of democracy and ICT systems.   An analysis of those areas would then be 
undertaken using Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems and Ihde’s Phenomenology of Technics 
focusing on democracy and ICT respectively.   Following further scrutiny, however, I concluded that 
Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems is too reductionist and abstract to fully represent the nebulous 
character of democratic politics where traditions, myths and culture play a significant role.   Even 
Luhmann himself raises some doubts with his comment that “one should not begin with the critique of 
[democracy] but should marvel that it functions at all”.  Despite this, I have cited Luhmann extensively 
throughout the thesis because, in his prodigious output, he regularly steps outside his formal theories 
and offers very practical and incisive comments on various aspects of management and organisations 
such as bureaucracy, decision making, risk management trust etc. 
It became apparent also that Ihde’s Phenomenology of Technics, while useful in providing an 
understanding of the individual’s experience of ICT, it does not help significantly in understanding the 
societal impact of ICT. 
There are many definitions of democracy and the practise of democracy varies from country to country 
and from antiquity to modern times even in some of its most fundamental attributes.  ICT, being 
ubiquitous and multifunctional, is also difficult to define comprehensively.   As a philosophical study, 
therefore, I decided that a scholarship approach rather than a quantitative or qualitative analysis was 
more appropriate. 
For my analysis of democracy I have relied on the works of various theorists and their reflections on 
applications of democracy from ancient Athens to the present day.  Held provides a very comprehensive 
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overview of democracy in all its manifestations.  Some of the theorists,  particularly those with a 
background in economics including Drucker, Galbraith, Hayek and Schumpeter, tended to focus on 
areas such as bureaucracy, technocracy, and the welfare state - areas in which ICT has proved to be 
especially relevant and which therefore provide a significant connection between ICT and democracy.   
Hayek and Schumpeter, in particular, consider the question of whether democracy is purely 
instrumental or has intrinsic value while Dahl examines the effectiveness of democracy in small 
communities within a globalised society.   Geuss is a realist and, like Schumpeter, provides a worthwhile 
contrast to some of the other theorists while Barber comes nearest to providing a practical model for 
strong and deliberative democracy.   Weber’s Economy and Society includes an invaluable guide on 
bureaucracy and on political systems.   I have relied on Luhmann’s work for insights into both 
democracy and technology and King and Thornhill have provided a useful commentary particularly for 
some of his more obscure work.   Habermas has made the public sphere very topical and has also written 
on the relationship between the the political system and the market.   But for space constraints, I would 
have delved deeper into his work.   For the same reason I have omitted Marx and although his work is 
very relevant to the development of both democracy and technology, I felt I could not do justice to it in 
the space available. 
One of the pivotal questions I had to address in the thesis was whether technology is neutral, 
deterministic or autonomous.   To say that it’s deterministic is to accept that it drives the course of 
history and this also applies in the case of autonomous technology since it presupposes technological 
determinism.    It was clear therefore that to answer the question concerning technology, it was necessary 
to trace its development against the background of historical events with a particular emphasis on The 
Industrial Revolution when modern, that is machine-powered, technology came into being.  The 
historians Thompson and Hobsbawm provided extensive coverage of this background while Heilbroner 
undertakes a direct analysis of machine culture in the context of history.   Perez developed a model of 
technological revolutions which elaborates on Schumpeter’s model of creative destruction.   Ihde is one 
of the most influential and most analytical philosophers of technology in recent decades and I have 
included his ‘phenomenology of technics’ which adds a useful insight to our relationship with 
technology as does the work of Dreyfus whom I have also quoted.   Heidegger’s The Question 
Concerning Technology is a relatively short but very obscure text which, because of its significance, I 
have analysed is some detail.     
Ellul’s The Technological Society is an important work and he is the philosopher most associated with 
the term ‘autonomous technology’.   Kelly embraces the idea of autonomous technology although he 
could be a bit more discriminatory in his theory of the ‘technium’.   Feenberg makes a valuable 
contribution on technological determinism although he is somewhat ambiguous about it but he proposes 
what he calls ‘subversive rationalisation’ as a practical means of undermining it.    Stephen Hill’s views 
are fairly similar to Feenberg’s but his dialectical approach to the culture and technology relationship 
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is more nuanced.  Carr, Oz, and Dedrick provided analyses of the productivity gains from the application 
of ICT.  Machlup’s work on knowledge creation and distribution is a good reference book but it is very 
pedantic and not nearly as useful as Finnegan and Murphy’s work on tacit knowledge.   Floridi is 
particularly useful on the subject of identity.    
I relied on Chomsky and McLuhan in particular for my analysis of the mass media while Price provided 
interesting examples of how political power is wielded in the mass media.   Micklethwait and Woolridge 
provided useful information on the development of the welfare state but were sympathetic to 
authoritarianism.   Two of the best overviews I encountered were Brown and Duguid on the nature and 
use of information and Dusek on the philosophy of technology.   I relied on Castells for the major case 
study on mobile technology.   VanVught provided an analysis of dedifferentiation across the university 
sector in a number of countries. Taken together, I found the work of Illich, Dewey, and Dreyfus 
extremely useful in understanding the potential for, and the limitations to, the application of ICT in 
education.   Because I had almost completed the thesis when I encountered Hirsch’s Social Limits to 
Growth which introduces the concept of ‘the tyranny of small decisions’, I was unable to incorporate 
this to the extent I would wish.     
Among the theorists I had to omit due to space constraints were Borgman, Latour, Mumford, Sunstein, 
and Winner while the works of Negroponte and Schmidt & Cohen were, in my view, insubstantial. 
I used four case studies to illustrate as comprehensively as possible the range of applications for ICT 
including applications in the home, in education, in business and government and in the mass media.  I 
also availed of Castells major case study on mobile technology.    This is a metastudy comprising over 
700 individual studies on the effects of mobile communications on societies throughout the world and 
was an invaluable source of information particularly in relation to mobile technology in the 







1.4 Thesis Structure 
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Chapter 2  provides a review of the literature from the leading theorists on democracy.  From this the 
different features and interpretations of democracy are identified and discussed.  Also, some of the 
more significant elements of democracy such as political power, participation, leadership, and 
bureaucracy are discussed. 
Chapter 3 follows a similar pattern with a focus on technology generally and, based on a literature 
review sets out the criteria for distinguishing between neutral, deterministic, and autonomous 
technology and it also provides an overview of the history and the stages of development of 
technology. 
Chapter 4 focuses specifically on Information & Communications Technology (ICT) and provides a 
number of case studies and an overview of the impact of ICT in terms of functional 
dedifferentiation and disintermediation as well as a discussion on virtual reality. 
Chapter 5 provides an analysis of ICT and a separate analysis of democracy based on the material from 
the literature reviews and these are followed by a discussion on the mutual dependency between 


















Democracy is an autological term in that one can choose from among many different and valid 
definitions.   Also, groups and communities can decide how they wish to implement democracy in their 
own particular situation.   Some put the primary emphasis on democracy’s intrinsic values such as 
freedom and justice while others stress its instrumental value in providing a mechanism for arriving at 
consensus.  Democracy is, therefore, a compromise between idealism and pragmatism just as it is a 
compromise between anarchy and autocracy and sometimes recourse to certain narratives and myths is 
required to support these compromises.   The situations in which democracy is applied are varied and 
are inherently complex since they involve interactions between people for the purpose of resolving 
conflicting requirements or ideas.  
 
Bureaucracy is an essential support for democracy when applied in the state or other large organisations.    
However, unless judiciously implemented, it can overburden and therefore undermine the democracy.   
The strongest manifestation of this can be found in the welfare state and the growth of the welfare state 
has become the most contentious point for many political theorists and political activists.   Few functions 
are as well suited as bureaucracy is to the adoption of ICT.   There is a mutual relationship between ICT 
and bureaucracy through which each boosts the development of the other.      
 
In the current chapter, I outline the main features of democracy and the concepts associated with it as 
identified by some of the leading theorists in their different approaches to the subject.   I include an 
overview of Luhmann’s theory of social systems which provides a somewhat unique perspective from 
which to analyse systems such as politics, bureaucracy, management and decision-making.  Central to 
his theory is the functional differentiation of social systems which, for him, implies that the political 
and economic systems should not encroach on one another.   It is interesting, therefore, that some of the 
leading political theorists - e.g. Weber, Schumpeter, Galbraith, and Hayek  -  were also economists.   
Luhmann presents a disembodied model of society which comprises communications rather than people 
which is in stark contrast to Geuss for whom political theory has to take account of the talents and 
foibles of all active and passive citizens. 
 
   
 
   
2.1 What is Democracy? 
Democracy is widely regarded as the ideal form of government and is the one that nearly all  
administrations believe they must, at least pretend to, embrace.    This is also a manifestation of  how 
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broad the concept is and how difficult it is to define it comprehensively.  Belief in democracy and 
“support for the central institutions of society” were greatly strengthened through the political 
consensus that developed in the aftermath of World War II.   The consensus was reinforced by the recent 
memories of fascism and the ongoing tensions of the Cold War and it was marked by a political will to 
address the inequalities in society (Held, 2006, pp.285-286).   The optimism and political openness that 
followed encouraged new thinking on social and political matters and saw the emergence of various 
movements in support of civil rights, feminism, the environment, peace, etc.  These and some other 
groupings comprised the New Left and Held argues that the “New Right emerged partly in bitter 
opposition to the prominence” being given to these groups (p.187).   In the early 1970s the consensus 
began to break down giving rise to a renaissance in “the political theory of democracy, albeit a 
renaissance marked by a fierce polarization of views (p.187).”  The years since have not been very 
positive ones for the development of democracy with questions about legitimation and overload 
(pp.190-201) coming to the fore.   Nevertheless, most states still wish to be identified under the 
democracy banner.  
 
The principles underlying Athenian democracy were set out by Pericles in his ‘Funeral Oration’ in the 
fifth century BC.   Among the most significant of these principles were: (pp. 13-14)  
• Power is in the hands of the whole people. 
• Everyone is equal before the law (Isonomia).    
• Poverty is not a bar to political participation.    
• In public affairs everyone has to obey the laws particularly those for the protection of the oppressed 
and avoid doing anything that would invite shame. 
• In their private affairs, everyone is free and tolerant. 
• All citizens are expected to participate in the affairs of state, in the debates and decision-making on 
policy.     
Weber’s approach to democracy centres on rationality.   He begins by identifying three categories of 
legitimate domination.   They are based on (i) charismatic grounds which rest “on devotion to the 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person,” or (ii) on traditional 
grounds based on “an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions,” or (iii)  on rational 
grounds “resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority 
under such rules to issue commands.” (Weber,1978, p.215) These, he emphasises, are conceptual 
formulations for the purpose of analysis which are unlikely to be found in their ‘pure’ form in historical 
cases.  The charisma model, in which recognition of a “charismatically qualified, and hence legitimate, 
person is treated as a duty,”(p. 266) can gradually evolve towards a democratic model through a process 
of rationalisation where “instead of recognition being treated as a consequence of legitimacy, it is 
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treated as the basis of legitimacy; democratic legitimacy.” (pp. 266-267)   This legitimacy is acquired 
through a plebiscite which Weber says - as though anticipating Schumpeter’s reservations about ‘the 
will of the people’ - that “irrespective of how its real value as an expression of the popular will may be 
regarded, the plebiscite has been the specific means of deriving the legitimacy of authority from the 
confidence of the ruled” (p.267).  This authority can be enforced ultimately through “legal coercion by 
violence [which] is the monopoly of the state.” (p. 314) 
 
In concluding, somewhat paradoxically, his assessment of the future of democracy, Luhmann says  that 
“one should not begin with the critique of its states and circumstances but should marvel that it functions 
at all and then ask how long it will continue” because democracy he says “is evolutionarily improbable, 
full of presuppositions but politically realizable.” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 238)   
 
Overall, Luhmann is not very positive about democracy.  Most of his efforts to define it are statements 
about what it is not, rather than what it is, and he is not very optimistic about the future of democracy 
as it is commonly understood.  He says that “[a]round 1800 the concept of democracy began to be 
valued precisely because of its internal impossibility: as the illusionary component of all future 
constitutions, as the concept of the future.”(p. 231)   For him democracy is not rule of the people by the 
people  -  i.e. “domination of the people over the people” or the “annulling of power by power” (p.232) 
although this is to ignore what has been accepted as a fundamental element of democracy ever since 
Aristotle  -  “Ruling and being ruled in turn.” (Aristotle, 1992, p. 362)   Neither, according to Luhmann, 
is democracy a “principle that states that all decisions have to be made in such a way that they are 
capable of being participated in.” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 232)   In other words, he does not see participatory 
democracy as a practical proposition and he sees inclusion, which manifests itself in its most extreme 
form in the welfare state, as detrimental to democracy.  He considers the outlook for democracy to be 
“pretty bad” if it is concerned about “reason and freedom….hunger and need, about political, racist, 
sexist and religious suppression, about peace and about worldly happiness of any kind.” (p. 231)    
 
The political system can be characterised as a means of producing collective binding decisions -  binding 
on both the decision makers themselves and those to whom the decisions are addressed (Luhmann, 
1990,  pp. 73-74)  
 
The functional differentiation of society means that the political system is operating as just one of many 
functional systems in a very complex and chaotic environment which is constantly changing with 
developments in the economy, science, education etc.   Luhmann concludes from this that politics “can 
continue to operate only as a closed [….] autopoietic system that has to code and program itself for 
contingency.   The structural innovation emerging from this as a result of mere historical chance has 
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received the name of democracy.” (p.234)   A democratic mode of government “is a ‘specific structural 
arrangement’ of the political system” (Czerwick, 2008, p.134 cited in Moeller, 2012, p.88)  - a view 
which is shared by most empirical theorists of democracy.    This is an instrumental definition which 
tells us nothing about the value system which democracy tries to reflect or the outcomes it tries to 
achieve.    
 
Schumpeter takes a somewhat similar line to Luhmann when he defines democracy as “a political 
method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political - legislative 
and administrative - decisions.” (Schumpeter, 1987, p. 242)  But Schumpeter emphasises that 
democracy, since it is only a method, cannot be an ideal or an end in itself.    In contrast to Luhmann’s 
view, he says there are “ideals and interests such as freedom of conscience and speech, justice, freedom 
of government and so on” which are above democracy and which democrats themselves are convinced 
a democracy will guarantee.   The will of the people cannot prevail unconditionally particularly if it 
endangers ideals such as these.   In implementing democracy or democratic procedures, time, place and 
situation must be taken into account.   Where the will of the people as represented by the majority is 
insistent upon restricting the rights of the minority, it “seems more natural in such cases to speak of the 
rabble instead of the people.” (p. 242)   
 
Taking account of the difficulties in achieving the ‘common good’ or the ‘will of the people’ or even 
establishing what they mean in practice, Schumpeter develops a new theory of democracy and while it 
coincides substantially with Weber’s views (Weber, 1978, pp. 1128-1130), he brings it together very 
succinctly.   The basis of his theory is “to drop government by the people and to substitute for it 
government approved by the people” (p. 246) so that the people, rather than deciding directly on issues 
of concern, elect those who are to make the decisions.   He refines his original definition of democracy 
thus: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” (p. 
269) 
 
As a liberal, Hayek believes in the free market with minimum interference from government and his 
constrained description of democracy reflects this although it belies the vehemence with which he 
defends democracy elsewhere. He is very critical of Schumpeter’s perspective on democracy, 
particularly his view that “it presupposes a belief in things higher than democracy.” (Hayek, 2013, p. 
348)   He says democracy “refers to a method or procedure for determining governmental decisions and 
neither refers to some substantial good aim of government […] nor is it a method that can be 
meaningfully applied to non-governmental organizations.”  He considers democracy  “an ideal worth 
fighting for to the utmost”, and “our only protection against tyranny” and says it is “the only method of 




Democracy, for Hayek, is based on the principle that the will of the majority is “authoritative and 
binding upon the rest only if the former prove their intention of acting justly by committing themselves 
to a general rule.”  In other words, the response of the majority to any situation is determined by just 
rules based on abstract principles which can be applied generally and not just to the particular situation 
in question.   In this way, the majority gets its legitimate power not through bare might but through “the 




2.2  Features of a Successful Democracy 
Luhmann’s description of democracy is purely instrumental and value-free and is in marked contrast to 
Amartya Sen’s description where democracy is shown to have intrinsic, instrumental and constructive 
values.  Democracy allows people to participate in the political life of the community and such 
participation “has intrinsic value for human life and well-being.”  Democracy also “has an important 
instrumental value in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims 
to political attention (including claims of economic needs).”  In addition “the practice of democracy 
gives citizens an opportunity to learn from one another, and helps society to form its values and 
priorities.” (Sen, 1999, p.10) 
 
There is, according to Geuss, a difference of opinion among political philosophers regarding the 
significance of the distinction between the “instrumentally useful” and the “inherently valuable” nature 
of democracy (Geuss, 2001, pp.125-126).  For some, this distinction “is sharp, and designates a basic 
and ineluctable feature of human thought and experience” while for others it “is relative and contextual, 
and […] is a sure sign of a deficiency in a society if […it] is taken too seriously.”(p.126)   For Dewey, 
who regards it as irrelevant, the distinction originated in the era when “slaves did the instrumentally 
necessary work, and parasitic aristocrats pursued the good for its own sake.”(p.126) 
 
While Hayek would be very critical of attaching intrinsic values to democracy as Sen has done, he is 
quite clear on the values his ‘Great Society’ should cultivate.   Two of the cornerstones of the Great 
Society are a democratic political system  and an open market economic system and it follows that these 
must facilitate, or at least not obstruct, the cultivation of the values of the Great Society.  His overriding 
concern as a liberal is to protect the freedom of the individual and minimise interference particularly 
from government.  This freedom is made available in the open society through a set of negative values 
which allow the individual to define their own space in which they can pursue their aims by applying 
their own knowledge.   The “indispensable foundations of civilisation” are the “three great negatives of 
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Peace, Freedom and Justice” and these must be provided by the government.   It is the role of the 
government with its monopoly of coercion to enforce a framework of ‘rules of just conduct’ which, 
rather than directing the individual to pursue particular positive ends, protects them “against 
unpredictable disturbance caused by other men.” (Hayek, 2013, p.465)   
 
Hayek’s view of democracy is very much in line with that of Aristotle who placed great emphasis on 
the fact that democracy was based on the principle of liberty which, he said, has two defining principles.   
The first of these is “’[r]uling and being ruled in turn’” and the second is “to live as you like….since its 
opposite, living not as you like, is the function of one enslaved.”  From this is derived the “ideal of ‘not 
being ruled’, not by anyone at all if possible, or at least only in alternation.”(Aristotle, 1992, pp. 362-
363)   
 
Based on the above principles Aristotle identified a number of features of democracy which, though 
they reflect the concerns of the city state, are still relevant to today’s large nation states.    The features 
are: “[e]lections to office by all from among all”;  “[r]ule of all over each and of each by turns over all”;  
rotation of offices with terms of office as short as possible and no official to have perpetual tenure;  the 
Assembly to be the key sovereign body with officials having sovereign power over as few matters as 
possible.  He also identifies the requirement that  payment for services be controlled and that members 
of the Council (i.e. the executive committee of the Assembly) “do not receive lavish pay”  to prevent 
the Council getting too powerful (pp.363-364).   
.     
According to Dahl the “ideal criteria [for democracy] are so demanding that no actual regime has ever 
fully met them” and in surveying past and existing examples of democracy, he lists seven attributes 
which, taken as a whole, “distinguish the political regimes of modern democratic countries from all 
other regimes” and can serve as criteria in assessing the level of democracy in nation states or countries 
today. These attributes are: elected officials having control over government decisions; frequent and 
fair elections; practically all adults have the right to vote; practically all adults have the right to run for 
elective office; freedom of expression for all citizens on political matters; the right for all citizens to 
alternative sources of information and these are protected by law; the right of all citizens to form 
relatively independent associations, political parties and interest groups (Dahl,1982,pp.7-11).  
 
In reviewing the different perspectives on democracy, it is worth noting Davies comment that “there is 
little consensus about the essence of democracy.  In theory, it promotes all the virtues from freedom, 
justice, and equality to the rule of law, the respect for human rights, and the promotion of political 
pluralism and of civil society.  In practice, ‘rule by the people’ is impossible.”   He concludes that what 
“does exist, as always, is almost universal abhorrence of tyranny.  And this is what propels all newly 




Schumpeter lists four conditions for democracy to be successful.   By successful he means “no more 
than that the democratic process reproduce itself steadily without creating situations that enforce resort 
to non-democratic methods” (Schumpeter, 1987, p.290 n.)  which, of course, has echoes of Luhmann. 
The conditions are as follows: 
 
- There should be a sufficient number of competent people of high moral character prepared to enter 
the political profession.  He argues for a political social stratum, “neither too exclusive nor too 
easily accessible for the outsider” that takes to politics as a matter of course (p.291). 
 
- “The effective range of political decision should not be extended too far.”   It would be impractical 
for politicians or for parliament to get involved in every issue that comes before them.   For many 
of the issues politicians must rely on the advice of specialists while formal approval will ultimately 
rest with themselves.    He also recommends, as do Luhmann and Drucker, the establishment of 
what are essentially quangos which “extend the sphere of public authority without extending the 
sphere of political decision.”(p.293)  There would be no political involvement other than at a 
supervisory/regulatory level. 
 
- A democratic government must be able to command “the services of a well-trained bureaucracy.” 
(p.293)    
 
- What Schumpeter terms ‘democratic self-control’ is essential.  By this he means in effect that 
everyone should be reasonable and should refrain from instantly taking advantage of every political 
situation without consideration for the wishes of others.   
 
Geuss highlights those features of democracy which best support the values we hold such as “human 
survival, peace, efficiency [and] continuity.”  The main advantage is that democracy provides a 
mechanism which facilitates the smooth transfer of power from one political group to another since, 
among other things, those yielding power know that they are likely to have the opportunity to return to 
government at some future date under similar circumstances.   Another significant advantage is that 
“many forms of democracy” allow for “widespread social discussion” before making decisions and this 
would increase the likelihood “that as much relevant information as possible [is] brought to bear on the 
decision”  Geuss adds that Mill, among others, “thought that such extensive public discussion” would 
make people more tolerant (Geuss, 2001, p.120).  
 
Geuss mentions some of the criticisms of democracy.  These include “the difficulty in pursuing long-
term consistency in policy-making”; (p.120) the lack of participation arising from representative 
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democracy; and the devaluation of human knowledge since democracy puts “the opinion of the fool 
and the expert on an equal level” and thereby making it difficult to bring “relevant expertise optimally 
to bear on outstanding issues.” (p.121) Geuss also quotes de Tocqueville’s reservations about tolerance 
and compromise being enabled through free public discussion.  Rather, de Tocqueville believes that 
“public discussion can have the effect of polarising and radicalising opinion, rendering positions more 
inflexible” (p.121).  Geuss says that, based on experience, the more one understands the reasoning 
behind views of others, “the more one sees that they are a tissue of culpably self-serving illusions, self-
deceptions, and deeply rooted prejudices – just as one’s own are, if seen with sufficient dispassion.” 
(p.121)  He adds that by delving deeper, one often finds that they are “immovably trapped by history 
and circumstance” and this may lead to greater empathy (p.121).   Lastly, Geuss notes the conflict 
between bureaucracy which operates on the basis of fixed, known rules and is organised hierarchically 
and according to clearly defined areas of responsibility, and democracy which is “anti-hierarchical and 
egalitarian.” (p.122) 
 
2.3  Democracy and the Economy 
Based on Luhmann’s theory, the political and economic systems are separate, enclosed and functionally 
differentiated systems which communicate with one another only through perturbations.  This hardly 
stands up in practice, however, where so much political activity is concerned with and influenced by 
the economy and many would argue that this is reciprocated.   The fact that many of the most influential 
theorists on democracy since the Second World War, including many that I have cited here, are 
economists would bear this out.   Politics and economics are not closed off from one another but are 
intertwined.   To continue Luhmann’s analogy with biological systems, it could be said that the economy 
is a parasite on the political system or that the systems infect one another.  
 
It is not just the content of the economic system, i.e. the flows of money, that impacts on the political 
system, but many would advocate that the business practices of the ‘open market’ economy should be 
adopted in politics and hence also in our democratic processes.  Schumpeter was one of the greatest 
exponents of this.  Being very much a pragmatist, he saw the business of democratic politics in 
somewhat the same terms as the business of commerce and this is summed up in his quote from a 
politician “What businessmen do not understand is that exactly as they are dealing in oil so I am dealing 
in votes.”(Schumpeter, 1987, p.285)1     Politics is to be seen as a competition for votes (markets), for 
political programmes (products) which are in fact very similar, although every means of persuasion is 
                                                            





used by the professional career politicians to show how unique their particular party’s (producer’s) 
programme (product) is.    
 
Sen examines the relationship between democracy and economic development.  While admitting that 
sufficient data are not available to establish a strong correlation between democracy and economic 
growth, he disagrees with the often claimed ‘Lee Hypothesis’ that authoritarian regimes are better than 
democracies at promoting economic development.   More significantly, he says that “in the terrible 
history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and 
democratic country with a relatively free press.  We cannot find exceptions to this rule, no matter where 
we look.”   He argues for “the protective power of democracy” with the appropriate balance of political 
incentives with economic incentives.”(Sen, 1999, pp.6-9)   
 
Lee Kuan Yew, the eponym for the hypothesis, was prime minister of Singapore from 1959 to 1990 
when his son, Lee Hsien Loong, succeeded him.  It is claimed that he transformed Singapore from “an 
impoverished swamp […] to a whirring hub of the global economy” with state spending consuming 
only 17% of its GDP in 2012 and his achievement is held up as an exemplar for government in the 21st 
Century (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2014, p.135).   He prioritised discipline over democracy.   Some 
of his opponents were locked up and elections were rigged with his party winning all the seats in every 
election from 1968 to 1984 while in 2011 it won 93% of the seats with 60% of the vote.  He has, 
according to Micklethwait & Wooldridge, achieved “the perfect compromise between accountability 
and efficiency” with its politicians being tested regularly in elections “but since the government knows 
it is going to win, it can take a long view [and is] able to think strategically and look ahead.”(pp. 137-
138). 
 
While Luhmann is opposed to any interference between the political and economic systems, he  
concludes reluctantly that “it does, however, seem that positive economic development is the single 
decisive factor in keeping a government in power, while, on the other hand, recessions are politically 
dangerous.”(Luhmann, 1990, p.13)  This is the flip side of Sen’s argument and the two conclusions 
together imply that the health of the economy is dependent on the political situation and vice versa. 
 
The free or open market is a key component of Hayek’s ‘Great Society’ since it acts as a 
communications system (in the Luhmannian sense) which facilitates the maintenance of order in 
society.  He says, for example, that while people tend to regard earnings in the market as rewards, their 
real purpose, in fact, is “to indicate to people what they ought to do if the order is to be maintained on 
which they all rely.”(Hayek, 2013, p.243)  The information provided by the market is impersonal and 
abstract and this matches the requirement to treat “every other person as a human being rather than as 
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either a friend or an enemy”(p.252) as we move from the small group, community or ‘tribe’ to the Great 
Society where personal relations with many or all the members can no longer be maintained. 
 
Hayek contrasts the spontaneous order of the market “where the individual is free because bound only 
by general rules of just conduct” with the type of order that prevails in the ‘organisation’ where the 
individuals are directed towards a particular purpose or end and “all are subject to specific directions 
by authority.”(p.247)  Likewise Habermas, describing the development of commerce in the sixteenth 
century, contrasts the “far-reaching network of horizontal economic dependencies” in the market that 
replaced “the vertical relationships of dependence” in the estate system (Habermas, 1989a, p.15). Hayek 
asserts that there is a lack of understanding of the operation of the free market and this is due to the 
emphasis on organisational thinking arising from the fact that so many individuals now work in large 
organisations and therefore “find their horizon of comprehension limited to what is required by the 
internal structure of such organisations.”(Hayek, 2013, p.293)  Government is an organisation, society 
is not. 
 
Merit and fortune/misfortune are often associated with justice but this is to misunderstand the working 
of the open market.   A person may think it unjust that they get very low pay for doing work which, 
though valuable, they find extremely unpleasant while someone else is very well paid for work they 
enjoy.   But in a free society “remuneration is based on the values the services have to the user and not 
on an assessment of merit earned” and the individual “is free to choose whatever occupation he can find 
and is not assigned to one by authority.” (p.254)   Similarly, Hayek says, when undeserved material 
misfortune such as unemployment hits some individual or group, this is merely a signal from the 
“steering mechanism of the market: it is the manner in which the cybernetic principle of negative 
feedback operates to maintain the order of the market” indicating that some activities should be reduced 
(p.255). 
 
In considering the development of the “bourgeois constitutional state”, Habermas hints at what might 
be one of the reasons for the significant role of the market in the political sphere.   He outlines the 
similarities between the laws of the state and the laws of the market.   These included the fact that  
“neither allowed exceptions for citizens, both were objective […] they were not directed at individuals 
(the free market prevented collusion).”   But, most significantly, “the laws of the market […] prevailed 
because they were intrinsic; […] The laws of the state, in contrast, needed to be explicitly enacted.” 
(Habermas, 1989a, p.80) 
 
 
2.4 Political Power in a Democracy 
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The structural arrangement which Luhmann associates with democracy is one “in which all social 
systems countervail the direct vertical application of power by the political system." (King & Thornhill, 
2005, p.110)  The political system is just one of many functionally differentiated social systems which 
together constitute society. (Luhmann, 1982, pp.131-138)  Other systems include the legal, economic, 
education and scientific systems and political power is dispersed through these rather than being focused 
directly on particular individuals and groups.   This is, of course, reciprocated in relation to any power 
these systems may exercise so that “[p]olitical power simultaneously regulates and is regulated by, 
limits and is limited by, legal power, economic power, media power, and so on.” (Moeller, 2012, p.90)  
The phenomenon of power in this context is best summarised by Geuss in his reference to the 
“Foucaldian programme of construing modern society as the locus of a dense network of ‘omnipresent, 
but not omnipotent power.’” (Geuss, 2001, p.27)   
 
Geuss, in the quote above, is responding to Weber’s view of power “as a property of the intentional 
action of a human individual” whereas, in contrast, he refers to Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s 
‘panopticon’ which made prisoners feel under constant surveillance “even if they were not” but this 
coercive power was more an attribute of the prison space itself than an “intentional action of any human 
individual or group of individuals.” (pp.25-26)  In his opinion, Weber makes a sharp distinction between 
power and influence while he (Geuss) favours “a significantly more flexible and realistic way of 
approaching the phenomenon of power” (p.27) - a “way that would include the effective employment 
of influence as an instance of the exercise of power.” (p.24)  He illustrates this by distinguishing 
between actual power, perceived power, reinforcing of perceived power, coercive power, persuasive 
power and charismatic power. (pp.26-27)    
 
Power is kept in check by that condition of democracy “in which the political system develops a variety 
of resources and points of reference for its communications, and in which political power is not located 
exclusively in one centre of execution.” (King & Thornhill, 2005, p.111)  This separation of powers 
addresses de Montesquieu’s requirement that “power should be a check to power.” (de Montesquieu, 
p.150)   "Democracy emerges, firstly, with the constitutional formalization of the separation of the 
executive, legislature and judiciary in the modern legal state, and then, secondly, with the 'separation 
of politics and administration' into two distinct subsystems of the political system." (King & Thornhill, 
2005, p.111)  
 
The executive is separated from the legislature lest, in Montesquieu’s words, “the same monarch or 
senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner” The judiciary is separated 
from the legislature to prevent “the life and liberty of the subject [being] exposed to arbitrary control; 
for the judge would be then the legislator” while the judiciary must be separated from the executive 




While the law, in a democracy, provides a check on the political system, it also provides “a positive 
medium for transmitting legal decisions through society” so "democracy is not really a 'form of rule': it 
is a 'technique of systemic steering'." (King & Thornhill, 2005, p.110)  Political decisions with regard 
to policy are made by government and these are submitted to the legislature and to the ‘administration’ 
generally to be refined, debated and passed into law.   This process, in which political decisions are 
second-coded in the form of law, makes the decisions more acceptable to the public while reinforcing 
the legitimacy of the political system itself. 
 
Whether power is seen by politicians as a means to an end or as an end in itself, for Schumpeter it is the 
key driver in politics.   Although political parties are generally seen to be centred on particular sets of 
principles and policies which differentiate them, Schumpeter defines a party as “a group whose 
members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power.” (Schumpeter,1987, 
p.283)  Politics is, ultimately, about the “competitive struggle for power and office” and the essentials 
such as government, legislation, administration etc. are incidental to this in the same way as the 
production of the essentials for life such as food, clothing etc. are incidental to the making of profits. 
(p.282) 
 
The formation of political parties facilitates the differentiation of government and opposition which, for 
Luhmann, provides the key to democracy and this became possible only when society was “arranged 
non-hierarchically into function systems.”(Luhmann, 1990, p.233)  Prior to that, when society was a 
stratified hierarchy, it was not possible to have the bifurcation - represented in democracy by 
government/opposition  -  at the top.   If such a bifurcation did appear, it manifested itself in “schisms 
and civil wars, i.e. disorder and calamity.” 
 
The government/opposition relationship and coding solves a paradox for Luhmann.   In a system where 
“there is superior and inferior power, then one also finds in it a true powerlessness of those who hold 
power and, conversely, a power of those who do not.[…] The opposition does not have the power of 
the government.   Therefore it can assert the power of those who are out of power.” (p.232) Similarly, 
in his only reference to democracy in his Theory of Society he says “[a]ll power comes about by 
submitting to power, and supreme power comes through submission to the lowest power.  We call this 




Ultimately, politics is, in Bismarck’s reported words, “the art of the possible.”2 (Crankshaw, 1982, p.75)  
When the ideals prove unattainable or the theory becomes impractical, the essence of politics  -  i.e. 
finding a workable solution  -  gets underway.   To quote Geuss, “politics is about action, and is a matter 
of tacit skills, practical insight, and the mobilisation of the imagination in pursuit of collective ends.” 
(Geuss, 2001, p.156) This usually involves compromise and consensus.   However, the 
government/opposition arrangement does not easily accommodate consensus so consensus is not 
forced.  But over time the outcome could be close to that which would be achieved through consensus 
because of “the possibility that governing and opposition parties will switch places at the next election” 
(Luhmann, 1990, p.233) and this possibility sustains the arrangement. 
 
Again, Schumpeter’s insistence on ‘democratic self-control’ is relevant here.   Politicians should allow 
the government the space to govern without trying to embarrass it at every opportunity and voters “must 
understand that, once they have elected an individual, political action is his business and not theirs.” 
(Schumpeter, 1987, p.294) 
 
There is a third element, public opinion, which favours the opposition and favours the government at 
different times and the resultant instability strengthens the arrangement through “the sensibility of the 
system that is created by it.” (Luhmann, 1990, p.234)  This is one of the factors that provides a 
continuous stimulus “for pursuing themes and innovations” but eventually even these begin to form 
patterns which generate structures which tend to restrict them.  Luhmann talks of ‘self-
despontaneification’ and gives the example of Green Parties which “find themselves exposed not only 
to an imposed order, not only to pressures to adapt but also to this process of self-despontaneification.  




2.5 Citizen Participation 
The emphasis on active participation in politics by citizens is such that many, particularly in the mass 
media, would regard it as a measure of the successful implementation of democracy with the example 
of Athens (which I deal with below) being held up in support.   But political theorists reject the idea of 
maximising participation in politics and would even consider it to be dangerous. (Pateman,1970,p.1) If 
we go back just a few decades, participation was identified with totalitarianism rather than with 
democracy.  There were high rates of participation in the Weimar Republic which collapsed “into 
fascism” as there were in many of the other fascist or totalitarian regimes that followed during the War 
                                                            
2 The original according to Crankshaw is “Because they have yet scarcely outgrown the political nursery, the 
Germans cannot accustom themselves to see politics as a study of the possible.” 
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and after, “albeit participation backed by intimidation and coercion.” (p.2)  Such fears have eased with 
the rise in the popularity of democracy.  Nevertheless, “extensive participation can readily lead to 
increased social conflict, undue disruption and fanaticism” (Held, 2006, p.162) and there is always the 
danger of what Mill referred to as  “the tyranny of the majority.” (Mill, 1998, p.8)  On the other hand 
“[l]ack of political involvement can […] be interpreted quite positively: it can be based upon trust on 
those who govern.”(Held, 2006, p.162)   Or, “political apathy may reflect the health of a 
democracy.”(p.162) 
 
Pateman reflects the view of a number of theorists when she says that for democracy to be effective “it 
is the participation of the minority élite that is crucial and the non-participation of the apathetic, ordinary 
man […] that is regarded as the main bulwark against instability.”(Pateman, 1970, p.104)  Claiming 
that “non-democratic attitudes are relatively more common” among the apathetic, she says that any 
increase in their participation “would weaken the consensus on the norms of the democratic method.” 
(p.14)   Quoting Berelson, she says that the democratic system requires both stability and flexibility and 
that “political traditions in families and ethnic groups and the long-lasting nature of political loyalties 
contribute to stability” while the “least interested voters” who may also be the most flexible and “the 
least partisan […] perform a valuable function for the entire system.” (p.7)  Pateman sums it up saying 
that “the apathy and disinterest of the majority play a valuable role in maintaining the stability of the 
system as a whole.”(Pateman, 1970, p.7) 
 
“Whenever one has to produce results within a specified period of time, discernible ineffectiveness, 
overburdening and stupidity unquestionably obstruct the full realization of the principle of 
participation.”(Luhmann, 1990, p.224)   Taking this quote from Luhmann, it would seem that he is fully 
in favour of the idea of participation in political life but would regard it as very impractical.   He is very 
critical of the idea that the political system can be legitimated through participation – an idea which 
arose from the expectation “that more participation would lead to more agreement.”  He says this is a 
carry-over from the past when one’s identity was only as part of the group  -  the family, the household, 
society.    Today society comprises various functional systems and the individual is a member of, or has 
access to, several of these systems.   Now it is the individual rather than the group that “is a subject or 
even the subject as such that underlies everything.”(pp. 220-221)  
 
Luhmann describes the unmanageable bureaucratic process that can develop around participation in 
organisations, and it has to be assumed that participation can take place only in an organisation, however 
informal.  Participation results in an increase in decisions.  Decisions have to be taken about decisions  
-  one must decide whether one will decide and how one will decide, or not decide.   Procedures have 
to be agreed and implemented to manage the group decisions.  If committees are to be set up, they must 
be prepared, “both regarding the subject matter as well as tactically.”   Luhmann says “the reflexivity 
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of deciding is shifted to a third level.  One has to decide about how a representative ought to decide 
about decisions.”(p.223)   “The result can be condemned as bureaucracy and praised as 
participation.”(p.224) 
 
Luhmann mentions the “new corporatism” where institutionalised fora are used to gain consensus from 
those affected before political decisions for radical shifts in direction are taken.   While “the organized 
representation of interests” in this way is a form of participation, it “has nothing to do with the original 
intention of the concern for more participation, with an improvement of the chances of individual self-
realization.”(p.229)   
 
Over the last few decades, the focus has shifted from efforts at merely widening participation to efforts 
at achieving greater depth and more active participation through the process of ‘deliberative 
democracy’. Widening citizen participation, especially if it is based just on turnout at elections, amounts 
to nothing more than the aggregation of individual choices.   The “aggregation of private preferences 
[…] embraces a concept of rationality more appropriate to consumer choice, i.e. market relations, than 
to politics.”(Held, 2006, p.235)  In consumerism, the individual takes only their own preferences into 
consideration whereas in politics they are expected to consider also the preferences of others although 
this would not apply in the Hayek’s liberal model or Schumpeter’s instrumental model. 
 
The development of deliberative democracy has been influenced by Habermas’ analysis of the public 
sphere as represented by the discourses on matters of public interest that took place in the salons and 
coffee houses of France and Britain towards the latter end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the 
eighteenth century (Habermas, 1989a, p.32) and involved the aristocracy and the intellectuals meeting 
to critically discuss art and literature in addition to political and economic issues (p.33).   He describes 
the modern public sphere as that which “comes into being in every conversation in which private 
individuals assemble to form a public body.[…]  Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in 
an unrestricted fashion  -  that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the 
freedom to express and publish their opinions  -  about matters of general interest.”(Habermas, 1974, 
p.509)   He expresses some scepticism, however, about publicising the deliberations in the age of PR 
since much of the publicity is merely for the purpose of winning “public prestige for people or affairs, 
thus making them worthy of acclamation in a climate of non-public opinion.”(p.514)   
 
Deliberative democracy is intended to provide citizens with the opportunity to meet and express their 
views and preferences on matters of public interest and concern in an environment which is free “from 
the distorting influences of unequal power, wealth, education and other resources.”(Held, 2006, p.238)  
The process of deliberation enables the “transformation of private preferences […] into positions that 
can withstand public scrutiny and test.”(p.237)   The process should be such that it exposes any biases 
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and special or vested interests and reveals any “preferences shaped by reducing one’s expectations to 
accommodate oneself to circumstances which seem fixed or unchangeable.”(p.237)  Key to the success 
of the deliberative process is that the participants have a say in developing the process for their own 
deliberations.   They can also call on experts to advise them on specialist topics. It is a learning process 
whereby they share information and exchange views but, most importantly, they develop their ability 
to engage in a heuristic process of rigorous rational argument as they present, support or criticise 
proposals while at all times maintaining an atmosphere of mutual respect among all participants.    The 
outcome of any deliberations can be distributed through “the communicative structures of the public 
sphere [which] constitute a far-flung network of sensors that react to the pressure of society-wide 
problems and stimulate influential opinions.”(Habermas, 1996, p.300)   
 
The Convention on the Constitution which was established by the Irish parliament, the Oireachtas, in 
2012 is a good example of deliberative democracy in action.  This was a forum of 100 people, 
representative of Irish society and parliamentarians from the island of Ireland, with an independent 
Chairman which met throughout 2013 – 2014 “to consider and make recommendations on certain topics 
as possible future amendments to the Constitution.”3 The Convention was supported by a team of 
academics and legal experts. 
 
Barber makes a significant and practical contribution to the deliberative model in his proposals for 
‘strong democracy’ which he contrasts with the ‘thin democracy’ of the liberal democrats who have 
“little sympathy for the civic ideal that treats human beings as inherently political.”(Barber, 1984, p.8)   
In a strong democracy, politics is the means by which people “with competing but overlapping interests 
can contrive to live together communally.”(p.118)   Barber’s model requires active participation by the 
citizens within the community but he emphasises that while politics in a strong democracy is “a way of 
life”, the idea is “explicitly hostile to the […] claim that politics is the way of life” as envisaged by 
Arendt.(p.118) 
 
The key feature of strong democracy is that it “acknowledges (and indeed uses) the centrality of conflict 
in the political process.”    It does not attempt to ignore, minimise or accommodate conflict but 
transforms it “into cooperation through citizen participation, public deliberation, and civic 
education.”(p.135)  This process involves making free choices “under the worst possible circumstances, 
when the grounds of choice are not given a priori” since to be truly free is to be “without guiding 
standards or determining norms.”(p.121)    It is not, however, a matter of bargaining and choosing a 
winner between the different options which individuals have brought to the table.   It is essentially a 
                                                            




dialectical process of never-ending “deliberation, decision, and action”(p.151) in the course of which 
participants “modify and enlarge options as a consequence of seeing them in new public ways”(p.136) 
and which should result in identifying a common purpose or common good.   The objective is to agree 
on a reasonable choice which provides a practical solution.  The reasonable choice may not be rational 
“but it will be seen as deliberate, non-random, uncoercive, and in a practical sense fair.”(p.127)   
 
Barber’s assertion about conflict being central to the political process echoes Machiavelli’s claim that 
it was the tension or “discord between the Plebs and the Senate” in Rome that made possible the three 
hundred years of peace with “such striking examples of virtue” in education, laws and liberty 
(Machiavelli, 1970, pp.113-114).  The tension ensured that they kept the peace by keeping a very close 
watch on one another. 
 
Barber’s proposal for developing strong democracy is to start with local neighbourhood assemblies 
which would meet regularly and relatively frequently.   They would confine themselves initially to 
discussion and deliberation on local, regional, and national issues.  This would provide a civic education 
process which would “eventually engender civic competence”(Barber, 1984, p.270) and facilitate the 
assembly in taking on more responsibilities over time.  These could include a watching brief over the 
accountability of public officials, a role which is undertaken mainly by the media (and accountability 
of the media could also be considered), examining legislation to assess the likely local impact, 
addressing local disputes and at a later stage again, developing local statutes(pp. 270-271).   
 
Hind’s proposal for the public commissioning of journalism in order to transform the means for 
developing and interpreting public opinion provides another useful addition to the deliberative model.   
It is based on the view that we, as citizens, “do not have adequate means to form our own 
opinions”(Hind, 2010, p.156) since the formation of public opinion is in the hands of private interests 
and the state.  The mass media is being taken over increasingly by big corporations, often headed by 
plutocrats, and the commissioning editors working for these “hold a near monopoly on both the 
investigative agenda and the publicity given to information.”(p.157) Even the relatively independent 
media are still beholden in most cases to their advertisers. 
 
The public commissioning system proposed by Hind would be an addition to, rather than a replacement 
for, the existing media.   Public funding would be provided and citizens would meet and “collectively 
and equally, make decisions about the allocation of resources to journalists and researchers.”(p.158)  
They would agree on the projects or stories to be investigated and journalists would be freed from the 
influence of corporate bosses and editors in their reporting.  News media “could be mandated to publish 
the results of publicly funded research.”(p.165) This activity “would provide a venue, and a reason for 
common deliberation”(p.158) among the citizens.   Like Barber, Hind insists that the “act of 
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deliberation” is as important as the “eventual product of deliberation.”(p.163)  Both the process and 
outcome should provide for a more informed, active and participating citizenry. 
 
Dahl contrasts the ideal of participatory democracy, which he says is effective only when implemented 
on a small local scale, with the urgent global problems confronting us regarding the environment, 
military conflicts, economic disparities etc. which can be addressed only within “large-scale political 
systems.”(Dahl, 1982, p.14)   
 
Any discussion on participatory democracy must take account of the contrary view as articulated by 
Constant almost two centuries ago.4  It is even more relevant today and would resonate well with 
Luhmann.    Examining the reasons why representative government “was totally unknown to the free 
nations of antiquity”, he explains how a very high level of political participation was facilitated.  In 
general today, the individual is at liberty to partake in any private activities he wishes provided they 
don’t interfere with the liberties of others.  With regard to public affairs, he can exercise some influence 
by taking part in elections, signing petitions etc.   This is the reverse of the situation in the ancient world 
where “the individual, almost always sovereign in public affairs, was a slave in all his private relations.” 
 
Comparing the ancient republics with the modern age, Constant identifies four major differences in the 
circumstances of the citizen.   Firstly, modern states are much bigger with far higher populations.   The 
ancient states were small enough to let a citizen feel that he could make an impact in public life whereas 
today the individual “lost in the multitude, […] can almost never perceive the influence he exercises. 
Never does his will impress itself upon the whole.”    
 
Secondly, citizens today don’t enjoy the same leisure time due to the abolition of slavery.  The slaves 
(and the women) did all the work which allowed the men to spend “every day at the public square in 
discussions.”  
 
 Thirdly, commerce has replaced war.  They are both “means of achieving the same end, that of getting 
what one wants […] War is all impulse, commerce, calculation.”   Therefore commerce is ongoing 
whereas there are intervals between wars.   If it weren’t for the opportunity, indeed the requirement, to 
participate in the affairs of state during these “intervals of inactivity, the citizens of antiquity “would 
have languished under the weight of painful inaction.”” 
 
                                                            
4 Constant, Benjamin; The Liberty of Ancients Compared with hat of Moderns; (1816)  





Finally, commerce supplies our needs and helps us to satisfy our desires “without the intervention of 
the authorities.”  This “inspires in men a vivid love of individual independence.”  We value our 
individual liberty whereas the citizens of antiquity sacrificed this for their political liberty.  We also 
value our political liberty but primarily because it guarantees our individual liberty which allows us to 
enjoy the benefits of commerce  -  money, property, credit etc.  
 
While “political liberty is indispensable” we need to organise it differently for our convenience and the 
representative system provides the solution.  Just as “Poor men look after their own business; rich men 
hire stewards”, the “representative system is a proxy given to a certain number of men by the mass of 
the people who wish their interests to be defended and who nevertheless do not have the time to defend 
them themselves.” 
 
In conclusion, Constant urges his audience not to allow “the enjoyment of our private independence [.. 
to cause us..] to surrender our right to share in political power too easily.”   He is concerned that we 




2.6 The Will of the People 
It is easy to have clarity regarding concepts such as the ‘will of the people’, the ‘common good’ or 
indeed democracy itself when these are applied in a relatively small community such as Athens where 
these concepts originally developed and where it was possible to bring most of the citizens together to 
discuss and decide issues.   The clarity is significantly diminished when these concepts are applied in 
the much larger nation states without due attention being given to the practicalities that arise due to the 
change of scale (Dahl, 1982, p.141). 
 
The difficulty in determining the will of the people is due to the impracticality of ascertaining every 
citizen’s views on all issues or on any particular issue.   Sometimes a government will put proposals to 
the electorate in a referendum.   No matter how complex a proposal or how many elements in it,  both 
explicit and implicit,  the voter is usually allowed to vote just ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and this doesn’t necessarily 
give a result that fully reflects the will of the people on the particular proposal.  Furthermore, it is likely 
that many people use these occasions to express their dissatisfaction with the government.   Opinion 
polls can provide more information but the outcome of these can be skewed by the formulation of the 
questions, the timing etc.   Timing can also be critical since the publication of the results of an opinion 
poll can affect how people will vote.  In other words, when dealing with a large electorate, the feedback 




Schumpeter feels it necessary to emphasise repeatedly and at some length the principle that “the will of 
the majority is the will of the majority and not the will of “the people”.”(Schumpeter, 1987, p.272)     
Sometimes ‘the will of the people’ can be in conflict with democratic ideals and to illustrate this he 
cites what he classifies as the most famous of all trials where Pilot was “certainly the representative of 
autocracy. Yet he tried to protect freedom.  And he yielded to a democracy.”(p.243n.) 
 
Schumpeter also considers the question of the ‘common good’ which, he implies, was a key element of 
the eighteenth century philosophy of democracy and he outlines the difficulties faced by ‘the people’ 
in determining the common good  -  it will mean different things to different people.  And even if the 
people agree on the overall principles encapsulated in the common good, there may be significant 
disagreements on the details or on the means of achieving them.   A clear example of this today are the 
gun laws in the US.  There is a major security problem arising from several mass killings by students 
or former students in a number of schools and colleges across the US.   There is general agreement that 
the common good requires steps to be taken to make the schools and colleges safer.   A large proportion 
of the population believes this can only be achieved by severely restricting the access to guns while 
another significant section believe it can only be achieved by arming the teachers.    
 
Schumpeter insists that even if it were possible to provide the democratic process with clear and 
accurate data on the opinions of individual citizens, the political decisions based on this data are not 
likely to “conform to ‘what people really want’,” nor can it be assured that the decisions will be a “fair 
compromise.”(p.255)   He refers to Napoleon’s achievement in reaching a settlement with the Catholic 
Church in France, resolving difficulties with the clergy, allowing somewhat limited freedom of worship 
and signing a concordat with the Pope “while strongly upholding the authority of the state.”  Through 
these actions, as a military dictator, he solved one of the most pressing political problems at the time 
and for this he received almost universal acclaim.    Schumpeter claims that, since the people were so 
divided in the chaotic aftermath of the Revolution -  particularly in relation to the Church, it would have 
been very difficult to achieve this result through the democratic system. 
 
Schumpeter considers the ability of the individual voters to interpret facts, draw rational conclusions 
and to make up their own minds clearly and independently and mentions two factors that militate against 
rationality  -  crowd psychology and advertising.   Regarding crowd psychology, he says it applies not 
just to the mob on the street but to almost any group including committees, parliaments, etc. which 
display to varying extents features such as “a reduced sense of responsibility,  a lower level of energy 
of thought and greater sensitiveness to non-logical influences.”   And of particular relevance  in the era 
of social media is his assertion that crowd psychology is not confined to physical gatherings of people.  
“Newspaper readers, radio audiences, members of a party even if not physically gathered together are 
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terribly easy to work up into a psychological crowd and into a state of frenzy in which attempt at rational 
argument only spurs the animal spirits.”(p.257)  
 
In relation to the motivation of voters, Schumpeter says that the issues that engage them (evoke 
volitions) most strongly are those “involving immediate and personal pecuniary profit to individual 
voters and groups of voters” and that experience shows “that by and large voters react promptly and 
rationally to any such chance.”(p.260) He notes that this is in conflict with the classic doctrine of 
democracy as espoused by Bentham and the Utilitarians but they “philosophized in terms of bourgeois 
interests which had more to gain from a parsimonious state than from any direct bribes.”(p.260n.)  
 
It is much more difficult for the voter to engage with, or feel a responsibility in relation to the ‘bigger’ 
political issues which are not as directly linked to the private concerns of the individual, their family or 
their business.  While one may have an interest in the wider national and international issues and may 
have views on them, one does not feel the same level of responsibility as in the case where there is  
money on the table.   In relation to these issues the voter lacks “a pungent sense of reality” -  there is an 
“absence of effective volition.”  Despite the availability of plenty relevant information, the citizens, 
including the educated citizens, are ignorant and lack judgement “in matters of domestic and foreign 
policy.”  The private citizen sees himself as “a member of an unworkable committee, the committee of 
the whole nation, and in this way he expends less disciplined effort on mastering a political problem 
than he expends on a game of bridge.”(p.261)   In bridge, the task and the rules are clearly defined as 
are success and failure and one is made aware immediately of any mistakes.  Schumpeter sums up 
saying “this goes to show that without the initiative that comes from immediate responsibility, 
ignorance will persist in the face of masses of information however complete and correct.”(p.262)    
 
In failing to engage in the wider political issues and bring “the rationalizing influence of personal 
experience and responsibility” to bear on them, the citizens are leaving open “opportunities for groups 
with an ax to grind.”    These groups will have vested interests of various kinds and may be groups of 
politicians, business people, idealists etc.  and the way is left open to them to fashion and “even to create 
the will of the people. What we are confronted with in the analysis of political processes is largely not 
a genuine but a manufactured will” in which case “the will of the people is the product and not the 
motive power of the political process.”(p.263)  
 
Hayek is concerned about the fact, as he sees it, that it is very difficult to establish the will of the 
majority through democracy.   The “majority government does not produce what the majority wants but 
what each of the groups making up the majority must concede to the others to get their support for what 
it wants itself.”(Hayek, 2013, pp.354, 358)  But this is just politics in operation  -  bringing together the 
different viewpoints and arriving at a compromise.  If one does not go down the road of compromise, 
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then one takes the road towards authoritarianism.   Through the deals and compromises, politicians are 
doing no more than acting on Hayek’s own theory of ‘civilisation’  -  they are bringing together the 
knowledge which is dispersed among many individuals. 
 
Once the will of the majority is established, this does not give the majority free rein to do anything it 
wishes  -  it must always act in accordance with the abstract rules of just conduct.  Otherwise it becomes 
mob law or, to quote John Stuart Mill, “the tyranny of the majority.”(Mill, 1998, p.8)5   For this reason 
Hayek says that ‘demarchy’ would be a more appropriate term than ‘democracy’ since the latter, if one 
goes back to the Greek roots, “seems to stress brute force rather than government by rule.”(Hayek, 
2013, p.381)6   Democracy had replaced an earlier term ‘isonomia’ which meant ‘everyone is equal 
before the law.’ 
 
There can also be a “tyranny of the minority” where a relatively small group of citizens use the processes 
and procedures of the democratic institutions to leverage their power successively through those 
institutions to such an extent that they control them.  A recent example of this is the shutdown of the 
federal government services in the US because, in the words of President Obama "one faction of one 
party in one house of Congress in one branch of government shut down major parts of the government 
all because they didn't like one law.”7  Most commentators agree that this was engineered by a small 
though significant faction of the Republican Party. 
 
Aristotle’s antipathy towards democracy was primarily because “the democratic idea of justice is in fact 
numerical equality, not equality based on merit” and this means that “there must be equality for each of 
the citizens [so] the poor have more sovereign power than the rich; for they are more numerous” 
(Aristotle, 1992, p.362)   He says that the best environment for democracy is “where the population 
subsists on agriculture or pasturing stock.  For having no great abundance of possessions, they are kept 
busy and rarely attend the assembly […]  They find more satisfaction in working on the land than in 
ruling and in engaging in public affairs.”(p.368)   There are faint echoes of Schumpeter and Mill in 
these sentiments. 
                                                            
5Mill also refers to “the slavery of the majority to the least estimable portion of their number” (p.313)  which 
illustrates his elitist view on the electorate.  
 
6 The word ‘democracy’ is derived from the Greek words  ‘demos’ (the people) and ‘kratos’  (power).  ‘Archein’ 
is another word for power with less stress on force  -  hence Hayek’s term ‘Demarchy’. 
 
7 President Obama is referring to a vote in the House of Representatives on 1st October 2013 which blocked 
the passage of a budget in protest against the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010.  
Obama, 2013 [online] available at http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/americas/131001-us-in-a-





Lincoln’s pronouncement that “you cannot fool all of the people all of the time” would appear to be a 
safeguard against the long-term negative effects of individual sectional interests but Schumpeter adds 
a cautionary note to this.   Having already argued that “it is only the short-run promise that tells 
politically and only short-run rationality that asserts itself effectively” (Schumpeter, 1987, p.261), he 
says that history “consists of a succession of short-run situations that may alter the course of events for 
good.  If all the people can in the short run be “fooled” step by step into something they do not really 
want [then] in reality they neither raise nor decide issues but […] the issues that shape their fate are 
normally raised and decided for them.”(p.264)   
 
A related phenomenon is what Hirsch refers to as “the tyranny of small decisions” where “[i]ndividual 
choices, each made separately and thereby necessarily without taking account of the interaction between 
them, combine to have destructive social consequences […] in the sense that they produce a worse 
result for the individuals concerned than could have been obtained by coordination of individual 
choices.”(Hirsch, 1987, pp.37,40,79,106)    Take the choice between having excellent public transport 
and few cars or plenty cars and poor public transport.  It is likely that a majority today would opt for 
the former but while the social planners are making the ‘big’ decision on this, the individuals buy cars 
since they have to make the “‘small’ choices to which they are confined in market transactions.” This 
increases congestion and reduces the custom for public transport, both of which increase the cost for 
public transport so the “car ownership feeds on itself.”(p.168, n.13) 
 
Schumpeter’s model also defines unambiguously the level of control the electorate has over the 
government.   The electorate has the power to elect the government and to evict it and this is the limit 
of its power other than on the very rare occasions when “spontaneous revulsion” at an action of the 
government or one of its members causes them to change course (Schumpeter, p.272).  This brings 
greater clarity to the question of what democracy is and what it is not and, in particular, deals with the 
question of interpreting the will of the people.  Napoleon’s actions regarding relations with the Church 
in the earlier example are clearly not democratic since, according to the definition, he was not elected 
by the people although his solution almost certainly reflected the will of the people and it is unlikely 
that an elected government could have arrived at such an acceptable and effective solution.  
 
If, however, we want the ‘majority’ to represent more closely the ‘will of the people’, it can be done 
through proportional representation but this, according to Schumpeter, offers “opportunities for all sorts 
of idiosyncrasies to assert themselves [and also] may prevent democracy from producing efficient 
governments and thus prove a danger in times of stress.” (Schumpeter, 1987, p.272)  Evidence 
throughout Europe today, and perhaps throughout the world would seem to support this.  He suggests 





2.7 Politicians and Political Leadership 
As mentioned already, Schumpeter argued for a social stratum of competent people that takes to politics 
as a matter of course.    Because of the nature of the politician’s work, politics has to be regarded as a 
profession.   There can be little time for any other pursuits in life if one wants to engage seriously in 
politics, most certainly at national level, (p.286) because of “the incessant battle in parliament”, the 
unrelenting competitive duels between politicians and between parties and the constant pressure from 
the electorate and the media.  As a result, Schumpeter implies that the politician pays more attention to 
‘his’ fellow politicians and the needs of his party than to his constituents and this further emphasises 
the independent non-delegate nature of the role.    Because of the constant pressure, the attention of the 
politician, and particularly the senior politicians such as ministers, is kept focused mainly on the short-
term goals.  On the more positive side, the system excels in developing the politician’s skill for 
understanding and managing people.   The system is also very good at ensuring that the most competent 
get to the leadership positions since “[t]here are many rocks in the stream that carries politicians to 
national office which are not entirely ineffective in barring the progress of the moron or the windbag.” 
(p.289) 
 
The strength of democracy lies in its clarity and openness and this is brought out in Schumpeter’s 
discussion of leadership.   Where there is strong leadership, the people have the opportunity of seeing 
how the ‘will of the people’ or public opinion is represented, faked or substituted by a ‘manufactured 
will’ (p.270).  Also, the democratic system will accommodate the various sectional interests including 
those associated with social issues, in a way that will filter and prioritise them according to the general 
political climate (and the will of the people).  Rather than being asserted directly, these will in general 
evolve over time until some political leader takes them on board, develops them and includes them “in 
his competitive offering” at election time (p.270) and “on principle at least, everyone is free to compete 
for political leadership.”(p.272) 
 
The fact that every member of the electorate can compete for political leadership, also clarifies the 
relationship “between democracy and individual freedom.”   No system provides for total freedom for 
the individual -  such a situation is impossible anyway since respect for one individual’s freedom always 
restricts the freedom of other individuals.  The amount of freedom allowed is a matter of degree and 
democracy doesn’t necessarily provide a higher degree of individual freedom than all other systems.   
But if everyone is free to go before the electorate and compete for political leadership, “this will in most 
cases though not in all mean a considerable amount of freedom of discussion for all.   In particular it 




Where politics differs from business is within the party, especially in relation to leadership.   Despite 
the moves towards democracy in the workplace, it seldom has any role in the selection of business 
leaders.   Democracy is carried through, however, into the political party and it is perhaps here that it is 
seen at it’s most intense.  Party leadership is, in theory, open to all members and since the business of 
politics is the competition for power, there will always be politicians with ambitions to replace or even 
displace their leader.   In pursuing this, they must carefully weigh up the risks of failure against the 
chances of success and “steer a middle course between an unconditional allegiance to the leader’s 
standard and an unconditional raising of a standard of [their] own.”   But the leader in turn must also 
steer “a middle course between insisting on discipline and allowing himself to be thwarted.” (p.281)   
This can in fact be very productive since everyone is forced, or at least motivated, to listen to what 
everyone else is saying, discussion and debate is intensified, compromises have to be made and this is 
the essence of politics.  
 
The US President is, according to Schumpeter, in the fortunate position of not having to sit in Congress 
unlike his counterparts (i.e. prime ministers) in other democracies who have to face the parliamentary 
battles on a daily basis.   This allows the President to concentrate more on longer-term issues.   However, 
the President is constrained somewhat by the four-year presidential and congressional elections and 
also the mid-term congressional elections.   The President must ensure a supportive Congress in order 
to get his long-terms policies approved but paradoxically this regularly compels him to concentrate on 
short-term vote-winning strategies. 
 
 
2.8 Morality in Politics 
Luhmann says that the election of a particular party to office should, under democracy, represent a 
decision in favour of “a political program that differs from that of other parties.”(Luhmann, 1990, p.236)  
Not only should the programmes differ, but they should be “of a contrary nature” and fit the binary 
coding of his functional differentiation model e.g. conservative/progressive, restrictive/expansive 
welfare state, ecological/economic etc.   However, he says that parties shy away from campaigning in 
this manner and, instead, make election promises they know they cannot deliver because the leadership 
that is required to speak about necessary austerities or about what cannot be done, does not exist.  So, 
instead of competing on the basis of their programs, parties compete on personalities and on their moral 
stance against the moral stance of their opponents. 
 
Luhmann argues that historically rulers could rule without moral considerations because of “an 
unavoidable arbitrariness at the top of every hierarchy” which put a distance between the sovereign and 
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morality “for reason of state.”(p.237) (L’etat cest moi!)  But this cannot work in a system with a 
bifurcated top such as democracy.  “Instead, democracy needs a different style of higher amorality -  
the renunciation of the moralizing of political antagonism.”   Parties should not take a moral stand 
against their opponents.   Put another way, all parties, while competing on the basis of their respective 
policies, must respect one another and respect their commitment to the democratic system since, to do 
otherwise would be to endanger the government/opposition model.    
 
Luhmann appears to miss the point that when one takes the moral high ground, one steps outside 
politics. President Bush’s declaration of war on the ‘axis of evil’ is one of the more extreme examples.   
By setting himself in opposition to ‘evil’, he took on the role of ‘God’ and since he had absolute right 
on his side, there was no question of arguing with him or trying to reach a compromise.  He had gone 
beyond politics and it was irrelevant.   In domestic politics, particularly though not exclusively here in 
Ireland, we see how reluctant the mainstream parties are to get involved in debates on issues which have 
a significant moral element such as abortion despite pressure quite often from the electorate. 
 
The political system can in many cases, however, convey the impression of a strong commitment to 
moral values such as peace, justice, equality or practical values such as low unemployment, low 
inflation, absence of corruption etc. since the existence of these values “which are widely held in 
modern societies […] means that the political system can always filter information through the 
vocabulary given by these values [and so] rationalize and legitimize its choices insofar as it responds to 
problems in this vocabulary.” (King & Thornhill, 2005, p.93 citing Luhmann, Die Politik der 
Gesellschaft, p.196) 
 
In Hayek’s model, everyone is a member of the Great Society but individuals are free to join the various 
smaller groups which make up the Great Society on a voluntary basis.   The smaller groups are in most 
if not all cases focused on particular ends and may depend on human emotions and moral values such 
as solidarity, unselfishness etc.   These will lead ultimately to totalitarianism if applied to the Great 
Society as distinctions between loyalty and disloyalty or friend and enemy are identified and the need 
or the excuse for control becomes apparent.   In the case of the smaller group the individual can leave 
but this is not possible in the universal group.     
 
Traditional morality and moral sentiments have no place in the Great Society.   The society is governed 
by the abstract rules of just conduct to which everyone is subject and is guided by the open market to 
do what is of most benefit to oneself and therefore to everyone in the society.   Hayek says it “did 
become part of the ethos of the Open Society that it was better to invest one’s fortune in instruments 
making it possible to produce more at smaller costs than to distribute it among the poor.”(Hayek, 2013, 
p.302)  He admits however that this ethos “leaves an emotional void by depriving men both of satisfying 
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tasks and the assurance of support in the case of need.”(p.303)   His use of the past tense in these 
passages would seem to imply a departure from this ethos but he concludes by emphasising again the 
inevitability of totalitarianism if the Great Society is run on the same basis as the familiar small group 
or is focused on a particular end or purpose. 
 
2.9 Abstract Rules 
Reference has been made to the ‘abstract rules of just conduct’ in Hayek’s Great Society.   Unlike 
Luhmann, Hayek is not a constructionist although they arrive at broadly similar conclusions in their 
analysis of the workings of democracy.   For Hayek, it is only through the use of abstraction that we 
can manage our affairs in the Great Society.  It is “the basis of man’s capacity to move successfully in 
a world very imperfectly known to him - an adaptation to his ignorance of most of the particular facts 
of his surroundings.”(Hayek, 2013, p.29)   It would be impossible for any individual to have command 
of the complete set of facts relevant to any action they are about to take.   All the facts exist within the 
Great Society but not with any one individual.  However, it is civilisation that “helps us to overcome 
that limitation on the extent of individual knowledge […] by conquering ignorance, not by the 
acquisition of more knowledge, but by the utilization of knowledge which is and remains widely 
dispersed among individuals.”(p.16)  Civilisation lets us benefit from knowledge we do not possess.  In 
this context Hayek notes that economics, while stressing the ‘division of labour’ has little to say about 
the fragmentation of knowledge. (p.14) 
 
Hayek takes issue with the constructivists’ view of abstraction which they conceive “as a property 
confined to conscious thought or concepts, while actually it is a characteristic possessed by all the 
processes which determine action long before they appear in conscious thought or are expressed in 
language.”(p.29)  He is scathing in his criticism of “Cartesian constructivism with its contempt for 
tradition, custom, and history in general” and according to which, he claims, “[m]an’s reason alone 
should enable him to construct society anew.”  He is opposed to this rationality because of its 
anthropomorphism and its intentionalist view of history which “found its fullest expression in the 
conception of the formation of society by a social contract” by Hobbes and Rousseau (p.11).   The 
“hubris of reason” he says “manifests itself in those who believe that they can dispense with abstraction 
and achieve a full mastery of the concrete and thus positively master the social process” and this 
concentration on the concrete led to philosophies “of ‘life’ and of ‘existence’ which extol emotion, the 
particular and the instinctive, and which are only too ready to support such emotions as those of race, 
nation and class.” (p.32) 
 
As opposed to constructive rationality and Cartesian dualism, Hayek sees mind and society evolving 
together  -  the mind being “an adaptation to the natural and social surroundings in which man lives and 
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[…] it has developed in constant interaction with the institutions which determine the structure of 
society.”  He says man was able to act before he could think or understand and that understanding is 
“simply his capacity to respond to his environment with a pattern of actions that help him to persist.” 
(p.18)     
 
Hayek fears the development of totalitarianism within democracy and points to the fact that dictators 
like Hitler, Mussolini or Stalin did not appeal just to the worst instincts in people but appealed as well 
“to some of the feelings which also dominate contemporary democracies.” (p.292)  These ‘feelings’ 
include the “desire for a visible common purpose” such as a welfare state which would cater for the 
needs of the poor and result from the rationalist intentionalist approach rather than the abstract approach.  
 
 The task of establishing and maintaining the rules of just conduct would lie with a Legislative 
Assembly. The most significant aspect for Hayek is that the rules would be abstract, that is, that they 
would be general rules not relating to any particular situation or event or to any individual person or 
group - a proposal made much earlier by Weber (Weber, 1978, p.217).   Somewhat like ‘blind justice’, 
the Legislative Assembly would not be able to predict the situations in which the rules would need to 
be enforced.  “Although the use of abstraction extends the scope of phenomena which we can master 
intellectually, it does so by limiting the degree to which we can foresee the effects of our actions, and 
therefore also by limiting to certain general features the degree to which we can shape the world to our 
liking.” (Hayek, 2013, p.31) 
 
2.10 Government and Administration  
Peter Drucker, in developing his theory of organisations, anticipates Luhmann’s approach to social 
systems. Taking a business or a university as examples, he says “the members of [these] organisations, 
whether employees or students, should be expected to take the largest possible responsibility for 
managing the community life of their institutions.   A great deal of what managements are doing today 
is not related to performance and function.   Why management should run the plant cafeteria, for 
instance – or student discipline – is not very clear.  And there are many other areas where community 
self-government can and should take over.  […] A wise management […] limits itself to the spheres of 
direct relevance to its central task.  Everything else it tries to unload.” (Drucker, 1969, p.194)   Here 
Drucker is advocating the differentiation of functions in the organisation on the basis of performance.    
 
Drucker says that each of the major services required by society such as healthcare, education, 
government, consumer products, defence etc., are provided by special-purpose institutions.   Each of 
these institutions “has its own autonomous management, [i]ts own job to do, and therefore its own 
objectives, its own values, and its own rationale.”   Reflecting the shift from differentiation by status or 
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title to functional differentiation (to use Luhmann’s terminology), Drucker says that while government 
might still be regarded as ‘lord’, “it can no longer be master.”  He adds that social theory “to be 
meaningful at all, must start out with the reality of a pluralism of institutions – a galaxy of suns rather 
than one big centre surrounded by moons that shine only reflected light.” (p.163)   There is no ‘centre’, 
no one institution is superior or inferior in status to any other.   Government acts as a co-ordinator or 
leader and in words to be echoed later by Luhmann, Drucker says “yet, paradoxically, government 
suffers from doing too much and too many things.  The purpose of government is “to make fundamental 
decisions […] to focus the political energies of society.   It is to dramatize issues.  It is to present 
fundamental choices.   The purpose of government, in other words, is to govern.” (p.217)   For Drucker, 
the governing function must not be distracted or diluted in any way by the follow-up implementation 
or execution of the decision.   
 
For government, to be effective and strong, may have to learn to ‘decentralize’ to the other institutions, 
to do less in order to achieve more.”(p.163)  The purpose of decentralisation “is to make it possible for 
top management to concentrate on decision-making and direction by sloughing off the ‘doing’ to 
operating managements, each with its own mission and goals, and with its own sphere of action and 
autonomy.”    
 
Luhmann, for his part, refuses to accept the idea that politics is “an instrumental contrivance that 
attempts to bring about increasingly better outputs - that is, increasingly better social situations.”   
Instead, he uses Parsons’ formulation that politics is “collectively binding decision-making.”               
(Luhmann, 2013, p.20)  This is essentially the same as Drucker’s view of the role.   It must be noted, 
however, that Drucker uses the term ‘government’ in the general sense while Luhmann is very specific, 
although not always unambiguous, in assigning the collective decision-making role to ‘politics.’  
According to Luhmann, the political system comprises two distinct functional components - politics 
and administration.  He modifies Parsons’ definition above  to say that politics is concerned with “the 
establishment of decision-premises for future decisions” (King & Thornhill, 2005, p.79) while the 
“administration […] is, by contrast, specialized on the elaboration and issuing of binding decisions, in 
accordance with politically prescribed criteria of correctness.” According to King & Thornhill, 
administration here includes “parliaments, sub-executives, councils, regional committees, quangos, 
tribunals and so on” (King & Thornhill, 2005, p.79) although elsewhere they say “Luhmann identifies 
the administration as a complex legislative subsystem of politics” and includes parliaments and a “series 
of other possible legislative organs -  ranging from […] cabinet-sittings to executive round-tables, to 
high-level discussion groups, to bureaucratic sub-executives, to neo-corporate bargaining fora, to 
delegations of organised labour, even to local administrative networks, such as councils, regulators and 




Among the problems Drucker identifies with democracy is that the bureaucrats are “protected from the 
demands of performance.”   Another is the difficulty that government institutions have in managing, or 
even adapting to, change.  Examples include government programmes surviving long after their work is 
accomplished.   They are rarely ‘killed off’ - they continue or evolve into other programmes for which 
their structures may be partially or totally unsuited.  
 
Drucker’s proposed solution is to contract autonomous institutions to undertake the performance of 
‘major social tasks” on the basis of performance rather than authority.   These institutions could be 
businesses, cooperatives or even existing government administrators once they are granted autonomy 
by the government.   The institutions would be the ‘doers’ and the government would be “the decision-
maker, the vision maker, the political organ” and it would “figure out how to structure a given political 
objective so as to make it attractive to one of the autonomous institutions.” (Drucker, 1969, p.220) 
 
The institutions would be run on a business basis since, according to Drucker, this has the following 
advantages: 
 
• “Of all our institutions, business is the only one that society will permit to disappear.”  The examples 
he gives for this are not convincing  -  comparing the storms of protest following the closure of a 
public hospital run by the Catholic Church and a school run by the Jesuits to the simple ‘regret’ that 
would be felt at the possible closure of an aircraft manufacturing company, is simplistic (p.221). 
However, it is likely that if a public hospital were closed down by the government, the public would 
protest and get a political campaign underway in which local politicians would engage. The political 
system opens itself to this type of political participation and thereby sustains the protest.   If a private 
business closes down, there is likely to be a protest about unemployment and the loss to the local 
economy but usually the business doesn’t engage with the protesters to any extent, so the protests 
are seldom prolonged.  Drucker’s solution would mean less politics.   The services should be much 
better but examples such as the privatisation of Eircom and of British Rail would raise significant 
doubts. 
 
• In a similar way and with similar consequences, “business can abandon an activity”. (p.221) 
 
• “Alone among all institutions [business] has a test of performance.”   The test is profitability with 
the risk of loss and closure and these are dependent on the judgement of the customers (p.222).  
However, he argues elsewhere that business can learn much from successful non-profit 
organisations.   The non-profits don’t base their strategy on money or centre their planning around 
financial returns.   Instead, they “devote a great deal of thought to defining their organisation’s 
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mission [avoiding] sweeping statements full of good intentions and focus, instead, on objectives that 
have clear-cut implications for the work of their members.”(Drucker, 2008, pp.170-171) 
 
• Business “has to prove its right to survival again and again.  This is what business is designed for, 
precisely because it is designed to make and manage change.”(Drucker, 1969, p.222) 
 
Schumpeter would have a similar approach to Drucker regarding the business of government.  He is 
concerned that the “effective range of political decision should not be extended too far.”   It would be 
impractical for politicians or for parliament to get involved in every issue that comes before them.   
Many of the issues on which decisions are required may be too broad, technical or complex to be 
considered in detail and in such circumstances politicians must rely on the advice of specialists while 
formal approval will ultimately rest with themselves.    He also recommends, as did Luhmann and 
Drucker, the establishment of what are essentially quangos which “extend the sphere of public authority 
without extending the sphere of political decision.” (Schumpeter, 1987, pp.292-293)   There would be 
no political involvement other than at a supervisory/regulatory level. 
 
Whereas the main concern of both Luhmann and Drucker is the separation of the legislative function 
from the executive function, Hayek’s emphasis is on the division of the legislative function itself  into 
two functions  -  one establishing the principles, or the ‘abstract rules of just conduct’ mentioned earlier 
and the other “representing the concrete wishes of the citizens for particular results.”   The latter would 
be governed by interests and the former by opinion, that is, “by views about what kind of action is right 
or wrong.” (Hayek, 2013, p.448) He is influenced in this, as was John S. Mill, by the idea of the Ecclesia 
and Nomothetae in Athenian democracy where the Ecclesia could pass “decrees on single matters of 
policy” whereas the Nomothetae’s role was “to revise the whole of the laws, and keep them consistent 
with one another.” (Mill, 1998, p.280)  In practice, the boundary between the legislative and executive 
function or between the Ecclesia and the Nomothetae is often unclear so differences between various 
theorists tend to be more about emphasis or terminology.  
 
Hayek sets out the five tiers of authority as follows: (Hayek, 2013, pp.457-458)    
1. The Constitution which deals essentially with organisational matters ensuring that there is no 
confusion regarding the power and authority of the other tiers.    
2. The Legislative Assembly with responsibility for devising the rules of just conduct. 
3. The Governmental Assembly, similar to existing parliamentary bodies which would include an 
organised opposition.   It “could not issue any orders for private citizens which did not follow 
directly and necessarily from the rules laid down by the [Legislative Assembly].” (p.454) and it 
would oversee the government as its executive organ. 
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4. The Government together with the Governmental Assembly would, within the rules of just conduct, 
“be complete master in organizing the apparatus of government.” (p.454) 
5. The Administrative Bureaucratic Apparatus to support the above. 
 
 
2.11 The Welfare State 
For many of the theorists on democracy, including Luhmann, Drucker and Hayek, the welfare state 
upsets their models or theories and they are therefore opposed to the idea although they accept that the 
state cannot ignore the plight of the very poor and it is necessary therefore to give it some consideration.   
 
T.H. Marshall saw the welfare state as part of a pattern where the citizens acquired “civil rights in the 
eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth century, and social rights [..] in the twentieth 
century.” (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2014, p.74)  Micklethwait & Wooldridge argue that the welfare 
state marked a change from a system providing benefits with associated obligations to one which 
responded to a demand for universal rights from the state (p.74).  
 
Before proceeding to discuss the difficulties posed by the welfare state, it is worth noting Castells’ 
comment that the welfare state “in its different manifestations, depending on the history of each society, 
was a critical source of political legitimacy in the reconstitution of government institutions after the 
Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II.” (Castells, 2010, p.402) 
 
Drucker’s difficulty with the welfare state is confined to an organisational issue in that it is administered 
through a state bureaucracy rather than through a business.  I discuss the implications of this under 
Bureaucracy below. 
 
For Luhmann, the origins of the welfare state can be traced back to the time of the French Revolution 
when the democratic vote brought the “the legally inaccessible aspect of ultimate, sovereign 
arbitrariness” under control and “the general populace acquired relevance.”   This was also around the 
time of the Industrial Revolution and the social consequences arising from this became driving forces 
in political life and “became the point of difference for political parties that have become 
organizationally entrenched since the end of the nineteenth century.” (Luhmann, 1990, p.26)  
 
The root of the problem lies in the principle of inclusion.   The stratified society of earlier times, when 
differentiation was by status, assigned each person “to one and only one stratum of society.” (p.35)   
This defined their position, rights and responsibilities and “every member of the system, from the 
yeoman up to the most powerful king, understood exactly the positions of the other members of the 
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hierarchy, their concerns, and their problems.” (Drucker, 1969, p.164)   But when differentiation by 
function replaced differentiation by status, the population could not be distributed across the different 
functions as they had been distributed across the different strata.   Instead, rules of access apply.  “As 
an individual, a person lives outside the function systems.   But every individual has to have access to 
every function system if and insofar as his or her mode of living requires the use of the functions of 
society.[…]this requirement is formulated by the principle of inclusion […] The welfare state is the 
realization of political inclusion.” (Luhmann, 1990, p.35) 
 
The growth of the ‘compensation culture’ is another aspect of the welfare state which causes significant 
problems.   Until the mid-20th century, governments provided help through relief programmes of various 
types to those who were adversely affected by economic or other developments.  These programmes 
ranged from, for example, the Poor Law system in Ireland and Britain during the early years of 
industrialisation to the relief programs under the ‘New Deal’ in the U.S. after the ‘Great Depression’.   
The welfare state began to evolve in Britain during the first decade of the twentieth century with the 
introduction of “free school meals for needy children (1906), old-age pensions (1908), a budget against 
poverty (1909) and national insurance for the sick and unemployed  (1911).” (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge, 2014, p.68)    It became firmly established  in the 1940s with the implementation of the 
Education Act, the National Insurance Act and the National Health Service Act.  The overall thrust was 
encapsulated by Aneurin Bevan in the words “[h]omes, health, education and social security, these are 
your birthright.” (p.75)  Prior to this the relief provided was at the discretion of the government or 
donors.   The shift from help to compensation (or from benefits to claims) marked a shift, in Luhmann’s 
words, “from the social state to the welfare state.” (Luhmann, 1990, p.23)   The essence of the welfare 
state “is compensation to the individual for the negative consequences of a particular organisation of 
life.” (Luhmann, 1990, p.22)  But the real difficulty arises from the fact that “the concept of 
compensation tends towards universalization because, according to the way the problem is presented, 
all differences can be compensated and yet differences always remain or new deficits appear that require 
compensation themselves.” (Luhmann, 1990, p.22)  Taking universalization and inclusion together 
means that government can, and does, become involved in addressing a wide range of very diverse 
specific problems and individual situations.   
 
Luhmann mentions additional potential problems that the welfare state may have to confront.  It is 
important to note that these “are closely connected with and burden one another reciprocally - in the 
sense that better solutions of the problems of one domain can increase the problems in another.”  One 
of these problem areas is the increasing change in the environment “produced by industrial society that 




A second problem area is motivation - the motivation of those receiving benefits from the welfare state 
which can perpetuate existing, or create further problems.  Also, with greatly improved standards of 
living, education, mass media and leisure facilities etc., we cannot count on the same motivating factors 
in the future as we have now.  People may not have the same welcome for the welfare state or be 
prepared to “work for the politics of well-being.”(pp.23-24) 
A third problem is the growing cost of the welfare state.  This not only forms “a daily financial problem 
but also threatens the differentiation of the political and economic systems because of the increasing 
relative size of the state budget in relation to other means.” (p.23)  Any decrease in differentiation will 
result in a similar decrease in the effectiveness of the administrative systems and hence a diminution of 
the overall democratic system.  To avoid such dedifferentiation “[p]olitical systems must always be able 
to reflect on economic or legal or medical or artistic issues, and so on, in terms distinct from those that 
these systems use to describe themselves.” (King & Thornhill, 2005, p.86) 
 
Habermas claims that the welfare state has failed in its efforts to achieve a significant improvement in 
the conditions of those on low incomes since “the redistribution of income is essentially limited to a 
horizontal reshuffling within the group of the dependently employed and does not touch the class-
specific structure of wealth.” (Habermas, 1989b, p.57)   He also says that “the upwardly mobile groups 
of voters who received the greatest direct benefits from the welfare state”, in order to protect their 
standard of living may “ally themselves with the strata concerned with “productivity”, to form a 
defensive coalition opposing underprivileged or marginalised groups.”   Castells makes a similar point 
in relation to African Americans and the growing hostility among the poor against the “middle-class 
blacks [who] strive to get ahead not only from the reality of the ghetto, but from the stigma that the 
echoes from the dying ghetto project on them through their skin […] particularly by insulating their 
children from the poor black communities”.(Castells, 2010, p.60)  
 
In addition to the structural problems just mentioned, Castells points to the problems caused in 
globalised markets by the varying levels of welfare benefits available from different states resulting in 
widely varying labour costs.   “Since firms, because of information technology can locate in many 
different sites and still link up to global production networks and markets […] there follows a downward 
spiral of social costs competition.”(p. 313)    However, Castells also notes that there is “a somewhat 
more complex relationship between productivity, competitiveness, and the welfare state, emerging in 
the knowledge-based economy” as shown by Finland which used the welfare state to increase 
productivity “by providing the human resource base for the advanced knowledge economy, in terms of 




Hayek’s difficulty with the welfare state arises from a misconstrued understanding of justice on which 
the welfare state is founded.   Justice is a quality that can be attributed to the actions of individuals or 
groups of individuals acting in concert as in organisations.   According to Hayek “[to] apply the term 
‘just’ to circumstances other than human actions or the rules governing them is a category mistake” 
(Hayek, 2013, p.198) because the nature of justice is such that someone or some group of people must 
be held responsible for any instances of justice or injustice.  Society, therefore, cannot be held 
responsible and, for Hayek, it follows from this that the term ‘social justice’ is an anomaly.    
 
There are other reasons also for his strident opposition to the idea of social justice.   Social justice 
involves directing certain efforts towards a particular group of people for the purpose of achieving 
specific results.   This is organisation-type thinking which undermines the spontaneous order of society 
and the abstractness of the rules that govern it.    
 
Hayek hints at the difficulty raised also by Luhmann, that once a problem of inequality, or perceived 
inequality, has been addressed in one area, it can create a problem in another area and this begins to 
destabilise the system overall (Luhmann, 1990, p.23).    Also, the term ‘social justice’ is often used as 
a camouflage for the protection of vested interest groups which helps “to engage the sympathy of the 
public.”   While organised groups tend to represent themselves as ‘social’,  he says that “the long run 
interests of the several individuals mostly agree with the general interest [but] the interests of the 
organized groups  almost invariably are in conflict with it.” (Hayek, 2013, p.257) 
 
Hayek is in favour of having an ‘even playing field’ where everyone starts with equal opportunities, 
this being a key element of classical liberalism and he mentions in particular the provision “on an equal 
basis the means for the schooling of minors”(p.247) although he questions whether the government 
should provide them.  He also sees “no reason why in a free society government should not assure to 
all […a] minimum income, or a floor below which nobody need to descend”(p.249) or should not 
provide  “some security against severe deprivation.” (p.294)  He suggests that these provisions should 
be made outside the market but it is not altogether clear how this is to be achieved other than avoiding 
any attempt to impose “upon all a system of common concrete ends towards which their efforts are 
directed by authority, as socialism aims to do.” (p.294)  
 
The use of coercion in the Great Society is restricted to the agencies of government for enforcement of 
the rules of just conduct with a view to “reducing all coercion as much as possible and leaving as much 
as possible to voluntary efforts.”(p.307)   Hayek sees voluntary organisations as a very important  
element of the free society.   While he does not say it explicitly, one can assume that he believes these 
organisations could be the agents for addressing the social deficiencies mentioned above.  Also, the 
stronger the voluntary sector, the healthier the society since he says “nothing can have a more deadening 
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effect on real participation by the citizen than if government, instead of merely providing the essential 
framework for spontaneous growth, becomes monolithic and takes charge of the provision for all 
needs.”(p.308)  He adds that the citizen getting involved in public affairs should not confine him/herself 
to affairs of government and the “public spirit should not exhaust itself in an interest in government.” 
 
Despite its shortcomings, the accomplishments of the welfare state were significant until the economic 
downturn in the 1970s when there was an enormous increase in welfare demands and a corresponding 
drop in tax revenue and other means of funding.  As happened then, such a situation is usually followed 
by  instability in the economy which the government attempts to manage and there follows a spiral of 
falling investment, increasing unemployment, more demands on the welfare systems, increasing 
government debt and then a period of austerity.  This should allow the situation to be brought under 
control so the economy starts to build again.  In attempting to manage the crisis, however, the internal 
complexity of the political system increases substantially and this manifests itself in a larger 
administration, a higher level of bureaucracy and more regulation. 
 
Held, in his analysis, identifies two strands of opinion on the crisis in governments today resulting from 
the increasing role of the welfare state.  The ‘New Left’ view is that it’s a legitimation crisis with 
confidence in the government falling due to austerity measures affecting working conditions, income 
levels, quality of state services, etc.   The view of the ‘New Right’ is that it’s an overload crisis with the 
government becoming “essentially dysfunctional for the efficient regulation of economic and social 
affairs.”   This resulted from the “growing affluence, ‘free’ welfare, health and education which 
undermined private initiative and responsibility,” and a decline in deference which, in turn, led to 
increased expectations and aspirations (Held, 2006, pp.190-196).   
 
 
2.12 The Mythical Element in Democracy 
Overall there are inconsistencies in Luhmann when he is dealing with the role of the electorate and their 
relationship with the politicians.   He is critical of the politicians making promises which they know 
they cannot keep.   Yet these promises are just part of the myth which is upheld through the connivance 
of both politicians and electorate in order to maintain the democratic system.   For Luhmann, according 
to Moeller, “the democratic narrative is a myth that serves the function of closing the political circle” 
in which the voters “merely constitute the periodically activated audience of the political system which, 
by this very activity, is integrated into a circle of political decision-making.” (Moeller, 2012, p.96)  
 
One of the occasions in which the ‘audience’ is activated is at election time when the citizens 
collectively decide who is to form the government and who is to form the opposition.  Or, taking 
49 
 
Moeller’s interpretation of Luhmann, once the votes are cast and the numbers calculated, then using the 
rules and procedures of the democratic ‘structural arrangement’, these numbers are transformed into 
political decisions regarding the formation of the government and opposition.(p.95)  
 
Luhmann accepts the very significant symbolic and mythical element in democracy (pp. 97-98) but 
does not accept the implications of this in, for example, insisting that the economy and the political 
system must be kept totally separate or that inclusion in the political system must be minimised.   These 
of course would undermine his model and this begs the question as to how relevant his model is to 
practical politics.   And politics is about practicalities.   Ideals indicate the direction but they are never 
fully attainable and politics has to take over to find a workable arrangement - “a structural arrangement” 
- to get the optimum solution.  As Geuss summarises it, “[p]olitics is a craft or skill, and ought precisely 
not to be analysed, as Plato’s Socrates assumes, as the mastery of a set of principles or theories.”(Geuss, 
2008, p.97) 
Pragmatism, however, must be coupled with myth if democracy is to be successful.   Pragmatism makes 
democracy operational while myth provides the explanation  -  the cover that allows everyone to support 
it.  The grey area lying between the pragmatics and the myth provides the environment for politics to 
work.     
 
While a rite is often regarded as being prescribed or determined by a myth, Cassirer holds the opposite 
view.   “Man may act very unreasonably; but even in his most irrational acts he cannot refrain from 
asking for the motives of his acts.  Myth alone can supply such a motive.   It becomes the interpreter of 
the rite; it enables man to understand what he does.”(Cassirer, 1979, pp.248-249)  
 
As already mentioned, democracy, for Luhmann is “a specific structural arrangement of the political 
system.”   In a different reference he says that democracy is the structural innovation emerging from 
the autopoietic system of politics.   He treats democracy  almost as the incidental result rather than the 
primary outcome of some political activities.   But his abstract descriptions of democracy  -  they can 
hardly be called rigorous definitions  -  do not provide an adequate explanation for the motivation behind 
the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968 or the quiet revolution that overtook all of 
communist Eastern Europe in 1989.   As Geuss insists, the political realist must understand the 
motivational force of powerful illusions.(Geuss, 2008, p.11) 
 
On the other hand one must take cognisance of Moeller’s argument that change can come only through 
a radical approach like Luhmann’s which goes beyond the values and vocabulary of today’s allegedly 
failed protest movements such as the anti-globalisation movement.   He says “society cannot be more 
democratic or free – because under the conditions of functional differentiation self-descriptions such as 
“democracy” (in the sense of “rule of the people”) or “liberty” (the right to realize an individual 
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lifestyle) are meaningless.”(Moeller, 2006, pp.116-117)  If we want to change our world for the better, 
we have to think beyond the outdated semantics which social protest movements only conserve and 
perpetuate thereby providing credibility and legitimation for the semantics employed by those they are 
protesting against.   The success of Marxism during the twentieth century is due, at least to some extent, 
to the new vocabulary Marx provided for the workers which allowed them to express a distinct identity 
for themselves and their cause. 
 
The failure to think beyond the current semantics or ‘outside the box’ has parallels with Heidegger’s 
idea of enframing with regard to technology which I cover in more detail below.   Briefly, it means that 
when we undertake an analysis of technology, we do so with an often unrecognised technological bias.   
There are plenty examples of this in the various ‘innovations’ we are presented with today  -  
technological innovations which solve problems but overlook the fact that the problems were caused 




Bureaucracy is an essential complement to democracy within the state because it allows the execution 
of government policies and regulations to be undertaken in an effective and fair manner.  In addition, 
for Luhmann, it is one of the systems, referred to earlier, which countervail the application of power by 
the political system.    
 
Luhmann distinguishes between the administration and the bureaucracy.   The former derives from “the 
primary division of the political system […] between politics and administration.” (King & Thornhill, 
2005, p.79)   The role of the bureaucratic administration is “the elaboration and issuing of binding 
decisions, in accordance with politically prescribed criteria of correctness.”(p.79)  It  includes the 
bureaucracy but also includes parliament and various networks of committees etc.   Bureaucracy itself 
is “the result of requirements placed upon the political system to offer performances outside those areas 
organized by collectively binding decisions.” (p.85) Bureaucracy is the instrument through which 
services are delivered to the citizens and to the state. 
 
Bureaucracy regularly overextends itself as it responds to the performances demanded by the welfare 
state and by increased inclusion encouraged by, among other things, “the competition of parties [which] 
stimulates one-upmanship vis-á-vis the other side.” (Luhmann, 1990, p.76)  King & Thornhill give an 
example of bureaucracy over-extending itself and compensating itself by self-reproducing when “the 
                                                            
8 There are numerous examples in this book of the phenomenon in question. 
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political system nationalizes a branch of industrial production […] The state will be forced to deploy 
new resources for channelling investment, for overseeing production, for overseeing those who oversee 
production, and ultimately for overseeing its own mechanisms for overseeing those who oversee those 
who oversee production.” (King & Thornhill, 2005, p.84) 
 
While Drucker’s reservation about the welfare state is that it is administered through a bureaucracy 
rather than a business he doesn’t deny the need for bureaucracy in the administration, in fact he makes 
a very clear case for it: 
 
“A ‘little dishonesty’ in government is a corrosive disease.   It rapidly spreads to infect the 
whole body politic.   Yet the temptation to dishonesty is always great.  People of modest 
means and dependent on a salary, handle very large public sums.   People of modest position 
dispose of power and award contracts and privileges of tremendous importance to other 
people.[…] To fear corruption in government is not irrational. […]  Any government that is 
not a ‘government of forms’ degenerates rapidly into a mutual looting society.” (Drucker, 
1969, p.214)  
 
There is a need for control but control “of the last 10 per cent of phenomena always costs more than the 
first 90 per cent.” (p.214)   
 
For Schumpeter, a democratic government must be able to command “the services of a well-trained 
bureaucracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense of duty and a no less strong 
esprit de corps.”(Schumpeter, 1987, p.293)  A bureaucracy is required to ensure that the range of 
political decisions are confined to high level issues.   The bureaucracy “must be in a position to evolve 
principles of its own and sufficiently independent to assert them.  It must be a power in its own right.”   
It must be competent at administration and capable of providing independent advice when required.    
 
Schumpeter argues for a social stratum for bureaucrats which would provide candidates with sufficient 
ability and prestige for positions within the bureaucracy.  Such a class would have been cultivated in 
France since the post-war Fourth Republic particularly through the establishment of ENA (École 
Nationale d’Administration) and they now have very significant influence (some would argue far too 
great an influence) throughout the EU. (Siedentop, 2000, p.135)    While emphasising that bureaucracy, 
rather than being an obstacle, is an essential element of democracy, Schumpeter does not overlook its 
deficiencies.   He says it can have “a depressing influence on the most active minds […] due to the 
difficulty inherent in the bureaucratic machine, of reconciling individual initiative with the mechanics 
of its working.   Often the machine gives little scope for initiative and much scope for vicious attempts 




 According to Weber, “[bureaucratization] offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through 
the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations 
[…i.e.] according to calculable rules and “without regard for persons”.”  He adds that “[b]ureaucracy 
develops the more perfectly, the more it is “dehumanized,” the more completely it succeeds in 
eliminating from business […] all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape 
calculation.” (Weber, 1978, p.975) Bureaucracy, therefore, is a system of rationalisation - it is based on 
rules, processes and procedures.  Roszak, putting it another way, says that the bureaucratisation of life 
is “the conversion of experience into numerical abstractions.”(Roszak,1994, p.4)  
 
Bureaucracy can function effectively in the absence of democracy and it can be traced in much earlier 
records than the latter.  The Pharaoh Userkaf employed a team of  bureaucrats over four thousand years 
ago to allow him “and his family to rise above the nitty-gritty of government.” (Wilkinson, 2010, p.94)  
Today, bureaucracy is an intrinsic part of any formal organisation of people.   It “is a precision 
instrument which can put itself at the disposal of quite varied interests, purely political as well as purely 
economic ones, or any other sort.” (Weber, 1978, p.990) 
 
Weber outlines six characteristics of bureaucracy which are: clearly defined areas of jurisdiction; a 
formal office hierarchy with clear lines of reporting and channels of appeal; the management and 
preservation of the ‘written’ documents (the “files”); fulltime salaried officials with the required 
technical expertise; specialist training and functional division of labour; and office management based 
on “general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned.” 
(pp.956-958,1393)   These give bureaucracy “its purely technical superiority over any other form of 
organisation”(p.973) which is the reason it is so ubiquitous. 
 
The bureaucracy, for Weber, is the “actual ruler” in the modern state “since power is exercised neither 
through parliamentary speeches nor monarchical enunciations but through the routines of 
administration.”(p.1393)  It gains its power through its tendency for centralisation, its expertise and its 
control of information.    
 
While bureaucracy has existed since ancient times, it is only with the development of machinery and 
modern technology that it has become widespread.  In the military, for example, most armies comprised 
conscripted men of the poorer classes or men of wealth and they generally had to provide their own 
gear and provisions.   With the introduction of technology such as guns and especially heavy artillery, 
warfare began to require much greater coordination and planning since equipment costs were higher, 
mobility was hindered to some extent and new technical skills were required.   The army became 
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bureaucratised with fulltime paid soldiers, more detailed planning, more rigid procedures and all 
equipment and provisions supplied by the ‘lord or master’. 
 
Similar developments took place in manufacturing during the Industrial Revolution.  Whether for the 
army or for the cotton mill or other enterprise, the cost of the machinery and other equipment was now 
far beyond the reach of the individual soldier or craftsman.   These were provided by the wealthy ruler 
or landowner.  While the craftsman couldn’t afford the machinery, the provider of the machinery and 
other means of production couldn’t work them and capitalism came into being.  Weber summarises the 
situation saying “the [separation] of the worker from the material means of production, destruction, 
administration, academic research, and finance in general is the common basis of the modern state, in 
its political, cultural and military sphere, and of the private capitalist economy.” (p.1394)  
 
The material means of administration would have applied mainly to office space and furniture rather 
than machinery or modern type technology in Weber’s time.   However, the administrator  -  i.e. the 
bureaucrat, in the narrower sense of Luhmann’s terminology  -  has two major advantages which allows 
him or her to garner and consolidate power.   The first is technical expertise, technical in the sense of 
tekhnē  -  technique or art.   The bureaucrat, particularly in the past, would have had little exposure to 
complex technology but, being fulltime salaried officials they would have developed very strong 
technical expertise in the processes, procedures and tactics of administration.  In the public sphere, “the 
political “master” always finds himself, vis-à-vis the trained official, in the position of a dilettante facing 
the expert.”(p.991)  
 
The second advantage which the bureaucrat holds is the possession of official information and the 
capacity, in many cases, to transform it into classified material.(p.1418)  The power of the bureaucrat 
in this regard has been undermined somewhat with the introduction of freedom of information 
legislation in many countries.  But here again the resourcefulness of the bureaucracy has developed 
various techniques to minimise the effect of this legislation.   What is more, the legislation has provided 
more scope to further expand the bureaucracy as is demonstrated, for instance, by the imposition of 
additional ‘rules’ which an interviewer has to follow when interviewing someone for a position in the 
public service in order to protect the bureaucracy itself from any allegations of bias or discrimination 
since the interviewee now has the right to feedback.   
 
Taking the expertise of the bureaucrats together with the nature of the information they possess, Weber 
says that “[b]ureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge”(p.225) 
and “as a means of exercising authority over human beings [it] is superior to any other form in precision, 
in stability, in the stringency of its discipline and in its reliability.”(p.223)   He also emphasises the 
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critical role of technical knowledge as ‘modern’9 technology develops and thereby anticipates the later 
development of the technocracy within the bureaucracy which I deal with later. 
 
Habermas makes an interesting observation regarding political participation and bureaucracy.  He says 
that citizens who are entitled to services - which would include practically all citizens in the welfare 
state – “relate to the state not primarily through political participation but by adopting a general attitude 
of demand – expecting to be provided for without actually wanting to fight for the necessary decisions.  
Their contact with the state occurs essentially in the rooms and anterooms of bureaucracies.” 
(Habermas, 1989a, p.211) 
 
Another difficulty raised by Drucker is that the “elaborate safeguards to protect the administrative 
structure within government against the political process” also “protects the incumbents in the 
[administrative] agencies from the demands of performance.” (Drucker, 1969, p.215)   The press can 
provide an antidote to this.  To quote King Frederick William III of Prussia in 1804, “a decent publicity 
is for both government and subjects the surest guaranty against the negligence and spite of subaltern 
officials and deserves to be promoted and protected by all means.” (Habermas, 1989a, p.84) 
 
Castells is concerned about the development of global bureaucracy arising from the “irreversible 
sharing of sovereignty [by nation states] in the management of major economic, environmental, and 
security issues.”  Individually, the states sacrifice power for durability.   Collectively, they display a 
paralysis in addressing these issues.   Partly because of this paralysis and “partly because of the inherent 
logic of any large bureaucracy” to take on a life of its own, international institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund “define their mandate in ways that tend to supersede the power of their 
constituent states, instituting a de facto global bureaucracy.”(Castells, 2010, pp.330-331)10   
 
2.14 Technocracy 
The spread of bureaucracy following the Industrial Revolution was one of the features marking the 
separation of the worker from the means of production.   This process was intensified during the early 
20th century with the development of scientific management and the increasing complexity and scale  
of technology.   According to the ‘father’ of scientific management, F.W. Taylor, one of its main 
principles is that “[all] possible brain work should be removed from the shop and centred in the planning 
or laying-out department.”(Braverman, 1974, p.113)  These developments led to greater specialisation 
                                                            
9 Weber was writing this between 1914 and 1920. 
10 Also, an article in The Economist entitled Good Fences (17 December 1998) states that “politicians are giving 
up some of their sovereignty—and some of their control over the limits of  their territory—to the 
bureaucracies of supranational organisations.” 
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and huge growth in production levels.  Detailed planning became critical because of the level of 
investment involved and the complexity of the production process  -   nothing could be left to chance. 
 
It was now the turn of the owner to become separated from the means of production.   Up to this point 
the owner in the large industries was an entrepreneur, one whose function was drive innovation through, 
for example, exploiting inventions and other opportunities for producing goods or opening new outlets 
or new sources of supply.  Difficulties had to be overcome in such cases because of  obstruction from 
those opposed to, or concerned about, change or due to the difficulty in understanding the innovation.  
The entrepreneur was someone who was able to get things done against this background.  But then 
innovation itself became routine and “the romance of earlier commercial adventure [was] rapidly 
wearing away, because so many more things [could] be strictly calculated that had of old to be 
visualized in a flash of genius.” (Schumpeter, 1987, p.132) The entrepreneur came back into vogue for 
a while during the ‘dotcom era’ in the 1990s  -  an example of the potential of ICT to revive some lost 
practices and ways of life. 
 
Genius is unpredictable and one of the achievements of today’s industry is to be able to manage without 
it by getting a more predictable though less inspiring performance through “taking ordinary men, 
informing them narrowly and deeply and then, through appropriate organization, arranging to have their 
knowledge combined with that of other specialized but equally ordinary men.” (Galbraith, 1974, pp.76-
77)  This marks a shift of power “from capital to organized intelligence”(pp.72-73) as is evident from 
the dilution of  the stockholders power generally.(p.65)  This organised intelligence resides in the 
technostructure.   
 
The goal of the technostructure is stability rather than profit maximisation.   This stability is achieved 
through planning  -  planning for continuity of supply, for production, pricing strategies and containment 
of  possible market uncertainty.  To quote  Galbraith “the technostructure is compelled to put prevention 
of loss ahead of maximum return.   Loss can destroy the technostructure; high revenues accrue to 
others.”(p.176)  We have here the distinction between property and possession  -  while the stockholders 
may own the organisation, the technocrats have possession and control of it. 
 
Where decisions are not made by the technocrats, they are almost certainly initiated or proposed by 
them for ratification by higher management so most of the decision making is effectively done by the 
technostructure.  Even the technocrat who is ‘merely’ briefing the non-technical manager can 
significantly influence the decision-making of the latter by the information he or she chooses to provide 




The technostructure is part of, or at least overlaps with, the bureaucracy but the boundaries become 
blurred because of the difficulty in categorising some of the specialists such as technicians, scientists, 
analysts etc. As Galbraith puts it “a continuum [..] exists between the centre of the technostructure and 
the more routine white-collar workers on the fringe.  At some point power, or the chance for moving 
towards the centre becomes negligible.  But it is no longer possible to recognize that point.” (p.269) 
 
Feenberg provides an illustration of the bureaucracy/technocracy complex through the example of  
medical services in which “vast bureaucracies […] mobilise the labor of physicians […]; these 
bureaucracies draw their power not from their role in healing, but from control of buildings, instruments, 
and financial tools such as accounting systems and computers.”(Feenberg, 1995, p.88) 
 
In this environment, planning for investment and production is not enough;  the market and the supplies 
are other large variables that must be stabilised through planning.   Large organisations assist one 
another in this stabilising process through long-term contractual arrangements for supplies etc. Some 
of the best examples of controlling markets are to be found in the ICT business where we’re led to 
believe we’re purchasing consumer items but we are in fact locking ourselves into proprietary systems.  
Ultimately the objective is to locate all effective decision-making, relating not just to the organisation 
itself but also to its external environment, deep within the technostructure thereby removing it from the 
influence of outsiders. (Galbraith, 1974, p.95)   Technology contributes to this in many ways including 
the replacement of blue-collar with white-collar workers and “opening the way for a massive shift from 
workers who are within the reach of unions  to those who are not.” (p.267)  
 
From this it follows that planning is critical to the success of an organisation because it assists in 
stabilising the environment.  Luhmann, however, asserts that planning increases rather than decreases 
dependence on chance because “[more] information means more internal disorder, more problems in 
producing order out of order and disorder.”(Luhmann, 1990, p.150)  Almost inevitably, this leads 
merely to an expansion of the technocracy to help in re-establishing the order.  Galbraith outlines the 
consequences of technology. (Galbraith, 1974, pp.32-35)  These illustrate the increased inflexibility and 
therefore an element of determinacy that is introduced into the organisation.  They include  
 
• an increased timespan for the completion of any task;  
• increased production capital needed in addition to that prompted by increased output; 
• money and time are committed “ever more inflexibly to the performance of a particular task.” 
• specialised and highly organised manpower, including specialists on organisation; 
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• “From the time and capital that must be committed, the inflexibility of this commitment, the needs 
of large organization and the problems of market performance under conditions of advanced 
technology, comes the necessity for planning.” 
 
Galbraith was writing at a time when consumer electronics were just coming on the market and before 
the PC or the Internet became available.   It could be argued, therefore, that his stated consequences are 
no longer valid since ICT has removed some of the barriers of time, place and organisation and this has 
allowed very successful businesses to be launched without the need for significant capital or supplies.  
The ICT industry itself provides the best examples of this with some of the software firms  rapidly 
growing into very large multinational corporations by their extraordinary means of locking-in 
customers.  As a result, thay have become a significant part of the globalisation process which, many 
would claim, is exerting a much greater influence or control than governments over the lives of the 
citizens.   The consequences outlined by Galbraith above, however, are still valid for many industries, 
particularly manufacturing industries. 
 
The recession following the debt crisis in 2008 in Ireland and elsewhere is evidence of the damage that 
can be caused by large corporations in search of capital and the powerlessness of governments to 
prevent it or even get adequate explanations from the technocrats.  When things go wrong, the technical 
explanations usually go unchallenged by the public who don’t understand the technicalities.   
Feenberg’s definition of technocracy as a political order “based on expertise rather than citizenship” 
(Feenberg, 1995, p.23) is relevant here.  I will return later to the question of whether ICT is a democratic, 
a neutral or a controlling technology. 
 
The technocracy is not confined to the private sector.   It is located also in the public sector.  ICT has 
helped bureaucracy enormously by providing much greater facilities and opportunities for record 
keeping and processing, analysis, planning, modelling etc.  As various systems and networks are 
developed through these activities the technocracy/bureaucracy consolidates its own power.    
 
2.15    Luhmann Overview 
According to Luhmann, society consists of a number of functionally differentiated sub-systems such as 
politics, the economy, law, education, science, etc.  The functional differentiation of society evolved 
around the eighteenth century from the stratified society that was differentiated by class.    Prior to this 
society was differentiated on a centre/periphery - usually city/country - basis which had evolved from 
the original tribal-type differentiation known as segmentary differentiation.   When a particular tribe or 
segment began to dominate, in trade for example, then a power imbalance tended to develop between 
the centre and periphery.     
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The significant advantage of functional differentiation is that, in theory at least, each individual has the 
opportunity to participate in, or avail of the services or benefits provided by the different functional 
systems. In previous societies, people generally found themselves confined to one of the separate 
hierarchical groups based on family, location, class, etc. and the benefits of wealth, opportunities, or 
services provided by society were not made available equally to all groups.   However, Luhmann notes 
that while function systems allow society to “claim equality and freedom for everybody” these systems 
have ways of “organizing their own boundaries, their own modes of inclusion and exclusion of persons 
[and can] transform equality into inequality and freedom into restraint.” (Luhmann, 2002, p.111)   
For Luhmann, society is not composed of people but of communications.  ‘Social’ implies 
communication.  People can use the social systems such as the economy or the law, but the systems 
themselves cannot be observed or analysed effectively as systems if they are taken to be composed of 
individual human beings.   Social systems are just one of three categories of autopoietic systems 
identified by Luhmann, the other two being biological and psychic systems.   Biological systems 
comprise bodies, cells and the various other living organisms.  Psychic systems are systems of 
consciousness, minds, thoughts, ideas etc. while social systems comprise communications.  So  
‘persons’ are not systems in themselves but “are a construct of the social system with which it refers to 
the conglomerate of organic and psychic systems.”(Seidl, 2014, p.10)  The psychic system triggers 
communications in the social system and the social system triggers thoughts in the psychic system. 
Much of Luhmann’s theory of society was built on borrowings from the theories of others, in particular 
the theory of autopoiesis from the biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela.   Biology is 
essentially a study of systems  -   life systems and the environment  -   and hence the frequency of use 
of biological terms in other disciplines.   It should be noted, however, that Nisbet,  challenges the idea 
of there being any affinity between evolutionary biology and the social sciences and he quotes Ernst 
Mayr saying that there is “no theoretical or substantive relation whatever” between the work of the 
geneticist or molecular biologist and that of the sociologist. Nisbet refers in particular, in this context, 
to the work of Talcott Parsons “and his followers.” (Nisbet, 1980, p.307) 
 
Maturana and Varela defined a living system as a system that reproduces itself recursively.  In the 
autopoiesis of a cell, for example, “a network of reactions” produce molecules which then interact and 
“generate and participate  recursively in the same network of reaction which produced them, and […]  
realize the cell as a material unity.”(p.2)  A significant aspect of autopoietic systems is that they are 
self-referential which implies that they are operationally closed and can, as a result, maintain their 
integrity.   The functionally differentiated social systems are, therefore, operationally closed such that 
each system has full control over its own operations.  No system is in a dominant position over any 
other system or systems so there is no central control of them.   There can, however, be structural 
coupling between systems which allows a system to detect developments in other systems through 
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‘perturbations’ or ‘irritations’ in the environment and to respond if necessary.  If, in the economic 
system, for example, there are ongoing warnings about a shortage of science and business graduates, 
then the education system is likely to become irritated by these and may decide to take action to address 
the problem.   The political system regularly responds to irritations from the economic system and this 
is reciprocated to the extent that more direct explicit connections develop between the two systems and 
dedifferentiation sets in which makes management within each much more complex. 
The move from hierarchy to functional differentiation has resulted in a more complex society.   
Luhmann even refers to the  hypercomplex society since “there are many competing descriptions of this 
complexity.”(p.109)   One reason for the increased complexity is the fact that different systems have 
different time frames or cycles.  Market cycles, corporate planning horizons, technology development 
cycles, government terms of office etc. will differ from one another.  Each system will be affected by 
decisions taken in some of the other systems but, being operationally closed, they operate independently 
and are not synchronised.  This makes decisions all the more complex.    
The question of complexity is very important to Luhmann but, although he is critical of the coverage it 
is given in the literature, (Luhmann, 2013, p.124) his own extensive coverage of it is no more 
satisfactory in terms of clarity. This reflects a problem generally with Luhmann in that he is not always 
precise or consistent. (King & Thornhill, 2006, p.188)11  He provides a very large jigsaw with a lot of 
missing and badly cut pieces. 
The world provides an outer limit or boundary for Luhmann’s systems theory.  One has to deduce from 
this that the world is not a system because it cannot have an environment outside itself, nor can it be an 
environment since the related system would then be part of its environment.   The complexity of the 
world is a function of all the circumstances and all that happens in the world and it is too complex to 
“be understood (ie given meaning), described or handled anymore.”(p. 193)   This arises because “[t]he 
more elements you have, the more each individual element is overstrained by connectivity 
requirements. […] The consequence of this is that, from a certain size upwards, each element can no 
longer be connected with every other, and that relations can now be created only selectively.” 
(Luhmann, 2013, p.124)    
The solution to the problem of complexity is to find ways of reducing the complexity.   But reducing 
complexity in the environment results in an increase in complexity in the system.   For example, in a 
small business with just a few staff, it is likely that each of them would have some familiarity with most 
of the business transactions and could handle queries from any customer.   As the business grows and 
                                                            
11 Hornung states that “Luhmann’s definitions or concepts do not seem to be precise, unequivocal, or, most 
especially, stable.  That is to say, they seem to be formulated for the moment and the present context, already 




the number of customers increases, it is necessary to formalise the channels of internal and external 
communications and establish distinct and more specialist departments within the organisation  -  the 
organisation becomes more ramified.   The more ramified it is, the better equipped it is to reflect and 
respond to the complexity of its environment.   Similarly, when the government introduces new 
regulations to streamline, say, some aspect of trade, this more than likely involves the formation of an 
additional section or office in a department to implement and monitor the regulations.  The environment 
(i.e. the trade) is simplified but complexity within the system (i.e. the department)  is increased with the 
extra office.  From this it can be seen that the growth of bureaucracy and the accumulation of power in 
bureaucracy is driven by a need to manage complexity in the environment.  
The transition to functional differentiation would have coincided more or less with a change in 
semantics from prudence and hazard to the management of risk.  But, for Luhmann, risk is not a clear 
concept since it is normally “defined by its antonym ‘safety’ and by its relation to practical affairs” but 
this is ambiguous since “in practical affairs there is no absolute safety.” (Luhmann, 1996, p.4)   So, with 
a future that by definition will always contain “elements of uncertainty”, why, he asks, do we invest so 
much effort in research on risk analysis, risk perception, and risk management etc. when an approach 
which would fit the traditional understanding of prudence in the face of hazard would be much more 
reasonable and simpler?   In fact there is so much analysis and research on risk that it contributes to 
“the increasing complexity of perspectives and information [which] may render our knowledge of the 
future even more uncertain.” (p.4)  In a competitive environment there is the additional factor that a 
decision aimed at reducing risk for one party is very likely to increase the danger for a competitor or 
competitors so there is a strong possibility that, of itself, risk management will not provide benefits to 
society overall. 
The “cleavage of decision making” due to the isolation of the risk management decisions from the 
dangers that these decisions cause for others, is now resulting in serious social problems (pp.16-17).  
Luhmann is concerned that greater participation “by all those who are concerned about and affected by 
decisions, including even future generations” is regularly advocated as a solution with Habermas being 
one of the most prominent advocates (p.17).   But such participation would overburden the democratic 
system since “participation, like rationalization, can only mean multiplication of decisions [..and…] the 
growth of bureaucracy.” (p.17)      
Another aspect of the risk management problem manifests itself  in the increased risk associated with 
lawsuits due to the complexity of the law nowadays and “the acceleration of changes by legislation 
[which] make outcomes even more unpredictable.” (p.15)  Yet among the main purposes of the law are 
increased safety and the reduction of risk.  But the problem with laws and regulations is that as one 
level of detail is covered, it exposes the next level of finer but more numerous details which the 
fastidious regulator cannot leave uncovered. 
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Luhmann’s view is that if risk is such a key aspect of decision making, what is needed is a “theory of 
modern society that explains why we have to make so many decisions and why modern society differs 
in this respect from traditional societies.” (p.5) 
While one would regard decisions as being a product, perhaps, of psychic systems, Luhmann says  
decisions are communications so they belong within the social systems.   They are produced by 
organisations which, being autopoietic, are a particular type of social system which reproduces itself on 
the basis of decisions. (Seidl, 2004, p.15)   Decision making is paradoxical because if the options 
proposed are equal in terms of the decision criteria, then it is not possible to make a decision other than 
one based on random choice but to do this requires a prior decision.   On the other hand, if the options 
proposed are not of equal value, then no decision is required.  “Only those questions that are in principle 
undecidable, we can decide – everything else would be mere calculation.” (p.20)   Strictly speaking, it 
is not possible to resolve the paradox because, as mentioned, deciding on how decisions are to be made 
defers the decision and takes one into an infinite regress “unless the paradox ends up in a place where 
it is not ‘noticed’” and thus prevents a state of paralysis (p.21).  The decision paradox is central to 
Luhmann’s theory of organisations because “most organisational phenomena can […] be traced back 
to this undecidability of decisions.” (p.21)   
Decision making is simplified by uncertainty absorption which enables one to make decisions without 
having to go right back to the start every time.   “[U]ncertainty absorption takes place when a decision 
is used by subsequent decisions as [a] decision premise” (p.18) –  it allows one to move on.        Luhmann 
links authority to uncertainty absorption since it “makes it possible to continue with communication on 
the basis of the assumption that someone can actually give reasons why he selects a certain topic rather 
than another.” (Luhmann, 2013, pp.224-225)   He also quotes Carl Joachim Friedrich’s definition of 
authority as the “capacity for reason elaboration.” (pp. 224) 
Luhmann’s objective is to provide us with the tools not just to observe society, but to observe the 
observers of society which would include observing ourselves.   He wants us to be aware of the context 
within which we observe society and we can attain this awareness through second-order observation.   
The first-order observer observes what is there while the second-order observer observes how the first-
order observer sees it.12   Second-order observation is about understanding the context within which 
society is observed and in this there are some similarities with deconstruction.    
                                                            
12 Hollander, Jaap den; Historicism, Hermeneutics, Second Order Observation: Luhmann Observed by 
a Historian; (n.d.)  www.intechopen.com/books/social-sciences-and-cultural-studies-issues-of-
language-public-opinion-education-and-welfare   [Accessed: 17 September 2016] 




In the past, second-order observation was undertaken on our behalf by privileged observers such as the 
clergy, the literati, the “transcendental subject,” (Luhmann, 2002, p.108) or the “Great Observer [with] 
the all-seeing eye.”(Hollander, n.d., p.54)   Luhmann is now encouraging us to become “observers of 
all those theories, concepts and beliefs which people use to understand events, attribute causes, make 
predictions and so on.”  And he exhorts us to “free ourselves from our own moral, religious, ethical, 
ideological and political beliefs and attitudes, and become neutral observers of the social world.” (King 
& Thornhill, 2005, p.2) 
In most cases with function systems, we are second-order observers.   Hollander mentions how 
historians work mostly with texts and other relics from the past so they are “second order observers, 
who observe how people from the past observed their own world.” (Hollander, n.d., p.40)  He adds that 
“Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolution […] shows that even scientific observations are 
historical relative” and scientists are still struggling with “Kuhn’s concept of paradigms.”(p.55)  
Stichweh notes that “[m]odern science […] in all its cognitive operations always refers to observations 
by other scientists already published before.”13  
When reading Luhmann, it is not always clear as to what is being observed and who the observers are. 
(Luhmann, 2002, pp.94-96)14   Also, it can be difficult to ascertain where the philosophers or 
sociologists fit among the observed and the various levels of observer.   However, he is very clear when 
answering his own question as to “how the world society can observe and describe itself and its 
environmental conditions given the enormous variety of living conditions, of cultural traditions, of 
political regimes” etc. The answer is that the observing and describing is done by the mass media 
(Luhmann, 2002, p.107).  Indeed, the opening sentence in his book The Reality of the Mass Media is: 
“Whatever we know about our society, or indeed about the world in which we live, we know through 
the mass media.” (Luhmann, 2000, p.1)  The mass media are the first order observers and we do the 
second order observing via the newspapers, radio, television etc. 
Luhmann provides us with a very rational, comprehensive, although often obscure, model of society.  
But he often steps outside this model to offer very incisive insights from a more pragmatic perspective 
as though taken from a higher level of observation. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
                                                            
13 Stichweh, Rudolph; Niklas Luhmann; http://www.fiw.uni-
bonn.de/demokratieforschung/personen/stichweh/pdfs/81_stw_niklas-luhmann-blackwell-companion-
to-major-social-theorists.pdf   [Accessed: 17th September 2016] 
14 This provides an example of the difficulty encountered in trying to identify the first order observer. 
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In this chapter I have given an overview of the main features of democracy as proposed by some of the 
leading theorists.    They range from the theoretical to the very practical and it’s this variety that gives 
democracy the flexibility to be successful and durable in many different environments.    I have 
highlighted a number of aspects including the significance of active citizen participation in democracy 
about which there is wide disagreement; the important role of myth in politics which I believe is 
extremely important but is often overlooked or not accepted at all;  the centrality of conflict in the 
political process which tends to be misunderstood; and bureaucracy, abstraction, the “tyranny of small 
decisions”, and functional differentiation which I will be returning to throughout the thesis since these 
play a key role also in the discussions on ICT and in my overall thesis. 
Chapter 3   Technology  
Chapter Introduction 
Opinion among the theorists is divided with some claiming that technology itself is neutral while others 
claim it is deterministic or autonomous.   Another group take a ‘middle way’ approach based on an 
analysis of the historical and cultural contexts within which technology has developed since the 
Industrial Revolution and conclude that the development takes the form of a dialectical or synthesising 
process between humans and the technology.    
 
In this chapter I outline some of the main theories on the development of technology generally together 
with some historical and cultural background that influenced the development.    This includes a 
summary of Heidegger’s essay “The Question Concerning Technology” which is a seminal work in the 
philosophy of technology. 
 
3.1 Technology 
Any philosophical analysis of ICT must start with technology itself.   It is only in the last three decades 
or so that technology has become a significant issue for philosophy despite the impact it has on human 
existence, on nature and on the environment generally.    The argument that this is because there wasn’t 
an awareness of the full impact on living and social conditions until the mid-twentieth century doesn’t 
stand up since the upheavals that accompanied the Industrial Revolution one and a half centuries earlier 
had, in many ways, a much greater impact.  Another argument is that technology always followed 
science and was therefore regarded as ‘applied science’, an argument which was first challenged by 




For Ihde, this argument about technology being applied science arises from the Platonist or idealist  
“classical mind-body arguments” in which science and technology are analogous to the mind and body 
respectively (Ihde, 1979, p.xxi).   Smithurst gives some examples of the practice following the theory 
and also of cases where the two are intertwined and develop in parallel. In addition, some “devices are 
invented, but for the laboratory, for the purposes of theory, and to feed the inquisitiveness of discovery.” 
(Smithurst, 1995, p.22)  Then there is the clear case of the atom bomb which “sprang fully armed from 
the head of theory.” (p.23)   Generally, until the advent of modern science, the theory was derived from 
the practice but in the twentieth century the picture is more complex.   As Smithurst concludes, the 
sciences themselves are interwoven  -  “[y]ou cannot have chemistry and mechanics and leave behind 
astronomy and geology”  -  and technology is interwoven with these (p.27).    
In “The Question Concerning Technology”, Heidegger seeks the essence of technology which, he 
emphasises, has to be distinguished from technology itself in the same way that the essence of tree 
“which pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree.” (Heidegger, 1977, p.4) So “the essence of 
technology is by no means anything technological.” (p.4)   He warns us against the danger of treating 
technology as something neutral since, in doing so, “we are delivered over to it in the worst possible 
way” and it “makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.” (p.4)   He gives both an instrumental 
definition of modern technology, i.e. technology is a means to an end; and an anthropological definition, 
i.e. technology is a human activity, and notes that the instrumental definition is correct  -  which is not 
to imply that the anthropological definition is not correct  -  but it does not inform us as to the essence 
of technology.   This leads to an analysis of the instrumental definition which concerns means and ends, 
in other words an analysis of causality and this leads Heidegger back to the Aristotelian doctrine of the 
four causes (p.6).   But in reaching back to the these, he focuses on the term aition used by the Greeks, 
in place of the term cause which we use, and translates this as “that to which something else is indebted.” 
(p.7)   As a result, a silver chalice is indebted to the silver from which it’s made and it is indebted to the 
aspect or form of chaliceness for its shape.    If the chalice is to be used for sacrificial rites, then this is 
its telos, the final cause, which Heidegger says is often misinterpreted as purpose or aim (p.8). 
 
There is one other ‘cause’, the efficient cause which, in the case of the chalice, is the silversmith who 
“considers carefully and gathers together the three aforementioned ways of being responsible and 
indebted.” (p.8) 
Heidegger takes the analysis of German and classical Greek words further to avoid the danger of 
misinterpreting “being responsible and being indebted moralistically as a lapse, or […] in terms of 
effecting.”   Instead, the four ways “are responsible for the silver chalice’s lying ready before us as a 
sacrificial vessel.”(p.9)  They bring it into our presence.   “They let it come forth into presencing.” (p.9)  
He then introduces the term occasioning saying that “[i]t is in the sense of […] starting something on 
its way into arrival that being responsible is an occasioning or an inducing to go forward.”   He 
concludes from this that “to occasion” is “the essence of causality thought as the Greeks thought it.” 
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In a quote from Plato’s Symposium, Heidegger links occasioning to poiēsis  -  “Every occasion for 
whatever passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing is poiēsis, is 
bringing-forth.” (p.10)  This, however, does not agree with other translations in so far as those 
translations do not provide a direct link between occasioning or presencing and poiēsis which is critical 
to Heidegger’s etymological chain.15   Nevertheless, the chain of meaning is maintained.   Poiēsis is 
explained in the relevant passage from Nehemas and Woodruff’s translation as follows: 
“[E]verything that is responsible for creating something out of nothing is a kind of poetry; and 
so all creations of every craft and profession are themselves a kind of poetry, and everyone who 
practices a craft is a poet.” 
Heidegger distinguishes two types of poiēsis.   One, ‘physis’ refers to an entity reproducing or 
“bringing-forth […] in itself” which occurs in nature and is similar to ‘autopoiesis’ mentioned earlier 
in the context of Luhmann’s theory.   In contrast, ‘poiēsis en allōi’  as in the ‘bringing-forth’ of the 
silver chalice, requires the intervention of the craftsman   (Heidegger, 1977, pp.10-11).  
Poiesis or bringing-forth into presencing can be also be regarded as the unconcealment or revealing 
of that which was previously concealed.   This revealing is what the Romans called ‘veritas’ and we 
now call ‘truth’(p.12).  “Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of 
technology” (p.12) and therefore technology provides a means for the craftsman to reveal the truth.  
Heidegger considers the origin of the word ‘technology’ and its derivation from the Greek word 
‘technikon’ which “means that which belongs to technē”(p.12) and the word technē was linked to  
the word episteme, both of which mean to be expert in a subject.  Technē refers to the work and 
skills of the artisan in the case of the crafts and the poet or artist in the case of the fine arts.   It relates 
directly to poiēsis en allōi which is the revealing or bringing forth of “whatever does not bring itself 
forth and does not yet lie here before us.”   He adds that what is revealed “can look and turn out now 
one way and now another” which can mean that the intermediary has choices as to the outcome 
(p.13).  As an example, one who builds a house “reveals what is to be brought forth [and this] 
revealing gathers together in advance the aspect and matter of the house.”   Heidegger concludes 
that “what is decisive in technē does not lie at all in making or manipulating nor in the using of 
means, but rather in […] revealing. […]  Technology is a mode of revealing.”(p.13)   He then 
considers whether this definition of technology, which is derived from Greek thought and certainly 
applies to the work of the craftsman, can also be applied to “modern machine-powered technology” 
which is very different since “it is based on modern physics as an exact science.”(p.14) Noting that 
                                                            
15The content of this translation does not agree with the content of the translation by Nehemas and Woodruff 






the reverse applies also since physics is dependent on technology for laboratory and other 
experimental equipment, he states that modern technology is also a revealing “but not in the sense 
of poiēsis.”   
Modern technology is not a ‘bringing-forth’ but a ‘challenging-forth’.    “The revealing that rules in 
modern technology is a challenging […] which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply 
energy that can be extracted and stored as such.” (p.14)  Heiddeger elaborates further on the 
revealing or challenging of modern technology saying that the energy in nature is unlocked, “what 
is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed 
and what is distributed is switched about ever anew.” (p.16)   What is stored is designated the 
“standing reserve” (p.17) which cannot be regarded simply as stock; it is something more since it 
reveals itself on being challenged. 
Heidegger contrasts a windmill, where the wind turns the sails and uses the energy directly without 
storing it, (p.14) with a hydroelectric plant on the River Rhine.   Whereas the windmill is passive in 
allowing, with minimum interference, the wind to work the sails, the Rhine no longer flows freely 
as it is damned up, challenged, to control the flow and maximise the power to produce electricity.  
He compares the Rhine of the poet’s artwork and the Rhine of the power works.    He goes further 
to assert that while “the Rhine is still a river in the landscape,” it is so merely “as an object on call 
for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry.” (p.16)  
The challenging is accomplished by man, but only at the beckoning of  ‘unconcealment’ itself.   He 
can only respond to what addresses itself to him (p.18).   “[M]an drives technology forward [and] 
takes part in ordering as a way of revealing.”  People have a role, and perhaps some influence, in the 
ordering of the standing reserve but, as a human resource “commanded by profit-making”, 
Heidegger asks, do they not also belong to the standing reserve? (p.18)   The challenging that 
provokes people to exploit nature, including the Earth, air, Sun etc., is called Enframing or, in 
German, Gestell, which Heidegger says is “the name for the essence of modern technology.”(p.20)  
Enframing is not technology.    A machine and its parts such as wheels, rods, electronic components 
etc. can be classified as technology and they come into action in response “to the challenge of 
Enframing” (p.21) but Enframing “is itself nothing technological.” (p.20)   
Gestell is usually translated as ‘frame’ or ‘bookrack’ or some similar object in which things are 
stored in an orderly fashion for easy retrieval.   In this case it implies that whatever is revealed is to 
be ordered, sorted, configured, secured, regulated etc. as standing reserve.  “[M]an’s ordering 
attitude and behaviour display themselves first in the rise of modern physics as an exact science.” 
(p.21)   Heidegger labels modern physics the “herald of Enframing.” (p.22)   Modern physics is 
concerned with forces and subatomic particles and therefore “its realm of representation remains 
inscrutable and incapable of being visualized.” (p23)   In this realm it is difficult to see how the 
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doctrine of the four causes can be applied when “nature reports itself in some way or other that is 
identifiable through calculation and […] remains orderable as a system of information.” (p.23)  
(Through modern science, nature becomes an abstraction and modern science also enables the 
technology to manage the abstraction.)   We are “continually approaching the brink of the possibility 
of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of deriving all [our] 
standards on this basis.” (p.26) In other words, we do not consider what cannot be measured.   Failing 
to realise that we become part of the standing reserve, we become arrogant.    Because of the 
predominant influence of science in defining and explaining our world, we miss the truth of what 
the world is.   The danger is “that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will 
present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve.”(p.33)  Enframing conceals even 
itself.    
Enframing presents a serious danger for humanity.  This prompts Heidegger to quote the lines from 
Hölderlin: 
“But where danger is, grows  
The saving power also.” 
He takes from this the reassurance that “the essence of technology must harbour in itself the growth 
of the saving power.” (p.28)  This leads to a further investigation of what is meant by ‘essence’ in 
the context of enframing.   Essence designates what something is. It distinguishes its main 
characteristic, its ‘whatness’.   Heidegger uses the example of different types of trees such as oak, 
ash, beech etc.    They all share a common ‘treeness’.  “Under this inclusive genus  -  the “universal”  
-  fall all real and possible trees.” (p.29)   If enframing were the essence of technology in the sense 
of genus as with trees, then every machine, tool or artefact of technology would be ‘an enframing’ 
just as any oak or ash is a tree.   But enframing is not a genus, it is a way of revealing, of challenging, 
“which allots itself to man.” (p.29)   Heidegger is not explicit as to how its allots itself to man but 
according to Lovitt, his translator, “such a way of revealing is seen when man becomes subject, 
when from out of his consciousness he assumes dominion over everything outside himself, when he 
represents and objectifies and, in objectifying, begins to take control over everything.” (p.xxix) 
According to Heidegger, essence endures in the same manner as Plato’s concept of idea endures.   
Enduring is therefore one of the characteristics of enframing.   He then associates the term ‘granting’ 
with ‘enduring’ based on Goethe’s use of the words interchangeably due to their phonetic similarity 
in German and adds that “That which endures primally out of the earliest beginning is what grants.” 
(p.31)  What happens therefore is that while the ‘challenging forth’ element of  enframing  throws 
us into  “the frenziedness of ordering” which prevents us from seeing the full truth revealed to us, 
the more primal granting allows us to endure so that at some time in the future we will enable and 
witness the coming to presence of truth (p.33).   We will experience the full richness of technē where, 
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to borrow some of Cassirer’s terms, the abstractions of language and science will be balanced by the 
intensifications of art (Cassirer, 1992, p.143). 
Heidegger’s essay has to be seen in the context of his philosophy of Being.   It is summed up in Lovitt’s 
interpretation that technology is “that phenomenon, ruled from out of Being itself, that is centrally 
determining all of Western history.” (Heidegger, 1977, p.xxix)   Some of his arguments appear weak.  
For example his argument swings from the pessimism arising from the danger of Enframing to the 
optimism of the ‘saving power’ based solely on the two lines from Hölderlin without providing any of 
Hölderlin’s context.  To identify the saving power, Heidegger relies on the association of different 
German and Greek words based on their meaning or phonetic formation and thus making parts of the 
essay as much a study in etymology as a study of technology.   But the apparent weakness arises from 
his effort to avoid the  trap he identifies in another essay, where a “countermovement […] necessarily 
remains, as does everything “anti,” held fast in the essence of that over against which it moves.” (p.61)    
He avoids the trap by writing in the expansive and imaginative style of the poet rather than following 
the strictly  rational and calculative discipline of the logician or scientist. 
 
Heim takes the implications of enframing a step further saying that “[t]he way technology enframes us 
affects our analysis of it, as it affects all reality apprehensions.  At the same time, reciprocally, the way 
technology enframes, also depends on the way we construe our interface with it.” (Heim, 1987, p.98) 
 
As regards the primacy of technology over science, Heidegger says that although “mathematical physics 
arose almost two centuries before [modern] technology,[the latter] got under way only when it could be 
supported by exact physical science”  and then quotes the Greek thinkers saying “[t]hat which is 
primally early shows itself only ultimately to men.” (Heidegger, 1977, pp.21-22)  Ihde notes that 
Heidegger “reveals a strongly romantic trait” in his preference for “traditional technologies over high-
tech and complex technologies” and this may weaken his case but it “does not mitigate the early insights 
involving technology as a way of seeing.” (Ihde, 1991, p.57) 
 
Ihde supports Heidegger’s position about technology preceding science but also claims that the belief 
in technology being merely applied science, although false, has had a profound effect on our assessment 
of, and probably therefore our relationship with, technology.    Until recent decades, philosophy paid 
little attention to technology compared to the attention paid to science and when it did consider 
technology, the interpretation tended to be the idealist one, i.e. technology as applied science.    By the 
time philosophy was taking technology seriously, concerns about the social and ethical impacts of 
technology were emerging and philosophy began to focus on these (Ihde, 1979, p.xxii).  According to 
Ihde, these questions, “as urgent and as important as they are, deal with effects of technology rather than 
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examine the phenomenon itself.” (p.xxiii)   We are therefore left with a lesser insight into technology 
itself than we have into science. 
 
Idhe says that if we take technology to be applied science, then a “series of relations may be formalized 
thusly: 
Science   →  Technology   →   Social Effect 
 
Here the original cause is science as concept; technology is its effect or application; and the ethical or 
social effect is the tertiary phenomenon.”  Therefore, in focusing on the social effects, we are merely 
focusing on a tertiary phenomenon.   “[T]he only radical way of treating any problems which arise at 
the end of the series as other than symptoms, would call for revision or change in the cause, in this case 
the conceptual foundations of science itself.”(p.xxiii) 
 
Ihde provides an analysis of how we relate to technology or, as he describes it, “a phenomenology of 
human-technology relations to discover the various structural features of those ambiguous relations” 
(Ihde, 2009, p.76) and he identifies four different types of relations  -  Embodied, Hermeneutic, Alterity 
and Background. 
 
Embodied Relations:  Ihde uses the wearing of glasses (spectacles) or the use of a telescope as  examples 
of an embodiment relation. Here the technology comes between the “seer and the seen.”(p.77)   One 
has to learn or take time to become familiar with the technology and the better the design, the easier 
this will be.  As one becomes competent in its use, the technology becomes more transparent until one 
is almost oblivious to it  -  the technology ‘withdraws’ and the person is hardly aware that they are using 
it to experience the world.  The technology almost becomes part of oneself, it’s an extension of oneself. 
 
The better the design, the greater the transparency and this can lead to “a wish for total transparency, 
total embodiment, for technology to truly “become me.” Were this possible, it would be equivalent to 
there being no technology, for total transparency would be my body and senses.” (p.78)     
 
Hermeneutic Relations: Hermeneutic relations involve interpretation which usually requires the reading 
of an instrument, a text, an image or some other representation of an object, event or process.   Ihde 
uses the example of the Three Mile Island incident where a nuclear meltdown almost occurred due to a 
misreading of an instrument panel while it was impossible to observe directly the pile or the equipment 
where the problem was occurring.   In cases such as this the “immediate perceptual focus of the 
[observer’s] experience is the control panel” but the reading on the panel “is now dependent upon the 
semi-opaque connection between the instruments and the referent object (the pile).” (p.84-85)   Another 
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example would be the temperature gauge in a car.   The gauge gives the exact temperature of the engine 
without the observer being able to experience it directly.    
 
Map reading is another example.  In this case the reader is focused on the map but the map “retains a 
representational isomorphism with the natural features of the landscape […] there is a kind of 
representational ‘transparency’ [which] ‘refers’ beyond itself to what it represents.” (p.83)    
 
Ihde provides a range of examples where perception is increasingly mediated by gradually more 
sophisticated technologies.  In the case of spectrographic astronomy, for example, it doesn’t provide 
any spatial representation of a star but “merely a band of differently colored rainbow stripes.”    The 
star is “mediated not only instrumentally but in a transformation such that we must now thematically 
read the result.  And only the informed reader can do the reading.”   A further transformation is possible 
by converting the output of the spectrograph to digital (pp.88-89).   
 
In discussing hermeneutics, Ihde considers shamanism and the interpretation of bones, entrails etc. and 
notes that this is “close to a familiar association between magic and the origins of technology suggested 
by many writers.”   He suggests that while the hermeneutic relations in this primitive practice have 
many shortcomings especially in detecting specific bodily ailments, the emphasis is on diagnosing 
underlying communal or social problems.  “The sometimes socially contextless emphasis of Western 
medicine upon a presumably ‘mechanical’ body may overlook precisely the context which the shaman 
so clearly recognises.”(p.87)  There is a contextual similarity between this and Heidegger’s thinking in 
relation to technology as “a revealing.” 
 
Alterity Relations:  Ihde borrows the term ‘alterity’ from Levinas who spoke of “the radical difference 
posed to any human by another human, an other” (p.90) in a face-to-face encounter.  We can have an 
embodiment relation with technology when the equipment we are using seems so much part of us that 
we do not even notice it explicitly.  However, if the equipment is unusable because it is missing or 
damaged, then we become very much aware of it, of its othernesss (Heidegger, 1962, p.105).  We see 
it in opposition to us, or as a competitor.   An example would be a computer or a piece of software with 
which someone is very familiar and which they ‘love’ using, but when it breaks down, “this quasi-love 
relationship reveals it quasi-hate underside.”  He adds that hacking “becomes the game-like competition 
in which an entire system is the alterity correlate.” (Ihde, 2009, p.92)  This sense of the technological 
competitor can also be found in various types of computer games. 
 
Backround Relations:   This applies to technologies that are in the background and “texture the 
immediate environment.”(p.95)  Lighting and heating systems are examples of background technology.    
Cookers, washing machines and other automatic appliances  which although they have to be turned on 
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and off or readjusted regularly, work most of the time without interference and one often becomes aware 
of the sound of them only when they stop and go silent. 
 
 
3.2 Technological Neutrality 
In its traditional or Aristotelian conception, technology is seen  not as “an end in itself but simply as a 
means to some further end.  [It] is as it were extrinsic to man’s nature.” (Hood, 1983, p.347)  This is a 
definition of ‘neutral’  technology.   Traditional tools such as the hammer and the handsaw are neutral  
-  they cannot work independently of an operator, they must be moved and guided at all times. They are 
“subservient to human choices” and are “neutral with respect to values and purposes” and because of 
this they tend to be very versatile and practical (Kaplan, 2009, p.xvi).   To quote Heim, “the tool may 
alter the conditions under which we live, it does not itself become a condition under which we live, as 
does, for instance,  the network of highways we traverse with automobiles.” (Heim, 1987, p.33)  Kaplan 
equates neutrality with instrumentality since he uses both terms to designate value-free technology 
(Kaplan, 2009, p.xvi).  
 
Most, if not all, hand tools fall into the neutral category.   Machines are not as easy to categorise.    
According to Mumford “the essential distinction between a machine and a tool lies in the degree of 
independence in the operation from the skill and motive power of the operator; the tool lends itself to 
manipulation, the machine to automatic action.” (Ingold, 2000, p.300)   However, as he indicates, the 
distinction -  and perhaps also the neutrality -  is a matter of degree.   The traditional pedal-operated 
lathe is totally dependent on the direct input of the operator for both motive power and guidance.  The 
electric lathe is dependent on the operator for guidance only whereas the stencil lathe which copies 
patterns has no direct input from the operator for either motive power or guidance.     
 
For Heidegger, the significant distinction is that between traditional and modern technology.  As 
mentioned above, he defines all technology as a way of revealing where, in the case of traditional art 
and craft technologies, the resulting output or artefact reveals itself (poiēsis).   In the case of modern 
technology, the revealing is brought about through a challenging or demanding of nature.  As an 
example he contrasts the windmill with the damn on the river.   The windmill could be considered a 
machine under Mumford’s definition but in harnessing the wind to provide energy, it does so in a 
passive manner.  It allows the wind to turn its sails but “they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing.” 
(Heidegger, 1977, p.14) The windmill doesn’t really interfere with nature. The damn, on the other hand, 





Both the windmill and the damn could be considered non-neutral since they are not versatile in that they 
serve only one purpose or end.    Alternatively, the windmill could be considered neutral since it  
interferes only very minimally with nature or with its environment.    
 
Some will still argue today that all technology is neutral, that it is ultimately under the control of humans 
who determine its output and is therefore but a means.   
 
 
3.3 Technological Determinism 
Kaplan defines technological determinism as “the idea that technology drives the course of history” and 
this is reflected, he says, in the references to various periods as the Iron Age, the Industrial Revolution 
and the Information Age.  “Technology imposes on a society specific social-political consequences. 
[…S]ociety responds more to technology than technology responds to society.” (Kaplan, 2009, pp. xvi-
xvii) This, he classifies as strong determinism whereas a technology such as email that merely 
influences social relations would be an example of weak determinism since it did not cause social 
change but “had a profound influence on the way we communicate.”   The terms hard and soft 
determinism are sometimes used instead. 
 
As an illustration of how technology can shape society, Dusek quotes the example of the feudal system 
in Europe which developed from the need to provide support for the mounted armoured knight and his 
emergence, in turn, was made possible by the introduction of the stirrup (although he adds that historians 
might argue about the details of this).  He expresses the view, however, that “in most cases there is an 
inextricable feedback from technology to culture and from culture to technology.” (Dusek, 2006, p.85) 
 
For Sclove, technology is influential but not determining since “there is always a margin of flexibility 
in how existing technological artifacts may be used or operated.” (Sclove, 1995, p.17)   The margin, 
however, is finite and varies with the technology and the timing.   He quotes, as an example, the 
installation of running water in the houses in the small Spanish village of Ibieca in the 1970s which 
brought to an end the social interactions that took place and strong bonds that existed between the 
women, children and men as they gathered throughout each day at the village fountain and washbasin.  
The introduction of running water and washing machines did not prevent them from gathering but the 
technology did alter “the system of inducements and interdependencies that formerly made such 
gathering occur naturally.” (pp.3,17)  Some would take a stronger deterministic line and identify 
technological processes as “the equivalent of a form of law […] as a binding expression of social norms 
and values” which everyone is obliged to accept.(p.11)  What is particularly significant is that many of 
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the modern technologies exert a structural social influence even on non-users of those same 
technologies (pp.14-15). 
 
Sclove mentions a number of factors that would support the deterministic view of modern technology.  
Many of these relate not to the focal, or intended, effects of technology but to the non-focal or secondary 
effects and these are likely to include negative environmental effects such as pollution and the depletion 
of natural resources or social effects such as unemployment (p.10).  Also, modern technologies such as 
the worldwide web tend to be dependent on other technologies and systems such as the electricity supply 
system.  Other systems such as communications and travel systems which would have been dependent 
on the electricity supply system now become dependent on the web also.   As a result, these systems 
and technologies become integrated and interdependent and their development is therefore irreversible 
(p.19). The interdependencies extend to more and more systems and the individual technologies “are 
designed so that they deliver their focal results in experiential abstraction from the countless other 
sociotechnical structures and processes required to bring them about.” (p.103) 
 
Because the interdependencies are not always obvious and the different systems or technologies cannot 
be clearly delineated, then the relationships are probably better described as entanglement rather than 
interdependence.   Entanglement also sums up the situation outlined by Sclove where “adverse 
externalities can […] perversely inhibit adoption […] of alternative technologies that would reduce 
production of the initial harm.”  He mentions, as an example, that “the pollution, noise and danger of 
cars” inhibits one from the alternative of using the non-polluting bicycle (p.166).  In the broader context 
he says that “the entire ensemble of modern technological systems -  including the background 
conditions required to keep them operating  -  tends to promote centrally coordinated, technocratic 
social administration.” (p.16)   It is not just the complexity and the spread of these systems that causes 
the drive towards centralisation.   When, for example, tensions or conflicts reflecting an element of 
NIMBYISM16 arise between local communities over proposals to locate some infrastructure such as 
high-tension power lines, gas pipelines or sewage plants, in one of their areas, these conflicts “will tend 
to elicit the involvement of high-level political institutions” thereby denying the local communities the 
hands-on experience of democratic politics. 
 
The most significant developments in society and culture arose from the technology of writing and, 
later on, the printing press.  Writing, according to Ong, “was and is the most momentous of all human 
technological inventions.” (Ong, 1982, p.85)17 The phonetic alphabet, as perfected by the Greeks, “was 
                                                            
16 Not In My BackYard 
17 In relation to philosophy itself, Ong raises the question that if it “is reflective about its own nature, what is it 
to make of the fact that philosophical thinking cannot be carried on by the unaided human mind but only by 
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democratizing in the sense that it was easy for everyone to learn.  It was also internationalizing in that 
it provided a way of processing even foreign tongues.” (p.90)  McLuhan highlights the fact that the 
alphabet, “when combined with papyrus, […] spelled the end of the stationary temple bureaucracies 
and the priestly monopolies of knowledge and power.” (McLuhan, 1967, p.92) 
 
During the Homeric period prior to the invention of writing, the poets and druids were the guardians of 
civilisation and culture.  Their encyclopaedic knowledge and formulas for memorisation and recitation, 
were developed for the “preservation of a magisterial tradition” and they enjoyed a command over 
education and government, which was lost as soon as alphabetic literacy was placed at the disposal of 
political power.” (Havelock, 1963, p.94)  This was, of course, the basis of Plato’s antagonism against 
the poets. 
 
Over two millennia after the invention of writing and when knowledge and power were again  
monopolised by the Church and other autocracies, the introduction of Gutenbergh’s printing press with 
movable type helped to break the power of these institutions and was instrumental in the development 
of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and all that followed.   While the invention of 
the phonetic alphabet and the printing press resulted in a redistribution of power, they also resulted in a 
diminution of sensibility since “the eye has none of the delicacy of the ear” (McLuhan, 1962, p.27) and 
in greater specialisation although Steiner questions whether these were the effects or the causes (Steiner, 
1985, p.285). 
 
If technological determinism is a fact -  if changes can be effected in society through the medium of 
technology, then technology can become a powerful political, economic and cultural weapon as some 









3.4 Autonomous Technology 
                                                            





To say that technology is autonomous is to say that it is independent of human control in both its 
operation and development.   Technology is invented, developed and operated by humans but they do 
not control it.   Autonomous technology “generally presupposes technological determinism.” (Dusek, 
2006, p.84)18 Jacques Ellul, who published his paper The Technological Order (Mitcham & Mackey, 
1983, pp.86-105) in 1963 is the person most closely associated with the term ‘autonomous technology’.  
 
Ellul claims that humans, although they exploit technology,19 are “to an ever greater degree the object[s] 
of certain techniques and their procedures” and he lists as examples, pedagogical techniques, 
psychotechniques, intelligence testing and others (p.88).  While these techniques are administered by 
other humans, these people are, in turn, exploited by still other techniques. 
 
Ellul counters the argument that ultimately technology contributes to the happiness of the individual, 
by emphasising the distinction between happiness and freedom.   To be free is to be the subject rather 
than object and consequently to have the freedom to decide the direction of technological development 
and to master the technology.   But people cannot be masters of technology; they cannot impose values 
on it and any values that exist in the technological society “are simply there to justify what is; or they 
are generalities without consequence; or technical progress realizes them automatically as a matter of 
course.”(p.89)   
 
Those who would be seen as the likely people to put humans in command of technology - to make them 
subjects rather than objects  -  are not, according to Ellul, capable of doing so.   They include the 
philosophers who have but a small influence on society; the technicians who “cannot make the slightest 
claim to have mastered any technique but [their] own”; the scientists who are too specialised and naive 
when it comes to considering the more general issues and the politicians who are subject to the electorate 
who, in turn, “are primarily concerned with the happiness and wellbeing which they think [technology] 
assures them.” 
 
Ellul examines the possibility of a new civilisation which is inclusive of technology and concludes it is 
not possible because: 
 
                                                            
18 Dusek also says that “technological determinism does not, on the face of it, presuppose  autonomous 
technology” but adds that this is undermined if one accepts the argument that “science has a  logic of its own,” 
as Heilbroner claims and that “technology is applied science” which is at variance with  Heidegger. 
 
19 Ellul uses the French term ‘Technique’ rather than ‘technology’.  There is confusion over the translation of   
     ‘La Technique’ but it is taken here as ‘technology’ i.e. any form of rationalised methodology. (See Stephen J.  
     Kline  -  What is Technology  -  Scharff & Dusek 2003) 
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• “When [technology] displays any interest in man, it does so by converting him into a material 
object.”   The technically quantitative takes over from the humanly qualitative (p.90). 
 
• Technical growth has brought us to a point where “we are confronted for the first time with the 
possibility of the annihilation of all life on earth, since we have the means to accomplish it.  In every 
sphere of action we are faced with just such absolute possibilities.”   Governments have absolute 
power in amalgamating “organizational, psychological, and police techniques [….and] when power 
becomes absolute, values disappear.” 
 
• Technology brings with it “a necessary order and a determinate process […] which freedom, 
unorthodoxy, and the sphere of the gratuitous and the spontaneous cannot penetrate.” (p.91) 
 
In examining the problems posed by technology, Ellul highlights some of the impediments to addressing 
them.   These include the tendency “to consider technology something possessing sacred character” and 
technical progress as one of humanity’s supreme achievements rather than as “a commonplace 
fabrication of certain objects”.  People must not become too attached to technical objects or take even 
their “most imposing technical conquests” too seriously.   They must overcome their natural inertia that 
“is leading [them] to accept a condition of slavery and to pay for [their] technological happiness with 
[their] freedom.” (p.96)  
 
Among the other specific problems identified by Ellul is that of unemployment.  While assurances are  
given that in the long run technical progress will provide greater opportunities for employment,  he 
expresses concern that the interim unemployment is not taken more seriously.   Even if it’s only short-
lived, interim unemployment can have far-reaching consequences for individual workers due to 
displacement.   For example, while Ireland has been very successful in building up a large hi-tech 
production sector since the late 1960s, interim unemployment at various times has resulted in large 
numbers of people emigrating for work, many of them never to return.    Whatever the outcome, the 
technology takes precedence over the human. 
 
Ellul refers to Nef’s work on the effect of industrial development on war (Nef, 1950) particularly in 
relation to the level of abstraction or detachment which technology allows us.  Technology removes 
“the anguish implied in the act of killing people [..and..] all the tiresome difficulties of conscience about 
the evil of  murder.”   This is analogous to defamation posted anonymously on the web. 
 
Although he was writing over fifty years ago, Ellul focuses on aspects of technology which have become 
particularly relevant in the ‘information age’.   He describes technology as a milieu in which we have 
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to exist, one which supplants the old milieu of nature.  This milieu, he says, is artificial; is “autonomous 
with respect to values, ideas and the state”; is a self-determining, closed organisation which “is formed 
by an accumulation of means which have established primacy over ends [and which] grows according 
to a process which is causal and not directed to ends.”   All parts of the technical milieu are “mutually 
implicated to such a degree that it is impossible to separate them or to settle any technical problem in 
isolation.” (Mitcham & Mackey, 1983, p.86)  
 
The technical milieu is somewhat similar to, if not identical with, Luhmann’s idea of the environment 
since Ellul says that “all social systems are situated in it […] a novel situation modifying all traditional 
social concepts.”   The political system, for example, “is not modified by [technology] as one factor 
among others which operate upon it; the political world is today defined through its relation to the 
technological society.” (p.86)  
 
Dusek says that autonomous technology is “independent of human control or decision [and] is claimed 
to have a logic of its own or, more metaphorically, technology has a life of its own.” (Dusek, 2006, 
p.105)  For Kelly, however, there is no metaphor  -  technology has a life of its own.   Because the term 
technology tends to refer to specific categories such as information technology, biotechnology etc., he 
coined the term technium to refer to a broader field and include hardware and “culture, art, social 
institutions and intellectual creations of all types.  It includes intangibles like software, law, and 
philosophical concepts.   And most important, it includes the generative impulses of our inventions to 
encourage more tool making,  more technology invention, and more self-enhancing connections.” 
(Kelly, 2010, pp.11-12)  Kelly relates the term technium to the German word technik and the French 
term la technique which, significantly, is the term Ellul used. 
 
Kelly defines autonomous entities as ones which display “any of these traits; self-repair, self-defense, 
self-maintenance […] self-control of goals, self-improvement.” (p.13)   The technium is one of these 
entities and can “be understood as a type of evolutionary life.”(p.45) He claims “[we] are coevolving 
with our technology” ever since the mind “liberated by language […] transcended the constraints of 
nature” (p.37) although he emphasises that “technology predated humans, appearing in primates and 
even earlier.”(p.43)  He outlines the “three evolutionary vectors in life.”  These are the structural aspect 
which is inevitable and is based on the laws of physics; the historical aspect which is contingent and 
includes those accidents and “circumstantial opportunities that bend the course of evolution; and the 
adaptive aspect which focuses on survival and is represented by natural selection. (p.182)  The structural 
and historical vectors also apply to technological evolution.   However, while in biological life the 
adaptive function is unconscious, that is “there is no designer, but in the technium there is an intelligent 
designer – Sapiens.”  It is therefore “open to free will and choice” (p.183) but Kelly also says that 
“technology begins with the Sapien mind but soon transcends it” with “additional forces” (p.57) 
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influencing it such as “exotropy” or negative entropy which he relates to information and increasing 
order (pp.57-69).  He says the technium is driven by what “we try to direct it to do” but it is also driven 
by its own requirements “to sort itself out, to self-assemble into hierarchical levels,[…] to perpetuate 
itself” and as it develops these requirements “are gaining in complexity and force.”(p.15)  In this he is 
reflecting on, or projecting from, von Neumann’s statement that “technology will […] increasingly turn 
from problems of intensity, substance, and energy, to problems of structure, organization, information, 
and control.” (p.41)   
 
While some of his arguments for this coevolution are weak, if not indeed ambiguous and lacking clarity, 
Kelly’s most compelling argument is based on the notion that most developments or new ideas in 
technology “are disjointed ideas merged.”  Ideas do not come alone but “come woven in a web of 
auxiliary ideas, consequential notions, supporting concepts, foundational assumptions, side effects, and 
logical consequences and a cascade of subsequent possibilities.” (pp.44-45) In other words, scientists 
and inventors are working from a pool of common knowledge and experience.   As a result, it often 
happens that a number of people independently arrive at the same conclusions or come up with similar 
theories.  Examples include Darwin and Wallace independently arriving at the theory of evolution 
through natural selection, or Einstein and Lorentz arriving at similar conclusions regarding relativity.   
The parallels between Kelly’s technium and Teilhard de Chardin’s Omega Point (Teilhard de Chardin, 
1974, pp. 23-56) in terms of increasing complexity, organisation and consciousness, are probably 
another example of similar thought patterns working independently in different fields but arriving at 
comparable conclusions. 
 
The concept of new ideas developing from the merging of existing ideas is termed combinatorial 
evolution (Arthur, 2009, p.18) by Arthur and he refers back to the influence of Schumpeter writing in 
1910 that “to produce, means to combine materials and forces within reach […] To produce other things, 
or the same things by a different method, means to combine these materials and forces 
differently.”(p.19) This seems very obvious and should not require further explanation but for the fact 
that scientists, in many cases, tend to prefer the image of the ‘lone scientist’ rather than acknowledging 
that even when working independently of one another they are still drawing on a common set of ideas 
and therefore a number of them are likely to arrive at similar conclusions or make similar discoveries.   
The risk that one of their discoveries happens to be only a rediscovery of something that was found 
previously, is an occupational hazard and an occasion “for acute stress.” (Merton, 1973, p.377) 
 
Merton rejects the idea of the lone scientist and distinguishes between the local milieux of the scientist 
and the larger “community of scientists [which] is a dispersed rather than a geographically compact 
collectivity”  He says that while scientists may be remote from one another, “they are responding to 
much the same social and intellectual forces that impinge upon them all [including] environing 
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structures of values, social relations, and socially as well as intellectually induced foci of attention.” 
(pp.373-376)   Merton notes that this was highlighted by Bacon in his Novum Organum published in 
1620.   He also says that Bacon “wholly rejected the notion that in the new science, discoveries would 
typically appear at random [but] once the right path is followed, discoveries in limitless number will 
arise from the growing stock of knowledge:  it is a process of once fitful and now steady increments in 
knowledge.” (p.346) 
 
The fact that multiple instances of the same or similar discoveries occur in science or technology arising 
from a common pool of knowledge supports the deterministic and autonomous theories of technology 
since they highlight a particular trend or direction.   Merton’s primary concern, however, is to show that 
there is value in having multiple discoveries or at least in maintaining an environment where this is 
likely to happen.  Others may believe that all but one of the ‘discoverers’ are redundant and might 
restrict the granting of funds to eliminate this wasteful duplication.  This would seem the rational and 
efficient thing to do but while ‘redundant’ can mean abundant or plentiful, it can also mean 
“superfluous, that which can be safely done away with.”  Merton advocates using the “more 
differentiated concept of redundancy [which] is relative and statistical [and] recognizes that efficiency 
increases the prospect of error [while] redundancy (or reduced efficiency) makes for safety from error. 
[Therefore] a functionally optimum amount of redundancy under specified conditions [is] that amount 
which will approximate a maximum probability of achieving the wanted outcome but no so great an 
amount that the last increment will fail appreciably to enlarge that probability.”(pp.378-380)  Multiple 
discoveries validate one another and reflect an environment that provides a greater probability for the 
advance of science and technology.   One has to deduce from this that the more economically efficient 
the management of the research effort, the less likely the discoveries that will advance science and 
technology. 
 
In discussing the “role of scientific genius in the development of science”, Merton says that “men of 
scientific genius are precisely those whose discoveries, had they remained contemporaneously 
unknown, would eventually be rediscovered.  But these rediscoveries would be made not by a single 
scientist but by an aggregate of scientists.” (p.381)  He is saying, in effect, that the development of 
science and technology is deterministic and autonomous unless it is constrained by funding 
mechanisms. 
 
Science and technology build on what has gone before.   This provides the conditions to allow the 
amount of scientific and technological discoveries, the range of technological devices, and the pace of 
development to increase exponentially.  But while this can happen based on quantity alone, the quality 
of the devices is also changing to allow the process of development to accelerate even more.   As 
development moves from heavy machinery towards light miniature devices, more and more of these 
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devices can become components of other devices  -  electronic clocks and GPSs being typical examples.   
The clock and the GPS themselves are a combination of other components so there is a great deal of 
recursion in the assembly of modern devices and this contributes further to the rate of development of 
technology.   Arthur hints that “all technologies stand by for use as potential components within other 
new technologies”,(Arthur, 2009, p.42) a sentiment that would resonate with Heidegger. 
 
Since any new technology is “the culmination of a progression of previous devices, inventions and 
understandings”, it is supported by “a pyramid of causality that leads to it.”(p.124) Arthur says that 
despite this, the emergence of any new technology is not predetermined.  Nevertheless, he claims that 
since “all inventions are supported by a pyramid of causality […] an invention tends to show up when 
the pieces necessary for it, and the need for it, fall into place.”(p.125)  Kelley, thinking along similar 
lines suggests that the emergence of the new technology is inevitable; “[if] inventor X does not produce 
it, inventor Y will.  But the step will come in the right sequence.”(Kelly, 2010, p.138)   
 
Heilbroner, in addressing the question “do machines make history?” (Heilbroner, 1967, in Scharff & 
Dusek, 2003 pp.398-404) says that “technical evolution follows a sequential and determinate rather 
than random course.”  This is borne out by the fact that it is possible” to make general predictions of 
technological capability twenty-five or even fifty years ahead.”  Like nature, technology evolves 
incrementally, not in sudden leaps (p.399).   The development of technology is controlled by both the 
“stock of available knowledge of an age” and the “material competence of the age” –  the latter being 
the general competence and available technology to manufacture or fabricate the components needed 
to assemble the new technology (p.400). 
 
One has to take into account here the conclusion of William Ogburn who was one of the first to consider 
this issue in depth: 
 
“[T]he more one studies the relationship between mechanical and social inventions, the more 
interrelated they seem.  Civilization is a complex of interconnections between social 
institutions and customs, on the one hand, and technology and science, on the other.   The 
whole interconnected mass is in motion.   When each part is in motion and banging up against 
some other part, the question of origins seems artificial and unrealistic.   If one pushes the 
question to the extreme, origins are lost in a maze of causative factors.” (Ogburn, 1964, pp. 
132-133)20 
 
                                                            
20 This extract is from Chapter 11 ‘Technology and Governmental Change’ which was originally published in 
The Journal of Business of the University of Chicago, IX, No.1, January 1936. 
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There is no disputing that the pace of development of technology accelerated significantly in the late 
eighteenth and into the nineteenth century.   This would have marked the beginning of modern 
technology.   For Heilbroner, it was the emergence of the market economy based on private property, 
i.e. capitalism, which provided society with the focus for the first time around by which to develop 
technology and the focus in this case was production.   Hence the replacement of the craft system by 
industrial technology and the factory system.   This development was helped and reinforced by the rapid 
and parallel development of science.   As a result, the continuous and rapid advances in technology and 
their diffusion throughout “assume the attributes of autonomous process, “mysteriously” generated by 
society and thrust upon its members in a manner indifferent as it is imperious.”  This, Heilbroner says, 
is the reason why it is so difficult to contest the idea of technological determinism (Heilbroner, 1967, 
pp.402-403 in Scharff & Dusek, 2003).  
 
As mentioned earlier, Heilbroner is concerned with the relationship between history and machines.   
With regard to technological determinism, he says it is “peculiarly a problem of a certain historic epoch  
-  specifically that of high capitalism and low socialism  -  in which the forces of technical change have 
been unleased (sic), but when the agencies for the control or guidance of technology are still 
rudimentary.”  He believes this will remain a problem until the controls over technology are greatly 
strengthened.   One has to bear in mind that he was writing in 1963 but his contention that “[The] 
surrender of society to the free play of market forces is now on the wane, but its subservience to the 
impetus of the scientific ethos is on the rise”, is now even more valid. 
 
A significant feature of the technology development cycles is that in many cases the newer enhanced 
model of a particular technology will not continue some of the facilities on the earlier models so 
obsolescence is introduced.   Take music audio technology, for example.   The cassette tape was 
introduced while vinyl records were dominating the market.  Some years later  the music CD was 
introduced.   At this stage vinyl was withdrawn gradually from the market.  Then with the introduction 
of the iPod and iTunes, downloads came into widespread use.   At this point, the cassette tape was 
withdrawn.   Technology for home recording which had been easy to use and very convenient became 
scarce and in most cases unavailable and downloads (MP3 or Apple) came near to monopolising the 
market. 
 
Behind the above developments was a major shift in the technology from HiFi equipment with 
significant high-precision mechanical elements to completely electronic equipment which is smaller, 
usually portable, probably cheaper but also provides much stronger copyright protection.  At another 
level, these developments led to the closure of many local music shops; redundancy for many highly 
specialised technicians and in some cases, less control for users over their music libraries as the 




In this example of music audio, we can identify a development cycle, but is it a technological or an 
economic cycle, or both, or how do they relate to one another or, in this context, are they the same 
thing?   This is what Schumpeter calls a “process of industrial mutation [that] revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within.”  It is an example of a process of “Creative Destruction” which he says 
is an essential element of capitalism and is put in train by competition from a new commodity or  new 
technology or a new source of supply etc. “which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs 
of the existing firms but at their foundations.” (Schumpeter, 1987, pp.83-84)  This is a revolution which, 
Schumpeter says,  marks the beginning of the business cycle and once this has taken place, the effects 
of the new technology or other phenomenon are absorbed over a period until the next revolution begins.  
There are strong similarities between this and the pattern of Kuhn’s “scientific revolutions” where a 
new discovery  -  e.g. X-rays  -  undermines the existing paradigm, thus “violating deeply entrenched 
expectations” and then requires a long period of assimilation or “mopping-up” before the next 
revolution (Kuhn, 1970, pp.24,59,64).   
 
 
3.5 Technological Development from a Historical and Cultural Perspective 
Perez elaborates on Schumpeter’s model of creative destruction.    She identifies five technological 
revolutions that have occurred since the latter half of the eighteenth century (Perez, 2003, p.11).  These 
were: 
1. The Industrial Revolution beginning with the first  mechanised textile mill in 1771. 
2. The Age of Steam  marked by the first run of the ‘Rocket’ steam engine in 1829. 
3. The  Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy Engineering following the opening of the Carnegie 
    Bessemer Steel Plant in 1875. 
4. The Age of Oil, the Car and Mass Production signalled by the first Ford Model-T in 1908. 
5. The Age of ICT following the development of the Intel microprocessor in 1971. 
Each of these revolutions led to what was largely the replacement of an existing technology or economic 
model over the subsequent half century or so.   For example, the mechanised mill gradually replaced 
the craft system of textile production; the steam engine replaced the horse and carriage and steel 
replaced wrought iron.    But these technological developments brought with them economic, social and 
organisational restructuring. 
Each revolution goes through four stages after the initial ‘gestation period’ for the new technology.  The 
first phase, the ‘irruption phase’, is marked by the appearance of new products and industries, (p.30)  a 
lot of innovations and explosive growth.   But there is also the displacement of old industries 
83 
 
accompanied by rising unemployment.   This is followed by the ‘frenzy phase’ in which there is “a 
flourishing of the new industries” and  the development of infrastructure to such an extent that 
production runs well ahead of demand and the market is saturated.  There is also an intensive investment 
of financial capital which causes a financial bubble and crash as the “paper economy decouples from 
the real economy, finance decouples from production while there is a growing rift between the forces 
in the economy and the regulatory framework, turned impotent.” (p.50)    
The crash and the resulting political and social unrest lead to a reassessment of “the excesses as well as 
the unsustainability of recent practices and trends, however wonderful they may have seemed until 
then.” (p.52)   Perez sums up the installation period as “a huge trial and error process” in which “the 
engineers, the entrepreneurs, the consumers and the financiers test the various directions of 
development of the technological revolution.” (p.103)   Following the completion of the installation 
period  there is a potential turning point into the deployment period which, Perez says, “has to do with 
the balance between individual and social interests within capitalism.”   Choices have to be made 
regarding the implementation of new regulatory frameworks “to put order in financial markets and to 
move towards full market expansion and greater social cohesion.” (pp.51-52)   If these are implemented, 
a “synergy phase” gets underway which is characterised by economic expansion, business confidence, 
near-full employment,   greater social cohesion, and “the reign of the ‘middle class.’” (p.54) 
In the final phase - the maturity phase - markets show signs of saturation, profits are tightening,  and 
mergers and acquisitions become more frequent.  The technologies have matured and their product life-
cycles have shortened.  Sources of innovation are becoming scarce.  Evidence of increasing social unrest 
begins to appear due to capitalism “showing too much capacity for wealth creation and not distributing 
enough.” (p.55)  As a result, the door is opening for new technologies to come on the scene and the next 
revolution to begin, a process which is encouraged by the large pools of idle financial capital which 
have accumulated during the existing revolution and are now searching for new opportunities.   The 
entrepreneurs behind this capital are willing to take significant risks in the hope of high returns through 
investments in a new class of innovative technologies.   This represents a paradigm shift from the 
existing to the new technologies.   It is possible that the development of these new technologies may 
have been blocked because they were “incompatible or not well geared” to the existing paradigm (p.28). 
According to Arthur, as technology accumulates “it creates the structure of the economy and the 
economy mediates the creation of novel technology (and therefore its own creation)”  by deciding which 
technologies will enter the economy.  The economy “emerges from its technologies”.  He says that it is 
only in the longer term of decades that one can detect this pattern of  “continual creation and re-creation 




Because new technology is built from pre-existing technology, Arthur asserts that it is self-producing 
although with some human agency through inventors and developers.   He says technology is alive but 
“only in the sense that a coral reef is living  [,….] it still requires human agency for its buildout and 
reproduction.” (p.189)   He also tells us that technology can be described as autopoietic and concludes 
from this that “every novel technology is created from existing ones […] in a succession that goes back 
to the earliest phenomena that humans captured” and that “all future technologies will derive from those 
that now exist.”  Also, “if technologies had appeared by chance in a different order, the technologies 
built from them would have been different.” (p.170)   
 
Kelly provides an example of how our modern technologies are determined by ideas and criteria passed 
down through a succession of previous technologies over two millenia in a story which, he says “is 
basically true.”    The rocket engines on the US space shuttle had to be within a diameter of  4’ 8.5” 
since they had to be transported by train.  The width allowed by the train was determined by the rail 
gauge and back from this there is a succession of causality through the width of horse carriages, to the 
road width in Britain, the Roman road width, the width of a chariot, to the width of two war horses 
(Kelly, 2010, p.180).  
 
Feenberg rejects the idea of technological determinism, at least by implication since it is difficult to 
find an explicit statement to this effect.   He claims that current theories relating to technology in society 
“presuppose a form of technological determinism which is refuted by historical and sociological 
arguments.” (Feenberg, in Feenberg & Hannay, 1995, p.4)   However, he advocates what he calls 
subversive rationalization but this is effectively an acceptance of technological determinism.  By this 
he means that society can influence the development and impact of technology but this is to accept 
rather than reject technology in each instance; we should work within the technology sphere rather than 
from outside it. 
 
One of the examples used by Feenberg is the introduction of  legislation in the 1840s in England to 
control the use of child labour in factories, and the disputes surrounding this.   There was much 
opposition to the legislation particularly from the factory owners who claimed the move was 
inflationary.   The children were sent to school rather than to the factories and “[c]onsequently, they 
entered the labor market with higher levels of skill and discipline that were soon presupposed by 
technological design.” (pp.7-8) This was obviously a very significant  improvement in the social 
conditions for children.  However, other issues are overlooked.   Women and children were employed 
because their labour was far cheaper than that of the craft workers they displaced during the previous 
half century and who, generally, remained unemployed.   This is an example of the interim 
unemployment about which Ellul was concerned.  Also, if we were to consider the different aspects of 
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this development, we would see that the social agenda benefitted in some cases and not in others, 
whereas the technology agenda always benefitted in the long run.  
 
Feenberg also quotes the example of regulations introduced in the US in the middle of the eighteenth 
century to set standards for the design of boilers in steamboats.   There had been thousands of casualties, 
many of them fatal, over the previous few decades due to “bursting boilers.” (p.14)  New standards and 
regulations were introduced and the number of casualties was reduced very significantly.  This brings 
out an interesting phenomenon which is much more prevalent today with the huge increase in 
regulation.   The technical issue of the bursting boilers was identified as a social issue to be addressed 
by regulation which is essentially bureaucratic rationalisation so the social issue is sandwiched between 
two rational, i.e. technical, phenomena. 
 
The problem with our approach to technology, as Feenberg sees it, is the emphasis on the function or 
‘goal’ rather than the meaning of the technology.   He says that technology “is generally excluded from 
humanistic study [because we] are assured that its essence lies in a technically explainable function 
rather than a hermeneutically interpretable meaning […but the…] concept of “goal” strips technology 
bare of social contexts, focusing engineers and managers on just what they need to know to do their 
job.” (pp.8-9)  He believes there are great opportunities to have the meaning better understood and the 
social element introduced into the technical design process or into  later redesigns.  He notes the 
particular case of the computer with regard to its goal: “progress of a generalized sort in speed, power, 
and memory goes on apace while corporate planners struggle with the question of what it is all for.” 
(p.9)  
 
Other examples quoted by Feenberg include the introduction of the Teletel service in France in the early 
1980s.   The objective was to have a ‘Minitel’ terminal supplied to each home in the country through 
which information would be provided by different state services.  However, due to the work of some 
hackers, it was discovered that users could send messages to one another and so what was intended as 
an information delivery system for government was turned into a very successful messaging system for 
citizens (Feenberg, 1995, pp.144-166). This is an example of subversive rationalisation, it marks a 
democratising of the technology.   He also mentions what in his view are effective protests or struggles 
in relations to nuclear power plants, toxic waste disposal and the “political demands for regulation of 
reproductive technologies.” (Feenberg, in Feenberg & Hannay, 1995, p.19)   The success of these is not 
based so much on legal rights  as on a mobilisation of opinion to resist “a specifically technological 
hegemony.”(p.18) 
 
The disputes and disagreements about options regarding technology are particularly acute when 
environmental issues are involved as in choices between “environmentally sound technology vs. 
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prosperity [or] workers’ satisfaction and control vs. productivity.”   We are faced with dilemmas but 
“what we need are syntheses.”(p.13)  Feenberg believes that such syntheses can be facilitated by 
technology if enough effort goes into the design to accommodate all the relevant inputs.    However, he 
says that a capitalist society militates against this for reasons which are probably best articulated by 
Henderson who noted that, following the Exxon Valdez oil spill off Alaska in 1989, which is considered 
one of the worst ‘man-made’ environmental disasters, the “costs of the clean-up [were] added to GNP 
instead of being subtracted. […] GNP ignores the value of clean water, fish and pristine scenic 
environments.” (Henderson, 1991, p.202) Luhmann expresses a similar view when, with regard to the 
environment, he questions whether “the language of the medium of money as such offers an adequate 
form of expressing and reacting to [the] problem of exhaustibility.” (Luhmann, 1990, p.69)    
 
Technology cannot be assessed on its own without context.   However the context can become very 
complex and confused when, for example,  it has to include social factors, economics and accounting.   
In relation to environmental issues it can be manipulated to show that the cleanup or reconstruction 
after a disaster is more ‘productive’ than prevention as is illustrated above. 
 
Although he doesn’t describe it as such, Hill sees the development of technology as, to some extent, a 
dialectical process which would be broadly in line with Feenberg’s advocacy of synthesis.   He contrasts 
how technology is experienced against what it promises  -  the experience being that “of apparent 
inevitability […] of being ‘framed’ by an immutable and ‘tragic’ power while the promise is “of 
continually new and enchanting means of mastering the problems humanity confronts.” (Hill, Stephen; 
1988, p.23) However, he says that to “attribute this intrusive power to technology per se is inherently 
wrong [since] social, political and economic negotiations are involved in bringing particular 
technological systems into existence.”(p.6)  What Feenberg says should be done, is already being done 
according to Hill, but not necessarily with the positive outcomes Feenberg anticipates.   Both Feenberg 
and Hill take the social constructionist approach which views technology as arising from the social 
interaction of humans (Dusek, 2006, pp.18-19,203-204).  
 
Like Heidegger and Heim above, Hill also uses the term ‘enframement’ but is more specific in what he 
means by it.  For example, enframement can be detected in the way our “[e]xperience of relating to and 
transforming nature is mediated by what technology makes possible.   Experience of using a particular 
artefact is housed in what ‘shadow systems’ of other technological systems make possible”  -  in using 
an electrical appliance, one assumes the existence of an electric grid, generating stations and fuel or 
other energy sources.  Hill adds that “for most people, the technical stock of knowledge that is required 
to understand fully the technologies of daily life is located elsewhere, within the specialised domains 
of scientists and technologists.”   These examples “are all conditions of ‘enframement’, of acting and 
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perceiving within the structures of social life that are allowed by the technological parameters of 
existence.” (Hill, Stephen; 1988, p.7) 
 
While the experience of enframement would seem to support the deterministic view of technological 
development, this is undermined by the fact that the frames are the result of human action.  “The frame 
aligns with human needs and only assumes power when humans actively engage with it.”   But the 
situation is more complicated since “the technological frame of social experience” is continually 
displaced “with a progression of encompassing frames, a progression in scale and international 
connectedness between technological systems of production, consumption, transportation, 
communication, urbanised living, and military destructiveness.” (p.24) 
 
Rather than accepting the deterministic view of technological development, Hill argues that there is an 
ongoing interaction between society and technology with the advance of technology being influenced 
by “social shaping forces” and the resultant technology influencing social development (p.26).  He 
takes, for example, the situation in the domestic household at the beginning of the twentieth century.   
With wages rising due to industrialisation, servants were getting expensive.   An apparent solution was 
provided by the manufacturers of electrical and other household appliances whose marketers  
encouraged “middle-class female spouses [to] adopt the latest consumer products and gadgetry” and 
take on the household tasks themselves.   “Instead of being managers , middle-class housewives became 
workers,  labouring on tasks that had no end, but which were required in service of […] their husbands 
patriarchal interests.” (p.35)   Here we had a social situation in relation to the cost of servants which 
influenced the development of a particular area of technology which, in turn, led to a change in the role 
and, it could be argued, in the social position of housewives.    
 
Taking the above example, if we were to examine the use of each of the household appliances 
individually (i.e.  take an instrumental view)  or if we were to base our assessment on the immediate 
everyday or ‘lifeworld’ experience it would be difficult to get a full understanding of the social impact.   
Hill suggests that we must stand well back to get a more comprehensive view of the social/technological 
interaction and “the influence of its historic trajectory.” (pp.26-27)  
 
Tracing back to the beginning of the ‘historic trajectory’ brings us to the Industrial Revolution in Britain 
in the latter half of the eighteenth century but the “mechanical logic that was basic to later self-regulating 
and automated industrial production” predated this by many centuries.  Hill notes that the mechanical 
clock which was developed in the thirteenth century was, as Lewis Mumford observed, “the model for 
all later automata.” (p.46)  The first printing presses were developed in China in the eleventh century 
and Gutenberg developed his in the fifteenth century and this, according to Hill, “was a paragon of mass 
production, using standardised, interchangeable components to produce a uniform product in large 
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quantities.”(p.46) The fact that the sustained development of modern technology and technological 
systems did not follow on directly from these inventions undermines the theory that the development 
was deterministic or autonomous.  
 
There were other significant developments before the Industrial Revolution.  Hill notes that Crowley’s 
Iron Works in County Durham had a relatively sophisticated “time-based organisational system” in 
place in 1700. He also refers to Josiah Wedgewood’s ceramics manufacturing business where a similar 
system was in place (p.115) although this was much later in the century. Wedgewood’s factory was 
probably more famous for introducing a production system based on the division of labour. 
 
Although the “elements of modern technology”(p.46) and some of the management and organisational 
practices existed long before the Industrial Revolution, the wider social and cultural background did 
not provide the appropriate environment within which the technology could be cultivated.   There was 
much turmoil and a multitude of developments were taking place within and across the different classes 
as the Industrial Revolution proceeded.  These included the influence of the Enlightenment and in 
particular Baconian science (p.49);  the influence - and the fear - of the upheaval of the French 
Revolution; further impoverishment of the labourers and the poor through the enclosures (Thompson, 
1968, pp. 237-245;  Hill, 1988, p.133;  Reid, 1988, p.57) increased levels of literacy among many of 
the working class (Thompson, 1968, pp. 19-27, 110-203, 322, 538-539)21  “the end to any notion of 
exclusiveness, of politics as the preserve of any hereditary élite or property group”; (p.24) the influence 
of John Wesley and Methodism (p.45).22  What the Industrial Revolution achieved through this social 
maelstrom was to bring the technological culture and the wider culture of society into alignment. 
 
The development of industrial technology required “the organisation of specialised knowledge” and 
“commercial and managerial acumen.”   Many of the inventors failed to benefit from the application of 
their inventions because they were unable to secure the capital to support these requirements (Hill, 
Stephen; 1988, p.152) and industrialisation had, therefore, to fall back on elements of the existing social 
structure, “in particular, the pre-existing powers of a commercial ruling class.” (p.153)  This ruling class 
                                                            
21 Thompson outlines in some detail the work of the Corresponding Societies which were springing up around 
Britain during the Industrial Revolution.   These advocated political democracy and were influenced by 
the works of Tom Paine.   They indicated a high level of literacy among, at least the leaders of, the 
working class.   
    Also, During the Luddite revolt in 1812, a great fear of the authorities was that some of the Luddite  leaders 
could read and write (See Reid p. 169). 
  
22 The influence of Methodism and John Wesley is a theme throughout Thompson’s The Making of the English 
Working Class. Wesley welcomed everyone to his Church.  There was no ‘elect’ for whom salvation was 
reserved.  With a combination of strict discipline, democratic organisation and concern for the less privileged, 
the working class and the poor were particularly attracted to Methodism.   
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provided the “new breed of capitalists” that shattered the existing “social relations of production […] 
so that the people had no choice but to participate in the burgeoning industrial system.” (p.133)  This 
accomplishment was essential to the success of the Industrial Revolution.   However, Hill asserts that 
the driver was industrialism rather than capitalism.   If capitalism were the main driver, how could we 
explain the manner in which society in the Soviet Union and China bought into the “twin principles of 
technological superordinancy and expansion”? (p.245)   
 
Industrialism required discipline, the discipline to work to the unremitting rhythm of the machine.   This 
discipline was imposed initially in an oppressive manner by the bosses who relied where possible  on 
the labour of women and children because they, particularly the children, were more submissive than 
men and cost less to employ.   This was a time of conflict and upheaval.   Towards the middle of the 
nineteenth century, however, with the introduction of the Factory Acts to protect child workers in 
particular and with the mass movement to the more structured environment of the towns and cities, the 
culture of the wider society was becoming aligned with the discipline and organisation of the technology 
culture.  Many other factors helped.  For example, while Wesley welcomed the working class and the 
poor to his church, he also inculcated a strict code of work and discipline or, as Thompson put it in 
relation to the younger leaders of Methodism at the time, “they fostered within the Methodist Church 
those elements most suited to make up the psychic component of the work discipline of which the 
manufacturers stood most in need.” (Thompson, 1968, p.390) 
 
The resistance to the new industrial regime gradually decreased but where it persisted, it provided “a 
direct inducement for accelerating technological change.” (Hill, Stephen; 1988, p.126)   However, the 
culture of discipline not only helped the process of industrialisation, it also helped the workers to emerge 
“as a socially-cohesive cultural group” within the wider society and not just within the factory walls 
(p.31) and it was only then that the “discipline of union-based organisation was possible (as distinct 
from ‘mob’ protest).” (p.241)  Between the ruling class and the working class stood the middle class 
“who most feared disorder” and “fostered the institutional means of balancing the interests of exploiters 
and exploited” particularly through education.(p.242)  They “created the schools system for the poor 
that symbolically bridged the order of superordinate and subordinate interests in society.”(p.159) 
 
Science was not a significant driver of the Industrial Revolution but the scientific method was of great  
interest to the industrialists for application in the workplace (p.145) since it “provided an ethos for 
disciplined technical observation [and] a way of thought that encouraged the development of technical 
and social systems.”(p.156)  Also, because of the moral undertones associated with discipline and 
knowledge, science provided a legitimating ideology for industrialisation and it reassured everyone, 
especially the middle classes who feared instability, that industrialisation was progressing in an ordered, 




Hill’s analysis centres on the alignment of the technological culture with the wider culture of society.  
This is brought into sharp focus in the US economy in the 1920s where, he says, a number of inventions 
were required “for the purchasing ability and desire of consumers to be brought into alignment with the 
technical systems that produced for them.” (p.190)  The first of these was consumer credit which 
allowed a significant proportion of the population to purchase the automobiles which were being mass-
produced and were to become a powerful status symbol for Americans with image beginning to take 
priority over function.    
 
The second invention was planned obsolescence which sustained the technological system.  In 1956 the 
President of General Motors, Harlow Curtice,  referred to it as ‘dynamic obsolescence’ to which he 
attributed many benefits including better job opportunities, higher living standards, the promotion “of 
science and the useful arts,” and most important of all “the continuance […] of the democratic processes 
themselves.” (p.192)  
 
The success of the production methods on which these systems were based, was due to the 
standardisation of the products.   The apparent paradox between this standardisation and the culture of 
the time with its “emphasis on individuality, and privatised possession of unique status symbols, rather 
than on collective consumption” required a further invention - ‘marginal differentiation’. (p.192) 
 
Hill summarises the situation with the quote “[T]o keep America growing we must keep Americans 
working, and to keep Americans working, we must keep them wanting; wanting more than the basic 
necessities; wanting the luxuries and frills that make life so much more worthwhile.”  (p.192 quoting 
Walter Engard) 
 
In a contrasting situation, Hill cites two examples where modern technology was introduced to primitive 
cultures and “[t]he people did not choose. Rather, they took advantage of what lay in a seemingly 
unproblematic way in front of them, and then lived the experience.” (p.90)   Elsewhere, referring 
specifically to information systems, he says that “[w]hat is so easily lost in the information-inspired 
race […] is consciousness of what is not present in solutions to immediate problems […] and a 
consistent morality and wisdom that locates the immediate problems amongst all others.”(p.238)   Do 
these specific examples not apply generally to all situations where people are presented with the options 
of modern technological solutions?   As he also says, we “participate in a technological code that 
remains a perpetual and unexamined context for lived experience, until crisis, such as system 




Hill implies that theories of technological determinism and technological autonomy are not adequate 
explanations of what drove the Industrial Revolution and the subsequent trajectory of technological 
development (p.36).   He shows it to be far more complex, but in doing so, it is difficult to avoid the 
impression of inconsistencies, or at least lack of clarity in a few of the details but this may be 
unavoidable with our present state of knowledge if we regard capitalism, greed, or technological 
determinism as explanations which are too simplistic. 
 
Culture “concerns the meaning system of society [..and] embodies shared ways of thinking and 
believing that grow out of group experience and are passed from one generation to the next.” (p.91, 
incl. quote from Kroeber & Kuckhohn, 1963)  Traditional culture evolved with new experiences being 
assimilated and sometimes aspects of the culture being reinterpreted to give meaning to changing 
contexts while maintaining the overall integrity and continuity of the culture.  With technology, 
however, and the practice of planned obsolesence, we now speak of technology as being disruptive.  
Technology is subject to very frequent changes which are difficult to assimilate in the culture and 
therefore it does not evolve in the traditional sense.  It is now a culture of newness, change and 
disruption with ‘fashion’ providing the necessary meaning for society at large. 
 
While fashion provides the meaning at the consumer end, at the producer end it is found in the “technical 
stock of knowledge” that resides “within the specialised domains of scientists and technologists,” (p.7) 
in other words, with the technocrats whom Hill compares to the scribes of ancient times that interpreted 
the culture for the illiterate masses (p.67).  In contrast to others who trace the rise of the technocrat back 
to F.W. Taylor in the early twentieth century (see 2.14 above), Hill, although he does not use the term 
‘technocrat’, traces it back to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution where the requirements of 
the factory system led to the “development of a new engineering and capital goods industry” which then 
determined the direction of technological development independently of the mill owners.  The mill 
owners continued to maintain control over labour but control of technology was now firmly in the hands 
of the engineers and specialists.  By definition, the specialist world is “collectively literate, but not 
individually literate, yielding power not to the specialist as such but to the corporate or state interests 
that control them.”(p.67) 
 
Considering the development of the technological society as arising from the alignment of cultures 
tends to imply that it happened naturally but, of course,  it didn’t.   Rather, it was brought by coercion 
of the workers  -  men, women and children  -  and all of those who had been dispossessed of whatever 
holdings they had in the country and had to migrate to the cities (and in fairness to Hill, he doesn’t 




Hobsbawm’s view, as a historian, would not be in conflict with Hill.   He describes the Industrial 
Revolution as the release of “the productive power of human societies, which henceforth became 
capable of the constant, rapid and […] limitless multiplication of men, goods and services” or what “the 
economists [call] the ‘take-off into self-sustained growth.’” (Hobsbawm, 1973, p.43)  He regards it as 
“probably the most important event in world history, at any rate since the invention of agriculture and 
cities.” (p.44) 
 
The fact that the Industrial Revolution began in Britain was not, Hobsbawm says, due to any 
technological or scientific superiority since the French were much further ahead in this area.  Education 
in Britain was also behind that in France although he makes exceptions of the “dour village schools and 
the austere, turbulent, democratic universities of Calvinist Scotland.”    Germany was well ahead of 
Britain in technical training.(p.45)  But Britain had a long history of trade and its colonial activities 
throughout much of the world were determined by its trading requirements.   As a result, it had a 
significant infrastructure in place in terms of capital investment especially in the ports, shipping, roads 
and canals to support the economic developments that lay ahead.   Also, according to Hobsbawm, 
“[p]olitics were already geared for profit.” (p.47)    
 
The key to the take-off of the British economy was the development of the railways during the period 
1830 to 1850 when 23,500 miles of railway was developed.(p.61)  The merchants, traders and wealthy 
classes generally had accumulated huge wealth from trade,  particularly during the preceding decades 
of the Industrial Revolution.  They needed opportunities to invest their money (p.62).   There were much 
more profitable enterprises for investment than the railways but these industries, such as, for example, 
the cotton industry, were unable “to absorb more than a fraction of the available surplus for investment.” 
(p.63)   The railways provided the only means to soak up the available investment capital.   The railway 
infrastructure was a great enhancement for trade but, even more important, it resulted in more than a 
trebling of the already very substantial output of coal and iron during the two decades in question (p.61).  
 
The timing, 1830 to 1850, above is significant for another reason.  According to Lienhard, the rate of  
development, as measured by the improvement rate, of all technologies developed before 1840 doubled 
every thirty years, i.e. one generation.  He gives the examples of the accuracy of clocks over the previous 
600 years and the efficiency of steam engines since the early 1700s.   From 1840, however, “we started 
doubling the exponent of improvement” except when they reached a limit within the laws of physics.23  
This has parallels with Moore’s Law which says that the computing power, i.e. the number of 
transistors, available on a chip will double every eighteen months (Brown & Duguid, 2002, pp.14-15).   
There is general agreement that, as Kelly says, the Law “has been astoundingly correct” for the last fifty 
                                                            
23  www.uh.edu/engines/epi559.htm  [Accessed 17th September, 2016) 
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years. Kelly asks whether Moore’s Law is inevitable, the answer to this question being “pivotal for 
civilisation” since it will have implications for technology generally.   He claims that “all technology 
follows computer technology [and] finding inevitability in one key area of technology suggests 
invariance and directionality may be found in the rest of the technium.”(Kelly, 2010, p.159)  This is, to 
some extent, supported by Gordon Moore on whose research the Law is based, and who commented 
that “once something like [Moore’s Law] gets established, it becomes more or less a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.” (p.162)  Others believe that the Law has prompted the ICT industry to “take it on faith that 
more power will somehow solve the very problems that they have helped to create” and “[i]nstead of 
thinking hard, we are encouraged simply to embrace dumb power.” (Brown & Duguid, 2002, pp.14-15) 
 
 
3.6 The Idea of Progress 
ICT, no less than other technologies, continues to develop along the path of progress as the conventional 
wisdom would have it.   What is meant by progress is, however, the question that must now be asked.   
For Hayek, “[p]rogress is movement for movement’s sake, for it is in the process of learning, and in the 
effects of having learned something new, that man enjoys the gifts of his intelligence.” (Nisbet, 1980, 
p.300)  He also says that we cannot determine the rate of progress although “we would be better able to 
digest it if it were slower,” but unfortunately it “cannot be dosed.”   Neither can we predict what progress 
will bring us but we must embrace it and pave the way by means of the free market. (Hayek, 2013, 
pp.500-501)   Spencer, almost a century before Hayek, gave a similar definition of progress which can 
be summarised as “motion from homogeneity to heterogeneity” as in the growth of a tree from a seed 
or an animal from an ovum   This “law of organic progress  is the law of all progress.”  It is the “evolution 
of the simple into the complex, through successive differentiations” and can be seen “in the evolution 
of all products of thought and action; whether concrete or abstract, real or ideal.” (Van Doren, 1967, 
p.102) 
The evolution of the simple to the complex gave rise to some disagreement regarding the evolution of 
scientific knowledge.   Since the range of scientific knowledge had become so vast, any individual could 
hope only to master a very limited area or speciality and if they wanted to know anything outside of 
their area of expertise, they would have “accept the word of an authority or specialist in that field.  
Hence, […] we are condemned to accept authoritarianism by the very immensity of human knowledge.”   
But, according to M. King Hubbert, science is not “a progression from the simple to the complex, but 
[rather] a progression from the complex to the simple.”   It is about reducing “chaotic phenomena” to a 
form which can be understood by the average human being (pp.327-328).   In other words, it is 
abstraction but in abstraction one is losing some context and therefore some meaning and the expert 




Is progress inevitable, is it necessary or contingent?    In the past, arguments for the necessity of progress 
tended to focus on the idea that it “is willed by and thus assured by Providence [or by] a natural cosmic 
principle” or “because it is inherent in human nature.”  Arguments for the contingency of progress 
almost invariably centred around the principle of human freedom (pp.238-239).   For the past few 
decades progress has become increasingly identified with economic growth which is determined by the 
level of production although the services sector is becoming increasingly significant.  This has to be 
contrasted with Van Doren’s assertion in the 1960s that “growth is not progress.”(p.258)   For 
Galbtraith, the emphasis on production is due to nothing more than its central role in economic science 
(Galbraith, 1970, p.139).   This can be seen today in the fear created generally by any news of a 
slowdown or decrease in economic production or growth.  Van Doren also speaks of irreversible 
cumulative change (ICC) which he says is necessary but he quotes Maritain as saying that progress, that 
is “the introduction of something new, […] is contingent […] on man’s free choice.” (Van Doren, 1967, 
pp.258-259) 
 
Nisbet is in no doubt about the link between the belief in progress and economic growth and 
development which, he says, can be traced back even to classical Athens (Nisbet, 1980, p.334) and he 
shows how this belief is shared in modern times by liberals, socialists, radicals and technocrats 
throughout the western world and also in the then communist countries such as the USSR and China 
(pp.303-306).  The belief is sustained by optimistic predictions “seizing upon some seemingly dominant 






One of the big questions in this chapter, and indeed in the whole thesis, is whether technology is neutral, 
deterministic or autonomous.   Heidegger’s concept of ‘enframing’ would rule out neutrality since he 
suggests that we are conditioned to think technologically.  Technological neutrality seems very 
plausible since, as individuals, we are generally free to accept or reject any technology.  But if we accept 
this, and since many ICT appliances, as we will see later, are now low-cost consumer items, then we 
must take Hirsch’s “tyranny of small decisions” on board also and taking these factors together with 
the clear evidence around us of the rapid spread of technology, I believe we have to accept the fact of 
technological determinism.  Since autonomous technology presupposes technological determinism, we 
must consider it as a possibility also or at least accept that it will not necessarily remain permanently as 
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mere science fiction. Hill and Feenberg take a more nuanced view and advocate a greater synthesis of 
technology and culture with Hill saying that technological development is the outcome of economic, 
political and social negotiations while Feenberg advocates working within the technological milieu to 








Chapter 4     Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
Chapter Introduction 
ICT was largely confined to scientific, technical, and internal business applications until the appearance 
of the World Wide Web in the early 1990s.   The rapidity with which ICT then penetrated, or at least 
affected, the lives of almost everyone in the developed world was phenomenal.    While the proliferation 
of ICT in the developing and Third World countries has been much slower, it has nevertheless been 
very significant when seen in their particular contexts.    That such a complex technology could become 
so ubiquitous in such a short space of time raises a question of democracy as to whether or not we have 
control over the development and application of the technology.    
 
I begin with a relatively detailed account of the case study conducted by Castells et al. on mobile 
communications.   This is a global study but, in my view, what is particularly significant is the insight 
it provides into the innovative use of ICT by communities in some of the less developed and 
underdeveloped areas of the world  -  an insight which is much more inspiring than that provided by 
many of the examples from the affluent developed world.   Following the case study, I provide an 
overview of current and some likely future applications of ICT in the home as well as in business 
government and the mass media. 
 
4.1   Mobile Communications - Case Study 
Castells et al. undertook a study of the effects of mobile communications on society.   Their study also 
examined how society helps to shape technology since “the more a technology is interactive, the more 
it is likely that the users become the producers in their actual practise” (Castells et al., 2007, p.2) -  
something with which Hill would agree and Feenberg would advocate.  Mobile, i.e. wireless, 
communication networks have diffused throughout the world “faster than any other communication 
technology to date” and because “communication is at the heart of human activity in all spheres of life 
[..this..] raises a wide range of fundamental questions.”(p.1)  The aim of their study is “to construct an 
empirically grounded argument on the social logic embedded in wireless communication, and on the 
shaping of this logic by users and uses in various cultural and institutional contexts.”(p.4) 24    Their 
study is in fact a metastudy, “having consulted hundreds of studies on all regions of the world.”25  
 
                                                            
24  Or, as they also state on p.3 “to answer the questions surrounding the transformation of human 
communication by the rise and diffusion of wireless digital communication technologies.” 
 
25 Over 700 individual studies are referenced in the ‘metastudy'.  Many of my references from   this work are, 
therefore, secondary references.   It would not be practical to give details of each of the   original  sources  but 
they can be traced via the references below. 
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In terms of signal quality and security, fixed line communication is much superior to mobile  
communication but the infrastructure for the latter is much easier, cheaper and faster to install and 
therefore it overcomes the main barriers to a fixed line service such as inaccessibility and lack of capital.   
This is why mobile telephony has developed at such a significant rate across the world in the last two 
decades.   While the main telephone companies continued to focus primarily on the fixed line service 
and confined their mobile offerings mainly to the business sector, the lower entry costs enabled 
entrepreneurs to exploit the mass market (p.14). In 1991 the ratio of mobile to fixed line telephones was 
1:34, but by 2004 the ratio was 1: 0.66, mobiles having overtaken fixed line phones in the previous year 
(p.7). 
 
The lower infrastructure costs allow the mobile suppliers to provide cheaper services to the consumers.   
In addition, the suppliers have provided more flexible payment options such as prepay resulting in a 
more affordable service and a “tendency for mobile-phone ownership to spread more evenly across 
income groups than has been the case with other consumable durables.” (p.57)  This applies across the 
globe since there is widespread diffusion of mobile technology not just in the developed world but also 
among many of those previously excluded due to poverty in the developing and under-developed 
countries.   There are some exceptions, particularly in Africa.  A report published in 2003 showed that 
while 76% of Ugandans used a mobile phone regularly, the figure for Ghanaians was only 20% (p.58).  
However, the spread of mobile technology has run far ahead of expectations in developing countries 
where, it was generally assumed, it would not be commercially viable (p.19). 
 
A number of factors besides low costs helped the diffusion of mobile technology although the fact that 
in the late 1990s, South Africans were spending 10% to 15% of their income on mobile phones, (p.57) 
begs the question whether costs mattered at all.  Various payment plans such as the offer of  “free and, 
later on, low-cost messaging” by private telecom operators in the Philippines was very attractive to 
those with limited money to spend (p.59). Perhaps the most significant factor in overcoming exclusion 
is the availability of prepaid services which allowed “those without a credit history, a permanent 
address, or a stable source of income to purchase cell phones.” (pp.61-62)  Prepaid services also benefit 
the provider through the cost-savings on billing and collection and passes to the customer the risks 
associated with “up-front investment in future calls.” (p.220) 
 
There was a very strong awareness of a digital divide in relation to the Internet.  With the widespread 
diffusion of mobile technology, the telephone divide is much narrower (p.32) and since one can now 
surf the Internet on a mobile phone, the Internet divide itself is less significant.   In terms of applications, 
the PC is a more versatile instrument but the mobile phone is handier.  Relative to the PC, the mobile 
phone is a simple technology to use.  The fact that voice is the primary medium for use on the phone 
means that it is available even to the illiterate.  Mobile phone users have more control over their 
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technology than PC users have over theirs since, to date at any rate, they are not as subject to the tyranny 
of regular unsolicited updates of their software of which the PC users are often unaware.  Because the 
technology is simple and because a significant proportion of its users have very limited resources, the 
user community have played a very substantial role in its development and have, to a large extent, 
forced the technology to align itself with their social needs.  However, one must note the qualifier which 
Castells et al. add: “ [While] people shape communication technology, rather than the other way around 
[…],  the specificity of the technology reflects into the way in which people conduct their lives.” (p.125) 
 
The first text message was sent by a Nokia engineering student in 1993 but it was not considered a 
serious option by the telecomms companies (p.266 n.1).  However, because texting (SMS) was much 
cheaper than voice telephony, there was a massive surge in its use particularly among those on low 
budgets including people in developing countries as well as teenagers and students throughout the 
world.  
 
For the poor and the marginalised, the primary purpose of the mobile phone is connectivity rather than 
mobility and this is helped by the lower cost of wireless infrastructure allowing for greater coverage 
compared to fixed lines.  But even among the wider user community, more and more of the ‘mobile’ 
communication is taking place from fixed locations such as home, office, etc. so that “mobile 
communication is better defined by its capacity for ubiquitous and permanent connectivity rather than 
by its potential mobility.” (p.248)   
 
In developing countries, even as a substitute for a fixed-line phone, there are still some constraints on 
mobile usage such as, for example, the availability of electricity for battery charging.   But these 
constraints have produced even greater innovation and resourcefulness among the users.    The charging 
problem has been addressed in some communities in Tanzania by a system “whereby all the phones in 
the community are taken to a nearby town once a week to be charged.” (p.65)  In other cases, car 
batteries are used for recharging (p.232).   In South Africa, the telecomms company Vodacom identified 
a commercial opportunity in the large number of customers who were selling time on their mobiles to 
their friends.  Vodacom established a franchise business offering modified and Vodacom-branded 
shipping containers as payphone kiosks with a number of cellphones as an investment option for these 
customers (p.232).   Prepaid cards, being used ‘reportedly’ as payment for goods and services,  have 
almost attained the status of legal-tender in some areas (p.62) while in other areas “people wishing to 
make or receive remittances can […] transfer prepaid minutes to other subscribers using text 
messaging” thus avoiding bank charges or the need for a bank account (p.223). Putting this trust and 
value on prepaid cards and credit shows the importance of mobile telephony in the daily lives of people 




Another innovative practice which has become fairly widespread in Africa is ‘beeping’ where “a person 
dials a number but hangs up before the call is answered.” (p.66)   Codes have developed, presumably 
somewhat similar to Morse Code, to convey messages on the basis of the number of beeps, thus 
exploiting the system for free communications. 
 
One of the most successful commercial development initiatives is the Village Phone Program  run by 
Grameenphone in Bangladesh.  Grameenphone is a mobile telecommunications provider  established 
by Telenor and Grameen Bank and based on the principles of the latter’s microcredit system.   The bank 
works on the basis that most poor people require the equivalent of only a few euro for the tools or raw 
material, such as a spade or wool, to start to extricate themselves from the poverty trap.  It is better to 
start this way at the bottom of the economic system, at the origin of poverty and hunger, (Yunus, 2003, 
p.35)  rather than wait for the trickle-down effect of overall economic growth while the poor  become 
prisoners of the welfare state.   It is also based on a belief that within every household there are skills 
waiting to be exploited  -  “not one single Grameen borrower requires any special training.” (p.205)   By 
2002, over one million poor people had availed of loans totalling $444 million. (p.164) Another 
principle of the bank is that it concentrates mainly on women borrowers because while “[p]oor women 
in Bangladesh have the most insecure social standing […] it is evident that destitute women adapt 
quicker and better to the self-help process than men.”(p.172) 
 
The Village Phone Program provides access to phones in over 200,000 remote rural locations 
throughout Bangladesh each managed by an operator, in most cases a woman, for whom it provides an 
opportunity to earn a living while providing an invaluable service to the community.   Grameenphone 
is also setting up Community Information Centres to provide voice, Internet, videoconferencing  and 
other information services in rural areas and plans, in the short term, to have one of these in every local 
area (www.grameenphone.com ).    A modified version of the Grameen Village Phone Program is 
operating successfully in Uganda. 
 
A very significant service provided by the Village Phone Program “appears to be its role in facilitating 
the flow of remittances from overseas or city-based relatives”. (Castells et al., 2007, p.270 n.4)  In fact, 
migrants and ethnic groups are probably the people most dependent on mobile communication since it 
enables them to keep in touch with home and with one another.   A survey of some migrant workers in 
China showed that they spent over 20%, on average, of their monthly income on mobile phone calls 
and felt compelled to update their handsets every “couple of years” at a cost in excess of one month’s 
pay.  To cover these costs, migrant workers “have to discipline themselves to work overtime, and work 




Much of the rapid diffusion of mobile technology arises due to “the wave of urbanization” across the 
world “when billions of rural-to-urban migrants use the mobile phone as both a functional tool to cope 
with a new social environment and an instrument to shape their recently acquired urban identity.” (p.59) 
There is much evidence of this “social and psychological need to achieve a status symbol which could 
be shown off in front of friends and even strangers in public.” (p.85)  This is very understandable for 
migrants trying to establish a place and an identity for themselves in strange surroundings, but it applies 
to many users as the mobile has become a fashion item, a topic I return to below.  Castells et al. assert 
that while the mobile is seen as a very important support by the migrant workers, it “only operates at 
the micro level” and it cannot solve the structural problems with which they are confronted (p.62). 
 
There are similarities and some overlap between the social situations of minority ethnic groups and 
migrants.    This applies also to their use of technology where, in the U.S., ethnic minorities were found 
to be at a disadvantage in terms of access and skill (p.67).   They had a negative view of computers and 
the Internet and felt that “they impeded personal communication” while mobile phones “were 
considered to be a necessity rather than a luxury in modern society.”(p.70)  “Both the African American 
and Hispanic populations [in the U.S.] have been found to have higher mobile phone ownership and 
usage levels than the Caucasian population.”(p.60) 
 
While mobile technology is probably ubiquitous today in the U.S.,  the take-up of the services there to 
2007 (the latest date of the studies to hand) has interesting features.   For perhaps the most advanced 
nation technologically, the take-up was quite slow.    In particular, texting was slow to develop in the 
U.S. compared to Europe and Asia.(p.181)   This is attributed, partly at any rate, to the fact that far 
fewer people in the U.S. use public transport and therefore have less opportunity for texting and for 
developing their skills in using mobile technology (p.37).   Again, in contrast to Europe, it was found 
that a higher proportion of women than men used mobile phones (p.42). 
 
In the more “collective, sociable cultures where there is a high level of mobile phone use, “there is little 
concern about the volume, location, or nature of public conversations.”  In the more individualistic 
society of the U.S., however, “a tendency to be extremely concerned about privacy and personal space 
has inhibited the adoption of mobile telephony.”(p.71)   A study from 1999, when mobile phones were 
still predominantly used for voice communication, concluded that people in the U.S. had  a preference 
for asynchronous communication systems “such as e-mail and voice-mail, because they are considered 
more efficient, keep things brief, leave users in greater control, and are more formal and guarded.”(p.37)  
At that stage Americans found pagers and caller-ID more perfectly adequate for their requirements. 
 
Considering that young people account for a high proportion of mobile users elsewhere in the world, it 
is interesting that there was “little systematic and academic study of how young people in the United 
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States [were] using emerging technology.   This is probably because young people have not been a 
major element of the US industry until recently”(p.133) i.e. 2007,   It is difficult to relate this to the 
finding that in the U.S. in 2003, “mobile users spent US$80-100 million on ring-tone 
downloads.”(p.112) 
 
We think of mobility in terms of physical movement but the success of the mobile phone is due to the 
fact that, perhaps unwittingly, it has addressed a much broader interpretation of mobility.  An individual 
can move physically to a different location, but they can also move to, or find themselves in, different 
situations mentally, psychologically, socially, culturally or materially or various combinations of these.   
The mobile now has features which some may find useful in any of these situations.   The mobile is 
also easy to use, at least relative to the PC and this is due, more than likely, to its size and limited 
capacity whereas with the PC additional power is used to compensate for bad design and a lack of 
engineering, particularly software engineering. 
 
As examples of different situations, take Japan where texting was very popular early on with young 
people due to the “small living spaces and hence limited privacy” in contrast with some European 
countries where many children have their own rooms.”(p.71)   While much of the emphasis is on 
privacy, a different situation exists in many developing countries such as India where, as indicated 
earlier, the mobile phone is a substitute for the fixed line phone and is shared between family and friends 
(p.64) to the extent that in some cases a number of people can partake in a telephone conversation at 
either end.   The phone call therefore becomes a social event and may even perform a social role similar 
to the now disappearing village pump. 
 
A significant factor in determining the use of mobile technology is ‘power distance’.   For example, “in 
“high power distance” cultures, such as Korea, it was considered unacceptable to send text messages to 
a superior.”(p.72)  A study published in 2005 found that countries with “extremely low power distance”,  
mainly in Scandinavia and Central Europe, had a penetration rate for mobile phones of almost 100%.   
These were also countries with high individualism and femininity.   Western Europe and North America 
were deemed to have “individualistic, masculine cultures  with ‘low power distance’” and had a 70% 
penetration rate approximately.   The ‘late adopters’ were collectivist cultures in Eastern Europe and 
South America with ‘high power distance’ and ‘high uncertainty avoidance’ characteristics (p.72).    
 
It is tempting to ask if mobile telephony will eliminate, or at least reduce, these cultural differences as 
electronic media tend to do.  However, there are other examples to show how mobile technology 
reinforces some cultural practices and has been assimilated by them.   In some Muslim communities, a 
man can validly divorce his wife by uttering the word ‘talaq’ three times.   This can now be done over 
the telephone provided two witnesses are present and the ‘message’ can be authenticated.   The reference 
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to ‘message’ would appear to refer to SMS and the fact that there is an explicit ban on divorce by texting 
in Malaysia would indicate that it is valid elsewhere (p.73). 
 
In South Korea, the mobile phone has had the effect of reinforcing traditional ‘father-centred’ family 
structures.   Generally, parents give their teenage children mobile phones as presents but they control 
their use of the device through the phone bills.   Also, the parents use the phones “to track down their 
children constantly and give orders anytime, anywhere.”(pp.148-149) 
 
Gender issues often come up for discussion in relation to ICT, particularly in relation to mobile phones 
and many people see them “as liberating users from gender limitations.”(p.45)   This argument is based 
on the view that mobile technologies provide protection for women, giving them a greater sense of 
safety and security and it also assists them in “carrying out family responsibilities across barriers of 
time and space.”(p.46)  It could however, and indeed is, argued that these reinforce rather than lessen 
gender role differences.    
 
The aggressive versus passive attributes of male and female respectively become apparent in findings 
where  “men [see] the advantages of mobile phones in terms of their ability to get access to others, while 
women [see] the benefits mainly in terms of other people having access to them.”(p.47)  Gender 
differences can also be detected in the way “men are more concerned with perceived usefulness, while 
women are more concerned with ease of use”(p.48) and men regard “the phone as an extension of 
themselves without which they could not function”.(p.47)   As a consumer item, the mobile phone 
exploits the gender differences in the market where “the ‘cool’ consumption styles include both 
‘masculine’ technology and ‘feminine’ trend-consciousness.”(p.50)  One commentator has argued that 
the role of the mobile phone in Japan’s kawaii, or ‘cute culture’ rather than empowering women, only 
“further subdue[s] females to the dominance of technological consumerism.” (p.52) 
 
As mentioned above, for a relatively long period after the introduction of the mobile phone to the 
market, the main telephone companies confined their mobile offerings mainly to commercial entities.    
This left the personal market open to be exploited by individual entrepreneurs.   Young people, having 
limited budgets, were very quick to take advantage of the non-voice features of the mobile phone, such 
as texting, and they became the real innovators in its use.  Generally, the entrepreneurial companies that 
paid attention to these innovators were the ones that succeeded and dominated what was fast becoming 
a very significant teenage market.    They transformed the innovations “into new technologies, new 
products and new business models, in a virtuous circle of interaction between active consumers and 
receptive business.” (p.245)   So the first users of mobile technology were business people followed 
shortly after by young people and, therefore, Castells et al. suggest, “[b]ecause the first users are the 
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shapers of the technology itself, the youth culture and the professional culture have framed the forms 
and content of wireless communication.”(pp. 245-246)   
 
The ‘interaction’ between the young consumers and business is exemplified by the manner in which 
“the promotion of texting via television entertainment shows that encourage[d] their (mostly young) 
audiences to send voting messages via their cell phones.”(p.136)   So anyone claiming, as Castells et 
al. do,  that young people are “the drivers of the diffusion of wireless communication technology in 
developed countries” (p.245) must take account of the role the IT industry plays in leading them, 
steering them or, as some would see it, exploiting them.   And Castells et al., perhaps somewhat 
ambiguously, warn about this exploitation and the power large corporations can exercise “in shaping 
the consumerist identity of young cell-phone users.  Given the susceptibility of youth, and peer-group 
pressure now materialized in the hyper-fast networks of the mobile-phone,  individual youngsters now 
have very little autonomy or independence not to get involved in the commercial vogue created by the 
likes of McDonalds and KFC.”(p.167)  
 
Choice and independence can mean almost the same thing, or at least there is a significant overlap in 
their meanings.   But a paradox also attaches to them in that they are often at their weakest where they 
are perceived to be at their strongest and this becomes very apparent in teenagers with their equal desire 
for independence and to be part of a group.    Mobile technology responds to these desires by “providing 
an ever-widening range of socializing and identification options “as an alternative to the “traditional 
socialization structures, such as the home, education system and broadcast media” (p.141) while the 
mobile phone itself provides an element of individual identity as “a miniature aesthetic statement about 
its owner.”(p.112) 
 
Mobile technology further complicates the relationship between young people and their parents and 
families.  They wish for autonomy as individuals on the one hand but also require the security of their 
family.   They “make all the decisions in their everyday lives, but need their parents to solve life’s 
problems.” (p.143)   The mobile phone plays a significant role in the ‘micro-coordination’ of their lives 
(p.152). 
 
Mobile technology “modifies but does not eliminate the power relations between parents and 
children.”(p.147)   In some ways it reinforces them allowing parents to track down their children and 
establish their whereabouts when necessary.   Taking it from another angle, “with information 
technology […] although the education process remains vertical, roles have been reversed and the flow 




The mobile phone has been transformed “from its basic communications functions into a key fashion 
object, a signifier of modern urban lifestyle, and a major component of contemporary 
consumerism.”(pp.56-57)  Reference has been made already to the link between the wave of 
urbanisation in recent times coinciding with the diffusion of mobile technology.  The importance of the 
mobile phone for migrants to the cities from rural areas or from abroad to enable them to keep in touch 
with home and with one another is obvious.   But it is also important for them even as a fashion item to 
help them establish their identity in the new surroundings.    Fashion in a mobile phone is represented 
for women, particularly in oriental countries, in its appearance and ease of use whereas for men it’s 
represented in the phone’s technical qualities although they might not admit to these being linked to 
fashion. 
 
The individual and collective identities are, according to Castells et al., linked through fashion.  They 
define “collective identity in the youth culture [as] a break with the dominant culture” and fashion as 
“the personalization of this rupture to achieve an individualized identity.  The sum of these individual 
identities, which express the collective identities in different ways, produces fashion.”(p.145)  They 
tend, however, to overlook the fact that with mobile technology in particular, this fashion and what it 
manifests has become the dominant culture.  
 
The relationship between ICT and youth culture invites further investigation.  The arguments of both 
Hill and Castells et al. indicate that the development of ICT is driven by an interaction between the 
technology and society, particularly by the youth culture within society.  “Young people […] invented 
uses that had not been foreseen by the initial designers of the technology [and] the key to success for 
companies is to identify and follow the innovations of young users.”(p.129)  But the input from the 
youth culture is influenced, as mentioned earlier, by the “specificity of the technology.”   Castells et al. 
quote studies from Finland of the relationship between young people, from early childhood to late 
adolescents, and their mobile phone (pp.129-131).   They show that the tendency is to view the mobile 
phone  successively as a toy, a games machine, a communications device, a personalised statement of 
individuality, as the person moves through the stages of childhood. 
 
Providing enticements for each stage of childhood could be regarded as exploitation on the part of the 
ICT industry  -  or, they could claim to be merely responding to the needs of the young and the children 
wouldn’t have the technology without the agreement of the parents.    But moral pressure can be exerted 
on those parents reluctant to provide the technology by assertions that they are depriving their children 
of vital educational media and even endangering their security when they’re out of home without a 
phone.  The arguments can be put either way and again do not help to resolve the question of whether 
the technology is deterministic or not.   However, new factors enter the scene with ICT.   Firstly, access 
to the Internet cannot be controlled effectively by parents,  particularly since young people tend to be 
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more technically competent in relation to it than their parents so the protective or guardianship role of 
parents is, to a lesser or greater extent, subverted by the technology.   There are legal age limits in most 
countries under which people cannot access alcohol or tobacco or pornographic films but there are no 
such controls on access to the Internet.   Secondly, young people are now much more affluent than in 
previous generations and are therefore in a better position to access the technology independently of 
their parents. Thirdly, games were perhaps the most prominent application on the first personal 
computers or microcomputers to become widely available in the early 1980s because the limited power 
of the machines was not capable of much more.   As a result, personal computers became established 
as gaming machines and have remained so (along with other applications) ever since.  
 
It is interesting to note the development regarding toys in the early seventeenth century in Europe.  Prior 
to this time, according to Sennett, “adults amused themselves with dolls, toy soldiers, and the other 
artifacts of childhood; such toys were few in number and costly.   As the cost went down the number 
of toys increased.  In this process toy objects also became the distinctive property of children.”(Sennet, 
2008, p.82)   This phenomenon is repeating itself to a certain degree today with mobile technology.  
 
The affordability of mobile technology is reflected in figures from both Gartner and IDC showing  that 
over 1.8 billion mobile phones were sold  throughout the world in 201326  while Worldbank data  shows 
that there were 96.9 mobile phones per 100 people worldwide in 2014.27 These figures ranged  from 
178 mobiles per 100 people in the United Arab Emirates to 64 in the UN category of  ‘Least Developed 
Countries’ while the figures for Ireland and the EU were 105 and 123 respectively.  The figures indicate 
how dependent we have all become on mobile technology.   It is an integral part of our lives to the 
extent that, for those for whom is it less affordable, other necessities are being sacrificed in order to buy 
into the technology.   Castells et al. give the example of Chile where “the average household now spends 
more on telecommunications than on water and electricity combined”  and where sales of mobile phones 
are depressing the sales of clothing and footwear (Castells et al., 2007, p.239) 
 
Our dependence on mobile technology and on ICT generally raises again the question of whether it is 
a means or is an end in itself.   It is a means of providing an individual with access to others  -  other 
people, other groups and other social systems.  This is particularly important for people in developing 
countries or any groups who otherwise would feel excluded.   Some see the technology as providing 
the “new garden fences” through which the “brief, frequent, spontaneous social networks of pre-
                                                            
26 https://mobiforge.com/research-analysis/global-mobile-statistics-2014-part-a-mobile-subscribers-handset-
market-share-mobile-operators#phone-shipments [Accessed 17th September, 2016] 
 




industrial communities” can be recreated (p.157).  Others see it as a means of  converting ‘lost’ or ‘dead’ 
time, such as waiting, using public transport or even driving, into productive time so that all time can 
become saturated with social practice (pp. 115, 174-177). 
 
Mobile technology breaks down the barriers of time and place.   But the primary purpose of barriers,  
and garden fences, is protection.  Human beings, at the most basic animal level, require routine to allow 
time and space for food and rest.  Technology doesn’t need these and globalisation doesn’t allow them 
since the sun never sets on the virtual global world.   However, people, for their very survival, need the 
security of protected space and protected time.   Yet one can detect language coming more and more 
into use which, inadvertently or otherwise, has the effect of confounding our understanding of these 
fundamentals.   For example, Castells et al. argue that with mobile communications technology 
“[p]laces are subsumed into the space of flows, thus losing their meaning in the space of places” (p.174) 
and elsewhere they speak of wireless communication homogenising space and “redefining space into 
the space of communication.”(p.178)  The great benefit of being able to access people or services online 
‘anywhere/anytime’ via mobile technology comes at the cost of being unable to isolate work, family, 
leisure or other commitments from one another but instead being exposed to the demands of all of them 
all of the time.   Communicating via mobile “is not so much about a new technical capability or freedom 
of motion, but about a smug and intimate technosocial tethering, a personal device and communications 
that are a constant, lightweight and mundane presence in everyday life.” (p.92) 
 
It is claimed that “mobile communication has unequivocally demonstrated its usefulness for the 
coordination of daily family activities” (p.89) and this is correct but perhaps only superficially.   There 
is now a randomness about the schedules of family members where there was previously a routine.   
This randomness is both caused by and managed by mobile communication.   Overall, it reflects less 
family cohesiveness due to the technology. 
 
The use of mobile technology in what would be regarded as productive spaces or to use ‘dead’ time 
profitably, raises some questions.   A survey undertaken in 2004 found that a high proportion of all 
texting was done during busy meetings or in classrooms (pp.176-177).   Such use is not just 
unproductive but indicates a lack of commitment that can be damaging in the long run.   Also, if space 
is truly ‘homogenised’, then those who are physically present in a place with someone do not have any 
priority for the attention of that person over those who are only accessible via their mobile.   Examples 
of this are common with individuals texting their friends for prolonged periods thereby excluding their 




One would expect that since mobile technology provides enhanced access and communications, it 
would enable stronger relationships to develop between people in the family, among friends, in business 
etc.    Better access and better communication allow greater flexibility.   Flexibility allows more choice, 
more options as prearranged meetings can be changed at short notice or one can opt out of the present 
company or discussion as in the examples above of people texting while present at meetings or when 
socialising with friends.   This militates to some extent against commitment and personal trust which in 
turn weakens relationships.    
 
The question of trust comes very much to the fore in the virtual world.   Trust, according to Luhmann, 
is an “effective form of complexity reduction” in social systems and, as such, it allows for “increased 
possibilities for experience and action” (Luhmann, 1979, p.8) so it allows us to manage more complex 
social systems.  One must distinguish between system trust which “counts on explicit processes” (p.58) 
and personal trust.   Trust “strengthens states as opposed to events and thus makes it possible to live 
and act with greater complexity in relation to events.  [..It] increases the tolerance of uncertainty.”  This 
must not be confused with what Luhmann refers to as the “instrumental mastery over events”(p.15) 
which provides the rationale for planning and which, if it can be assured, obviates the need for 
trust.    But planning, according to Luhmann, as mentioned earlier when discussing technocracy, 
increases rather than decreases dependence on chance and therefore increases complexity.   This 
increase in complexity can be counterbalanced by the occurrence of events which reduce uncertainty.   
Money provides some guarantee  against future complexity and uncertainty because when an individual 
“holds the money symbol in his hand, he also really possesses the possibilities which it promises, so 
that he can confidently put off his decision about [its] final use.”  This depends, of course, on the 
individual putting his trust “in the stability of the value of money, and the continuity of a multiplicity 
of opportunities for spending it.” (p.50) 
 
Mobile technology has been playing a significant role in political motivation and mobilisation.  It has 
provided an alternative to the mass-media for the dissemination of up-to-date news and can operate 
independently of the power of the state or of wealth.    But it is principally at the micro level of 
organisation, as has been indicated also in other contexts above, that the technology proves its 
effectiveness rather than at the level of policy or strategy discussion and formulation.   This has been 
demonstrated on a number of occasions in ‘flash mobilisations’ or flash mobs.   Castells et al. provide, 
as an example, the overthrow of President Estrada in the Philippines in 2001 (Castells et al., 2007, 
pp.186-193)   Following a critical development in Estrada’s impeachment trial, a “massive” 
demonstration formed “within hours” in Manila demanding his “immediate removal […] from the 




The demonstration to remove Estrada was organised almost instantaneously via texting and part of the 
evidence for this was the strain on the mobile networks as they tried to cope with the huge increase in 
network traffic.  It was the first time mobile phones were used effectively in such a significant political 
event.  Compared to the events surrounding the overthrow of the Marcos regime in 1986, it has been 
argued that “there was less violence and military involvement […] and that the demonstration was more 
centred on information and IT.”(p.188) 
 
While mobile technology made a very important contribution to the success of democratic  political 
events in the Philippines and elsewhere, the more excessive claims in this regard must be modified by, 
or at least take account of, some other factors.   The fact that the overthrow of Estrada was relatively 
peaceful was partly as a result of the military taking the side of the protesters.   Also, it ignores the 
violence that took place a few weeks previously when five bombs exploded in crowded areas of Manila 
although it is not totally clear if the events were connected.    More significantly, when Estrada was 
formally arrested, “a crowd of perhaps one hundred thousand [gathered in Manila] and demanded 
Estrada’s release and reinstatement.” (p.189)   The  Estrada supporters were the poor of the slums and 
the rural areas who, in general, would not have had access to mobile phones, yet they were able to 
congregate very quickly and thereby called into question “the proclaimed importance of the new 
media.” (p.190)  They were dispersed by the military after a few days and received largely negative 
publicity from the press.  The contrast between the middle-class, mobile-phone owning city dwellers 
and the poor has been highlighted. 
 
Castells et al. give other examples of the use of mobile technology and ICT in general in political 
campaigns.   One example is the election of Roh Moo-Hyun as president of South Korea in 2002 
(pp.193-198).  Having previously failed in a number of elections to other offices, he drew on the backing 
of an online supporter group called Nosamo which used the Internet and mobile phones for campaign 
management and coordination, for holding monthly committee meetings online and for membership 
recruitment through which it increased its membership from approximately 100 to 70-80,000 within a 
year.   When, during the late morning on election day, the polls showed that Roh was losing, “[w]ithin 
minutes more than 800,000 e-mails were sent to mobile phones to urge supporters to go out and vote.  
Traditionally apathetic young voters surged to the polls, and by 2 p.m., Roh took the lead and went on 
to win the election.” (p.196)  What was significant about his campaign, besides the use of technology, 
was that “many of his closest aides […] were former student activists.” (p.195) 
 
Three days before the 2004 general election in Spain, bombs exploded on three suburban trains in 
Madrid “killing 192 people and injuring over a thousand.” (p.198)  Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for 
the explosions and this was made credible by Spain’s involvement in the Iraq War.  The government, 
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however, blamed the Basque separatist group, ETA, and this claim was supported by most of the 
television and radio networks and the newspapers.  It was established after the election that the 
government was deliberately withholding information but if its claim about ETA were taken as correct, 
it would have favoured the government party in the election.   Spanish law prohibits political 
demonstrations and public statements on the day before general elections.  However, the many citizens 
who were not convinced by the government’s stance  started a campaign via mobile phones and the 
Internet and as a result, ‘flash mob’ demonstrations took place “in all Spanish cities” (p.202) despite 
the legal ban.    The election showed an increase of 2.5 million voters28 over the previous election and 
approximately one million voters switched to the main opposition party, the Socialist Party while the 
government party, the People’s Party (PP), lost the election.  
 
The protests organised against the National Convention of the Republican Party in the New York in 
2004 included “the largest ever Convention protest” (Castells et al., 2007, p.203) in the form of a march 
with approximately half a million people.  The Convention was held against the backdrop of the Iraq 
War.   The protests were carefully planned over the previous year.   Wireless technology was used 
extensively in the planning and coordination of the protests including the sending of ‘alerts’ prior to 
and during the protest themselves.  The protests, although widespread, were not very effective and failed 
to disrupt the Convention and following the Convention, President Bush’s popularity increased.  The 
use of wireless technology was anticipated by the police who then exploited it by listening in or 
monitoring text messaging and getting access to information regarding the planned protests as well as 
information during the protests themselves which led to thousands of arrests.  Also, alerts sent to 
protesters could be intercepted and counteracted by the police.    The protest did not have a clear 
objective since it comprised various groups with different agendas “ranging from anti-war through 
animal rights to abortion rights.”(p.206)  Also, the fact that it was planned centrally and well in advance 
was very much in contrast to the spontaneity which is a strong feature of the more intimate mobile 
environment. 
An effort was made in the province of Guangdong in China in 2003 by SARS victims together with  
their friends and the hospital staff treating them, to alert the wider population to the outbreak of the 
disease.  The authorities denied the reports of the outbreak and launched a mass media campaign saying 
“the infections were no more than a variant of pneumonia [and] that it was already under control.”   
Most people believed the official version “only to witness the SARS epidemic in full swing within 
weeks.” (p.207)  The mass media were perceived to have had a higher credibility than the mobile media. 
                                                            
28 Chari, 2004 available at:   http://www.academia.edu/840991/The_2004_Spanish_election_terrorism_as_a_catalyst_for_change 
[Accessed 17th September, 2016].   This figure is at variance with that given by Castells (one million) but both 






In considering the role of media in political events, one cannot ignore the part played by the radio 
station, Radio Television Libres des Milles Collines (RTLM) in the Rwandan massacre in 1994.  
800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed over a three month period by extreme Hutus.  This 
followed months of “extreme anti-Tutsi propaganda” broadcasts from RTLM which “explicitly directed 
that the [Tutsis] be exterminated.”29  RTLM, a private radio station, was on the air for only one year. 
This was before mobile technology was widely available.   It is difficult to say whether the technology 
would have had any effect against the broadcasts and the horrifically efficient organisation of the 
genocide, particularly when the international community, including the UN, failed to take any action 
although the world at large was aware of what was happening. 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the examples outlined above: 
 
• Mobile technology can be very effective when used to mobilise and coordinate a large group to 
respond to some event, especially a sudden political event or manoeuvre but it can also be 
monitored, to some extent at least, by the authorities. 
 
• Texting is confined to micro-coordination in the political arena, such as publicising the place and 
time of a meeting, as in other areas of life mentioned earlier.  It provides little scope for developing 
ideas or strategies or elaborating on previous messages.   Therefore “mobile phones and texting 
have to work closely with other media, such as the Internet and radio […] in order to deliver actual 
political consequences.” (Castells et al., 2007, p.193) 
 
• Mobile technology has been effective in mass political movements where “other processes have 
been in play, including a precipitating event strong enough to arouse anger or other emotions, 
activist instigators, support from respected institutions such as the church, and supplementary 
information from mainstream and/or Internet sources.”(p.212) It is also apparent that strong, 
determined leadership with clear, focused goals is required. 
 
• Mobile technology can be used to bypass the mass media or to counteract misinformation 
disseminated through the mass media.  However, false rumours can be spread more easily, although 
perhaps not as widely, via mobile technology and the Internet and it is easier to create a rumour 
than to dispel it. 
 
                                                            
29  http://www.rwandafile.com/rtlm/  [Accessed 17th September 2016] 
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• Castells et al. suggest that mobile technology “creates a new form of public space” (p.185) although 
they also argue that it does not always have high credibility or sufficient capacity to spur two-way 
civic deliberation.”(p.193) 
 
• When disseminating information via mobile phones, if every person forwards messages to those 
listed in  their address books so that in each case the sender is known to the receiver, this enhances 
the credibility of the message and allows “the network of diffusion [to increase] at an exponential 
rate but without losing the proximity of the source.”(p.201)  An example of a contrasting situation 
occurred during the regional elections in Italy in 2004 when Prime Minister Berlusconi, who already 
owned some of the television networks, “decided on the eve of the election to send 13 million 
“personal” messages to cell phones.”(p.211)  There was widespread indignation at this perceived 
invasion of “personal and political privacy” and Berlusconi lost the election “by a larger margin 
than anticipated.”  
 
• “It is the person-to-person, horizontal, mass communication, rather than a new technology for top-
down mass communication, that accounts for the difference in the mobilizing impact of a given 
message.”(p.211) 
 
• A notable feature of networking technology has been the development of relatively spontaneous 
communities of practice with a particular goal - flash mobs being the extreme example.   Experience 
suggests that to sustain them long-term, they, or some central steering group, should meet offline 
on a regular basis.  
 
• Throughout Castells et al.’s study, there is an implicit assumption, although with some specific 
exceptions, that the overwhelming majority of mobile users are young, middle-class and tend to 
think along the same lines politically. 
 
Beaumont’s analysis of events in the early stages of the ‘Arab Spring’ would support these conclusions. 
(Beaumont, The Guardian, 25th Feb. 2011)   The events led to the overthrow of governments in Egypt, 
Libya, Tunisia and Yemeni as well as uprisings in other countries throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa.  The role of the Internet and social networking has been exaggerated by some groups and 
undervalued by others due to over-simplistic assessments of the different situations.   Beaumont says 
the role of the social networks has been “important as it also has been complex, contradictory and 
misunderstood.”  It varies according to the local situation and “how people live their lives online in 




In Tunisia, the state was weak as was the case in the Philippines when Estrada was ousted.   This may 
appear a truism but it is unlikely at this point that one could find an example of mobile or social media 
having an impact against the wishes of a strong repressive state.   While the technology may be seen in 
most cases as democratic, it can also be exploited by autocratic powers.   The government in Tunisia 
shut down Facebook but was then “confronted with a threat by cyber activists to close [the 
government’s] internet accounts” so they had to relent and instead they started diverting accounts to “a 
fake login page” to steal passwords. (Beaumont)   It is possible that such cyber battles will form part of 
future political revolts. 
 
The events of the Arab Spring were triggered by Mohammed Bouazizi burning himself in Tunisiain 
protest at his treatment by the authorities.   A few months previously, another man had done the same 
but it wasn’t recorded on photograph or film whereas Bouazizi’s death was and the images were posted 
on Facebook to be seen throughout the world. (Beaumont) 
 
The use of mobile technology during the Arab Spring was most effective when complementing other 
media.   For example, in Egypt, while “details of demonstrations were circulated by both Facebook and 
Twitter, [an] activists' 12-page guide to confronting the regime was distributed by email.” (Beaumont)  
Also, protesters were able to send images and film via Facebook and YouTube to the mainstream media 
such as Al Jazeera who would then transmit them worldwide including the country of origin where 
possible. 
 
The significant advantage of mobile and Internet technology over the mass media can be summarised 
in its relative freedom from the cost constraints of the latter and  the fact that  it is “unlimited by 
publication deadlines and broadcast news slots.” (Beaumont) 
 
 
4.2 Information and Knowledge 
Data, information and knowledge form a hierarchy with data at the bottom and knowledge at the top.   
Despite these terms, particularly information and knowledge, being used as prefixes to describe so many 
aspects of the world, e.g.  -society, -industry, -economy, -revolution, etc.,  there are no agreed, workable 
definitions.   In fact the terms are often used interchangeably.   Machlup quotes various definitions 
including “[i]nformation…. is essentially raw data, Knowledge ….is interpreted data.” (Machlup, 1980, 
p.8) This, however, would imply an inversion of the relationship between data and information as given 
earlier.   Machlup himself  distinguishes between information and knowledge by defining information 
as a “process by which knowledge […] is transmitted.”  But he immediately qualifies it by saying that 
when the term ‘information’ is used to describe the contents of the communication rather than the 
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process, “one may want information to refer to the knowledge currently conveyed by [the process] in 
contrast to the knowledge previously accumulated in the knower’s mind or records.”(pp.8-9) Roszak 
quoting Machlup says “Information […] is acquired by being told, whereas knowledge can be acquired 
by thinking.” (Roszak, 1994, p.93) 
 
Brown and Duguid also refer to the role of the ‘knower’ in relation to knowledge.  Whereas information 
is independent, “more-or-less self-sufficient” and can be easily retrieved, forwarded, quantified, 
compared etc., “knowledge seems to require more by way of assimilation.   Knowledge is something 
we digest rather than merely hold.”  Knowledge “entails a knower” and because of this attachment, it 
is “harder to detach than information.” (Brown & Duguid, 2002, pp.119-120)  From this they conclude 
that “as the abundance of information overwhelms us all, we need not simply more information, but 
people to assimilate, understand, and make sense of it.” (p.121) 
 
Lyotard, in contrast, expects “a thorough exteriorization of knowledge with respect to the “knower”” 
and believes that the “old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training 
(Bildung) of minds, or even of individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so.” 
(Lyotard, 1984, p.4)  For Lyotard, knowledge has two principal functions  -  “research and the 
transmission of acquired learning.”  The channels through which learning is transmitted are being 
transformed “by the proliferation of information-processing machines” and knowledge “can fit into the 
new channels, and become operational, only if learning is translated into quantities of information.” 
(p.4) 
 
Following Mintzberg, one could locate data, information and knowledge along a ‘hard/soft’ scale with 
data occupying the hard end, resident in a machine and having a high level of accuracy, a high degree 
of certainty but not possessing the richness of knowledge which would occupy the other end of the 
scale.  Knowledge is soft, resides in people’s heads and would have a lower level of accuracy and  
certainty than data. On this continuum, information would be located between the hard data and the soft 
knowledge (Adam & Murphy, 1999, p.36).  Other than this, it is very difficult to find a clear and 
satisfactory definition of the term ‘data’ anywhere else in the literature.  However, because of their 
almost universal influence on ICT, it is worth noting Schmidt & Cohen’s somewhat stark definition that 
“data itself is a tool” and “[e]veryone in society benefits from digital data.” (Schmit & Cohen, 2013, 
p.15)30  
 
                                                            




Luhmann defines information, within the context of autopoietic systems, as an event which is part of a 
communication.  It “is a surprising selection from among several possibilities.   As a surprise, it can 
neither be enduring nor able to be transported; and it has to be produced within the system, since it 
presupposes comparison with expectations.” (Luhmann, 2012, p.36)   “If one utters a specific sentence, 
this sentence is chosen from the set of all sentences that could be uttered.   This set is determined by 
what was said beforehand.” (Luhmann, 2013, p.216) The range of possibilities for selection, the 
“horizon of expectations,” (p.217) sets the context.   The message is understood in the context of the 
communications that preceded it.  This should eliminate any possibility of ambiguity.  Luhmann notes 
that the code for the mass media, i.e. information/non-information, is very different to the code for art.  
“Works of art must display sufficient ambiguity, a plurality of potential readings” and he cites 
Finnegans Wake as an example. (Luhmann, 2000, p.128, n.15) 
 
Since, within Luhmann’s theory, information provides a surprise, then it cannot be repeated.  “If it is 
repeated, the only information that is still there is that apparently someone considers it necessary to 
repeat it.” (Luhmann, 2013, p.217) When a news item is repeated in the media, it retains its meaning 
“but it loses its information value” so the media system is constantly “transforming information into 
non-information.”  However, the autopoietic process is feeding the non-information back into the 
system “and in doing so forces itself constantly to provide new information.” (Luhmann, 2000, p.20)  
Advertising, of course, makes use of repetition.   Luhmann explains it as “the reflexive figure of the 
information value of non-information [being] used as an indicator of significance and of meriting 
rememberance.”   The viewer “notices the repetition of the value of the product.” (p.20)  The 
consistency  of the message stands out particularly against the background of constantly changing news.   
 
Luhmann gives other examples to highlight the distinction between information and meaning.  In the 
language of biologists, “genetic codes contain information, although as a matter of fact they consist of 
structures and not of events.”   Also, following one of his examples, University College Cork is not 
information.   One is not surprised every time one sees it that it is still there.   It is a structure and it has 
meaning  -  we know why it exists -  but it “has no informational value.” (Luhmann, 2013, p.90)  
 
The Kennedy-Nixon debates in the 1960 U.S. Presidential Election were broadcast on radio and 
television.  After the first debate, polls of television viewers put Kennedy ahead while polls of radio 
listeners put Nixon ahead.  Both groups heard the same discussion but for some, if not all of the viewers, 
the visual image provided an additional element to assist them in making a judgement.   Kennedy 
presented the better image and this was reflected in different ways.   His darker suit made him stand out 
more prominently; he looked more relaxed and therefore more confident and credible, and he appeared 
to focus more on the viewers, i.e. the electorate, whereas Nixon was seen to focus mainly on his 
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opponent (Dallek, 2003, pp.284-287).  By accommodating two of the senses rather than just one, the 
television broadcast provided more information, a greater richness and more context. 
 
Most of the information processed on computers is communicated to us visually, i.e. primarily via text 
but also via images.  The information we impart is, in most cases, visual or auditory.   However, we 
gather information through the five senses.   Therefore, the information we receive through the 
electronic media is limited, and limited essentially to ‘hard’ information. 
 
Roszak highlights how simple projects such as making breakfast “have defied the best efforts of 
cognitive scientists to program them.” (Roszak, 1994, p.237)   However, the preparation of food may 
require all of the five senses in order to process the relevant information to accomplish the task properly.  
So, from an information processing perspective, making breakfast is quite a complex task as are most 
of the things we do instinctively.   But it is not just the additional senses that introduce extra complexity.   
For example, if two people meet to discuss something, how they greet one another could influence the 
content of the discussion.  A cold greeting by one might be seen by the other as signifying an expression 
of power and dominance and as a result they might be less open or forthcoming in the discussion.   It 
may be possible to write an AI-type program to represent the ‘cold’ greeting, but whether a high level 
of accuracy could be achieved is debatable and in practical terms it would be dependent on a high level 
of abstraction in the programming. 
 
A high level of abstraction is closer to the vernacular than low-level computer languages which are 
closer to the operational processes of the machine.   If a program is written in a very high-level language, 
the programmer can focus primarily on the problem to be solved rather than on the workings of the 
computer and on the unique features of the particular model of machine being used.  The program will 
probably generate a larger program or set of programs automatically in a lower language and these may 
generate further programs with the cycle continuing down the levels until eventually the last stage is 
reached where the compiler translates the program or programs into machine instructions which can be 
processed directly by the computer.  Colburn describes three types of abstraction in programming -  
language abstraction as described above; procedural abstraction to accommodate commonly used 
procedures such as matrix multiplication; and data abstraction to manage machine-oriented data types 
such as arrays, floating-point numbers etc. (Colburn, in Floridi 2004, pp.322-325)  
 
Roszak expresses concern that such abstraction further removes the machine from human responsibility 
and quotes Donald Michie as saying that it could lead to a “technological black hole” in which “humans 
will not be able to understand the reasoning behind computer results that make key decisions.”(Roszak, 
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1994, p.231)31 The Y2K project that dominated the latter half of the 1990s is evidence that this risk 
was, and probably still is, widespread. 
 
The abstraction is achieved through language, in this case various levels of computer programming 
languages.  It is worth noting in this context Lyotard’s comment that “for the last forty years the 
“leading” sciences and technologies have had to do with language.” (Lyotard, 1984, p.3)32    According 
to Roszak “the new biology has been so tightly entwined with the language and imagery of information 
science that it is almost impossible to imagine the field developing at all without the aid of the computer 
paradigm.”   He provides examples of how biochemists latched on to the concepts and terminology of 
information science and those developed by Norbert Weiner for his theory of cybernetics (Roszak, 
1994, p.17).   And it is interesting to note that much of this was subsequently adopted by Luhmann for 
his theory of society.  
 
In the field of astronomy, Bernard Lovell asked if computers are “antiserendipitous” since they “act as 
very narrow filters of information; they must be oriented to specific observations. In other words, they 
have to be programmed for the kinds of results that the observer expects.”  This raises the question of 
whether “they may be obscuring from our understanding further major features of the universe”. (p.115, 
quoted from Science Digest, June 1984, p.94)  A similar question arises in relation to the Human 
Genome Project which set out to “revolutionize the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of most, if not 
all, human diseases” through sequencing the human genome.  While it provided some valuable insights, 
the project failed in its stated objective.  This, some would claim was due to an overall strategy that 
focused primarily on the computational aspects of DNA sequencing rather than on the biological aspects 
of genes (Hall, 2010, pp.60-67). 
 
4.3 Communication 
Luhmann defines society as a communication system (Luhmann, 2012, p.52) comprising functionally 
differentiated subsystems (p.75).  This is in contrast to the stratified traditional and tribal societies that 
persisted until feudal times and were differentiated on the basis of status.  The Greeks were the first to 
make a move away from the tribal society which was dominated in their case, as mentioned above, by 
the druids.   This followed the invention of writing using the phonetic alphabet around the eight century 
BC (Havelock, 1963, p.39) which “moves speech from the oral-aural to a new sensory world, that of 
                                                            
31 Quoting from “Computers that could lead to Disaster”, in New Scientist, January 17th 1980, p.160 
32    The areas of science Lyotard refers to are “phonology and theories of linguistics,  problems of 
communication and cybernetics,  modern theories of algebra and informatics, computers and their languages, 
problems of information storage and data banks, telematics and the perfection of intelligent terminals, 
paradoxology.”  He was writing this in the late 1970s before the first microcomputers  (PCs) became available.  
He says this list is not exhaustive. 
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vision [and] transforms speech and thought as well” and restructures the human lifeworld (Ong, 1982, 
p.85).  The phonetic alphabet, according to McLuhan, provides “the meaningless sign linked to the 
meaningless sound [with which] we have built the shape and meaning of Western man” (McLuhan, 
1962, p.50) and “sacrifices worlds of meaning and perception that were secured by forms like the 
hieroglyph and the Chinese ideogram.”(McLuhan, 1967, p.93) 
 
Speech at its most primitive is emotive, even animals can express emotions acoustically.  As speech 
developed through language it became more propositional although to this day practically all speech, 
other than formal sentences of mathematics, retains “a certain affective emotional tinge.” (Cassirer, 
1992, p.29)  Speech tends towards the emotive, writing tends towards the objective.  Speech is 
embodied, writing tends to be disembodied and detached. The visual is focused, the acoustical is not.  
“In tribal cultures, experience is arranged by a dominant auditory sense-life that represses visual values. 
The auditory sense […] is hyper-esthetic and delicate and all-inclusive.  Oral cultures act and react at 
the same time.   Phonetic culture endows men with the means of repressing their feelings and emotions 
when engaged in action.” (McLuhan, 1967, p.96)  People in oral cultures who have no experience of 
writing “learn a great deal and possess and practice great wisdom, but they do not ‘study’.” (Ong, 1982, 
p.9) 
 
The phonetic alphabet enabled a high level of abstraction and this has been taken to the extreme with 
the development of binary digital representation of information.   The introduction of electricity was, 
obviously, the other significant factor in the development of communications since they could now be 
transmitted instantaneously, or at the “speed of total causality.” (McLuhan, 1967, p.370)   In other 
words, based on our present level of knowledge, we have reached the limit in terms of abstraction 
capability and of speed in communications technology and this should provide us with far greater clarity 
of understanding in our communications.  But electricity has other attributes besides speed which 
complicate the situation. 
 
Mechanisation implies a linear sequence of operations but automation, enabled by electricity, allows 
“instant synchronization of numerous operations.” (p.372)   With electrical technology “the utmost 
variety and extent of operations in industry and society quickly assume a unified posture” just as the 
“central nervous system is not merely an electric network, but […] constitutes a single unified field of 
experience.”(p.371) If McLuhan were around to experience the Internet, he would regard it as an 
extension of the central nervous system.  But McLuhan also suggested that those of us in the Western 
world are facing a significant disadvantage “as against the “backward countries” [since it] is our 
enormous backlog of literate and mechanistic technology that renders us so helpless and inept in 




Through radio and television we are informed almost instantaneously of events around the world.  The 
news is shared across the globe and our world becomes the Global Village.   It becomes more difficult 
to remain detached from what is happening around us.  But there are different levels of 
detachment/involvement.   In the case of an event such as a football match, there are the players who 
are participating in the sport; the spectators in the stadium who are participating in the event and the 
television viewers who are passively viewing and listening to the mediated report of the event.  This 
applies across most areas of public life such as politics, citizenship, the arts etc. where there are few 
active participants but there are many whose involvement is confined to viewing and listening.  This 
brings back, to some extent, the passive aspect of tribalism which literacy helped to eliminate.  Some 
aspects of pre-literate culture can be experienced again.    The dominance of the written word is 
challenged by the oral-aural experience, an experience Ong refers to as ‘secondary orality’, which is an 
orality “that is sustained by telephone, radio, television, and other electronic devices that depend for 
their existence and functioning on writing and print.” (Ong, 1982, p.11)   
 
Feenberg substitutes the distinction “between repeatable and retrievable discourse” for that between 
oral and literate cultures (Feenberg, 1995, p.136) to highlight their roles in preserving the social memory 
and social integration.   For the preservation of social memory, oral cultures “rely heavily on repetition 
[…] and access to the text is not under individual control but regulated socially through participation in 
public functions and performances” whereas individuals in a literate culture who are free from such 
regulation can access, and interpret for themselves, permanent texts of the present and past whenever 
they wish.  However, Feenberg notes that the distinction is not as significant today due to the fact that 
speech can be recorded and retrieved also.(p.136)   But the retrieved speech (or image) can be edited, 
changed or reproduced in a different context to the original and the source material does not, yet at any 
rate, have the same authority as the written word. 
 
Havelock takes a different view, stating that in every society there is “a linguistic statement or paradigm, 
telling us what we are and how we should behave” and this is “ drilled into the successive generations”  
in literate societies “ through books or controlled by written documents as it was in preliterate society 
which lacked documents.”  He adds that “a collective social memory, tenacious and reliable, is an 
absolute prerequisite for maintaining the apparatus of any civilisation.”  (Havelock, 1963, p.42)  But is 
such a paradigm, geared towards social cohesion or integration, compatible with a functionally 
differentiated society?  Does ubiquitous technological connectivity express today’s paradigm?  I return 
to these questions below (See 4.5).   
 
The Internet provides for active involvement which effectively does not exist for radio listeners or 
television viewers.   But, while one can participate in public discussion on the Internet, one can use 




By definition, all media mediate and they can do it at a number of levels.   In mediating, they select or 
tailor the context.  Reporters mediate as do commentators, editors, script-writers, cameras, microphones 
etc.  It is impossible to communicate information without mediating.   
 
 
4.4 Reach of ICT 
4.4.1 ICT in the Home 
In a research paper prepared in 2000, Lewis sets out a vision of ICT in the connected or 
networked home (Lewis, 2000).   While all the technology envisaged by Lewis was available 
when she produced the report, it has not yet been adopted on a wide-scale basis.   This is, 
perhaps, because while the technology is available, the necessary infrastructure is not fully in 
place or perhaps it is such a major innovation - an invasion of what many would regard as a 
protected space -  that the ‘market’ is not yet ready for it.  The success of the smartphone, 
however, could accelerate the adoption of the ‘smart’ home since it could act as the integrated 
remote control to manage all the systems whether one is at home or away.   
 
The vision for the home of the future that Lewis sets out is one where practically all appliances 
and systems are connected so that they can be controlled automatically, locally or remotely via 
the Internet.  These include the systems for heating, cooling, lighting, security, entertainment, 
health care, home office systems for personal and work-related business including teleworking, 
e-learning and distance education systems as well as the standard text, voice and video 
communications systems for keeping in touch with family and friends.  These systems would 
be controlled by “digital butlers” which would monitor the internal and external environment 
and adjust accordingly.   Voice-activated  control systems and biometric systems for security 
would also be used as would alarm systems to detect defects such as leaks etc.    Other facilities 
would include telemedicine-based applications for the elderly, infirm or housebound and links 
to local services providing immediate information on buses, trains and other services as well as 
links to government services for tax returns etc. 
 
In the context of today’s technology, there is nothing extraordinary in Lewis’ vision but the 
vantage point from which some see it can raise concerns about what’s driving it.   For example, 
Roszak quotes an article in the Futurist which reassures us that “[o]nce your house can talk to 
you, you may never feel alone again” and he quotes Pamela McCorduck saying that the future 
home will be “equipped with a “geriatric robot” that will solve “the problems of aging.”” 




Though everyone knows what home is, it is not easy to give a complete definition.  It is often 
defined as the family residence but it is more than a building, a house or a location.  It also 
comprises  relationships within the family and relationships with the local community and the 
wider world.  Emotional attachments are a particularly significant attribute of the home.  The 
life of the home is very much in contrast with the rational workings of the external environment, 
the civic world or the world of work.  While the Internet can help to keep families connected, 
it is unlikely that it, or any other physical technology, could adequately represent the 
connections that exist in the home.  This is best summed up by Dreyfus’ remark that “[w]hatever 
hugs do for people, I’m quite sure telehugs won’t do it.” (Dreyfus, 2009, p.68)   The home is a 
protected space even though the physical space may overlap with the workspace in the case of 
people working from ‘home’. 
 
While the Internet and the associated technologies can help to maintain communications with 
those who are physically absent, people regularly absent themselves mentally from their 
physical surroundings through their preoccupation with these technologies and it can be argued 
that this is leading to the breakdown of relationships within the home as we know it.   The 
Internet can not only connect people, it can also separate or isolate them.  Schmidt and Cohen 
state that the Internet and mobile devices enable “individuals to transcend their current 
environment” (Schmidt & Cohen, 2013, p.185) but in doing so it is in danger of impairing some 
of the existing environments.    The secure and intimate environment of the home could be 
sacrificed for the technologist-designed environment of the Internet. 
 
The basis of the model which Lewis describes is quite simple  -  connect everything.   While it 
refers to the house, it nevertheless tries to blast through every aspect of the protected emotional 
space that is the home.   There is no purpose behind it other than the fact that it can be done, 
like Mallory’s reason for climbing Everest “because it is there.”   The model is expressed today 
in the ‘Internet of Things’ although it’s not far removed from the dystopian version described 
almost a century ago by E.M.Forster (Forster, 2011).33       
 
 
4.4.2 ICT in Education 
Illich, in his proposals to ‘deschool’ society, or put another way, to democratise education, 
argues that effective skills training can be achieved only if it is “freed from curricular restraints” 
and an effective liberal education can be achieved only if it is “dissociated from obligatory 
                                                            
33 Forster’s The Machine Stops was originally published in 1928. 
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attendance.” (Illich, 2002, p.17) He is opposed to the institutionalisation of education, because 
the control of education and of other social services by the state marginalises the poor and 
leaves them without power over their own circumstances (p.3). For Postman, “[s]chools became 
technocracy’s first secular bureaucracies, structures for legitimizing some parts of the flow of 
information and discrediting other parts […] in short, a means of governing the ecology of 
information.” (Postman, 1993, p.63)  He uses the term ‘ecology’ to convey that attribute of the 
information environment whereby a significant change in one area or component changes the 
whole environment.   He extends it to the world of technology saying that a “new technology 
does not add or subtract something.  It changes everything.” (p.18) 
 
The alternative to traditional schooling that Illich proposes is to provide ready access to the 
available resources for anyone who wants to learn at any stage in their lives.   He would be in 
agreement with Brown and Duguid, when they say that while learning tends to be regarded “as 
a supply-side matter, thought to follow teaching, training, or information delivery”, it is in fact 
“much more demand driven. People learn in response to need.” (Brown & Duguid, 2002, p.136)  
They refer to Tagore’s story about the teacher who was “determined to teach [him] music, and 
consequently no learning took place.”  But he did “pick up from him a certain amount of stolen 
knowledge” by watching and listening to him when he “played for his own and other’s 
entertainment.” (p.136) 
 
Illich categorises the necessary learning resources under four headings.  First, things such as 
books, libraries, laboratories, workshops etc. Second, models, that is people with particular 
skills or expertise that they are willing to share with anyone wishing to learn them.  Third, peers 
such as colleagues with whom the learner can share or discuss their studies or wider issues 
reflecting to some extent the environment Newman suggested for his university.  Fourth, elders, 
who would act as consultants providing direction and advice for the learner (Illich, 2002, pp.75-
76).   The initiative is with the learner who creates a small support community around him or 
her and reciprocates in the process by supporting their endeavours.  
 
Writing a good while before the Worldwide Web or even the Internet became a reality, Illich 
encourages the use of technology to develop these communities and in this context mentions 
computers, telephones, film, and recordings (p.19) while designating the “the reticular 
structures for mutual access” in the communities as ‘learning webs’ or ‘educational webs’ since 
‘web’ is a “word less evocative of entrapment” than ‘network.’   He gives the example of the 
TV networks which have become institutionalised by the bureaucrats who decide on the content 
which they believe is “good for or in demand by the people” and he warns that “[t]echnology 
is available to develop either independence and learning or bureaucracy and teaching (pp.76-
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77).”   This is very pertinent in the light of some of the excessive claims being made about the 
benefits of ICT in liberating the education system by its evangelists as is the warning from 
Dewey issued long before technology became a significant factor in school.  While advocating 
greater freedom in the education process than exists in the traditional school, he says “that an 
educational philosophy which professes to be based on the idea of freedom may become as 
dogmatic as ever was the traditional education which is reacted against.” (p.22) 
 
Illich’s ideas are very revolutionary but are not out of harmony with Dewey’s more moderate 
approach.   Dewey was opposed to the authoritarianism and rigidity of the traditional school 
system and the way in which the subjects taught were not, or at least not necessarily, related to 
the life experience of the learner.  Rather, there should be “an intimate and necessary relation 
between the processes of actual experience and education.” (Dewey, 1963, p.20)  He argues for 
an education environment based on individual freedom and “democratic social arrangements”, 
on “mutual consultation and convictions reached through persuasion.” (p.34)  
 
Learning should develop through progressive experiences which “are linked cumulatively to 
one another” and avoid the disconnectedness that “may artificially generate dispersive, 
disintegrated, centrifugal habits.” (p.26)  But the progression of experience could go in the 
wrong direction and induce, for example, “a lack of sensitivity and of responsiveness” which 
might restrict the possibility of richer experiences later or the learner’s “automatic skill in a 
particular direction [could]  land him in a groove or rut.” (pp.25-26)  It is the role of the 
educator, who possesses greater insight and more mature experience, to evaluate the direction 
and “moving force” of the learner’s experience and organise the conditions to enable it.   The 
learner’s experience is dependent on his or her previous experience and on the experience of 
the educator since “all human experience is ultimately social.” (p.38)   
 
Stonier sees “the decentralisation and democratisation of education” leading to the “expansion 
of information [which] will make it increasingly difficult for teachers to keep up with new 
developments.”  As a result “there will be increasing reliance on students teaching students and 
students teaching teachers.  The common effort exploring new knowledge can be extremely 
rewarding.” (Stonier, 1983, p.179) 
 
In his critique of distance learning, Dreyfus outlines five stages in the learning process that one 
must progress through to become an expert in a particular domain with a sixth stage if one is to 




1. Novice:  The learner is introduced to facts, rules and procedures and the learning is 
essentially a matter of drill and practice.   Information is to be consumed and this can be 
facilitated by the Internet which “can offer an improved version of the correspondence 
course.” 
 
2. Advanced beginner: The information is put in context through the introduction of new 
“situational aspects” and ideally this would be achieved through direct interaction between 
instructor and learner but it could be achieved also through distance learning. 
 
3. Competence: The learner recognises the wide range of possible situations, distinguished 
only by subtle differences and with solutions which are less well-defined.  The learner has 
to take responsibility for the decisions and emotions come into play - emotions of fear in 
anticipation and relief or joy or alternatively disappointment at the outcome.  The learner 
becomes very dependent on the experience of the instructor and the relationship between 
them in this and subsequent stages has to be embodied through face-to-face contact.   
Dreyfus stresses the Internet’s shortcomings in this area which “may well leave students 
stuck at competence.” 
 
4. Proficiency: In this stage emotional involvement is essential and the “resulting positive and 
negative emotional experiences will strengthen successful responses and inhibit 
unsuccessful ones.”  The proficient performer can intuitively “discriminate among a variety 
of situations” but will still have to work out the best solution. 
 
5. Expertise: The individual can be deemed an expert when they are capable of providing an 
“immediate intuitive situational response” to a problem or event.     Reaching this level of 
expertise requires significant involvement in real-life situations or simulations such as case 
studies.      
 
6. Master:  Mastery is achieved when one has the confidence to “respond to novel situations 
without time for deliberation” or to consciously override “conventional expertise […] to 
yield improved performance.”    These situations require a strong emotional involvement 
from the master. 
 
One can achieve only competence via distance learning.  Each level requires a greater 
commitment, a greater personal or emotional involvement on the part of the learner.  One has 
to develop a greater passion in relation to the discipline, matter or mechanism with which one 
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is working.  It would be very difficult to achieve this in the detached environment of distance 
learning.  Proficiency and expertise require the experience and example of an instructor while 
mastery is achieved by those with expertise who, on their own, push out the boundaries of their 
field or discipline.   
 
Getting personally involved in order to become proficient or expert in an area means that one 
has to make a commitment to the area, a commitment that cannot be easily revoked.   In doing 
this one has to put one’s trust in others - instructors, teachers, other learners in the group or 
class etc.  -  and trust involves risk.   In Luhmann’s words “it must be possible for the partner 
to abuse the trust; indeed it must not merely be possible for him to do so but he must also have 
a considerable interest in doing so.” (Luhmann, 1979, p.42) There is also the risk of failure, the 
fear of which is made particularly acute by the presence of others.  This is balanced by the 
possibility of experiencing success, an experience which is intensified by their presence.  The 
intensification of the experiences, both positive and negative, is a very significant factor in the 
learning process since it helps one to remember and to hone one’s skills. 
 
Not alone does the learner make him/herself vulnerable in entering the commitment but the 
instructor is doing the same.   Any perceived weakness in the expertise of the instructor will 
diminish the learner’s confidence in him/her and the awareness of this risk will help to further 
sharpen the instructor’s skills.   This contributes to the instructor’s mastery of the subject or 
discipline and must, in turn, contribute to its development. 
 
The learner also makes him/herself vulnerable when doing experiments in the laboratory but 
this vulnerability is largely removed when the experiments are simulated on a computer.   As 
Roszak notes, the experiment “already edits reality for purposes of focus and control; the 
simulation now edits the experiment by eliminating the real scientific work involved […] But 
even worse, it neatly eliminates the risk, which is the whole point of experimentation.” (Roszak, 
1994, p.70) 
 
For Dreyfus “the crucial question is whether our relation to the world is that of a disembodied 
detached spectator or an involved embodied agent” (Dreyfus, 2009, p.53) and there are aspects 
of learning, such as cultural style, which are “too embodied to be captured in a theory.” (p.46)  
He also refers to the term ‘Urdoxa’, which he describes as an embodied and “constant readiness 
to cope with things in general that goes beyond our readiness to cope with any specific thing.” 
(p.56)34  Human interaction cannot be understood in its full context unless perceived by the 
                                                            
34 Dreyfus attributes the term ‘Urdoxa’ to Merleau-Ponty but the reference given appears incorrect. 
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whole body and quoting two roboticists, he says that “it cannot be captured by adding together 
3D images, stereo sound, remote robot control, and so forth.” (p.57)35 For Merleau-Ponty,“[the] 
life of consciousness […]  is subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us 
our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation [and] 
brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility.” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, p.136)   
 
Dreyfus points to the example of why people attend the theatre when they could see a film for 
a small fraction of the price.  It is the presence of the cast and the audience and the interaction 
between them that provides a richer experience and also the fact that the individual members 
of the audience can choose what to focus on at any particular time whereas in the cinema that 
is decided by the Director (Dreyfus, 2009, p.60).   Something similar happens when a teacher 
is delivering a lecture over a video link.   The teacher cannot choose very easily who or what 
to focus on in the class.  Nor can the teacher pick up what she would normally get through 
peripheral vision.   She cannot make eye contact with the students or detect very interested or 
bored students.   More importantly, what is missing “is a sense of the context, […] the mood in 
the room.”(p.59) This can have a strong influence on the interaction between the teacher and 
students.   In a somewhat similar vein, Brown and Duguid emphasise the significant role of the 
social forces in the background.  It is not “the information that creates that background.  The 
background has to be in place for the information to register” and they use the analogy of the 
ripple from a disturbance on the lake -  “[w]e notice the ripple and take the lake for granted.   
Yet clearly the lake shapes the ripple more than the ripple shapes the lake.” (Brown & Duguid, 
2002, pp.138-139)  Teachers or students in a distance learning situation can focus in on the 
‘ripple’ but they can’t fully experience the ‘lake’ and all that is happening in and around it just 
on the PC screen.   
 
Discussing the integration of technology into the school system, Schmidt and Cohen forecast a 
transformation of education to “a more flexible experience adapting itself to children’s learning 
styles and pace.”(Schmidt & Cohen, 2013, p.21)  Technology will provide for more interactive 
workshops for the students.  “Critical thinking and problem-solving skills will become the focus 
in many school systems as ubiquitous digital-knowledge tools […] reduce the importance of 
rote memorization.”(p.21)  This brings us back to King Thamus’ response to Thetus when the 
latter reported that he had invented writing, something  which “will make the Egyptians wiser 
and will improve their memory; I have invented a potion for memory and for wisdom.”  Thamus 
                                                            
35 The two roboticists, John Canny and Eric Paulos, “criticize the attempt to break down human- human 
interaction into a set of context-independent communication channels such as video, audio, haptics, etc.” 
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replied that “[y]ou have not discovered a potion for remembering, but for reminding; you 
provide your students with the appearance of wisdom but not with its reality […]  And they 
will be difficult to get along with, since they will merely appear to be wise instead of really 
being so.” (Plato, 1997, pp. 551-552  (Phaedrus 274 e – 275)   
 
Schmidt and Cohen advocate an educational environment which will still be based primarily in 
the school but will make extensive use of tools “in the spirit of the Khan Academy, a nonprofit 
organization that produces thousands of short videos (the majority in science and math) and 
shares them online for free.” (Schmidt & Cohen, 2013, p.21)  Steven Duggan of Microsoft 
speaks of the potential of resources such as the Khan Academy, which “reaches 216 million 
students with 26 teachers” in the developing world (Irish Times, Technology Section, 10th 
April 2013) but he has “mixed feelings” about the effectiveness of such resources in the 
developed world where the education system is using “bankrupt models” and the challenge is 
“to convince parents that things are broken.”  The need, he says, is for “a personalised learning 
and teaching” and he points to “the irony of collaborative learning projects that culminate with 
students sitting exams individually.”   
 
For Schmidt and Cohen, personalization is also “the key advance” that technology provides 
through “devices, screens and various machines [which] will offer entertainment, wanted 
distraction, intellectual and cultural enrichment, relaxation and opportunities to share things 
with others.”  For the educational experience in countries in the underdeveloped and developing 
world which “will not be left out of the advances in gadgetry and other hi-tech machinery,” 
(Schmidt & Cohen, 2013, p.15) they advocate the predictability of the virtual world to 
overcome the volatility of the physical world (pp.22-23).  
 
It is clear that there are, at least potentially, many shortcomings or inconsistencies in the 
examples above but they are provided by individuals from two of the top ICT companies in the 
world, Google and Microsoft whose ultimate interest is in selling technology.    The analysis 
they provide of the existing problems in education is superficial.  If the experience of students 
is confined to the predictability of the virtual world, they will not be well equipped to face the 
uncertainties of the real world.   Technology can be a great educational resource particularly 
where there is a need to reach large numbers of students or where teachers are in short supply.   
However, to say that technology can provide an overall superior educational experience to that 
provided by people is to claim that the virtual world is more real than the physical world. 
Teachers, instructors or mentors are still needed to manage and assist in the delivery of the 
material to the students.   If the greatest universities in the world still require a large team of 
librarians to assist the academics in their use of the information resources, how can those with 
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poor education, limited or no literacy and few resources of any kind, be expected to get full 
benefit from hi-tech systems without the presence of significant personal help?   
 
Making the case for the deployment of ICT in education is not confined to sources within the 
industry itself.   It is taken up, even more enthusiastically in some cases, by teachers, parents, 
education administrators, politicians and most of those in any way involved or interested in the 
education system but the arguments tend to remain at a very superficial level.   One school 
principal insists that ICT enables “the expansion of the role of the teacher as an “information 
provider” to accommodate that of “information facilitator”.”(Irish Times, Education Today, 
Teaching Matters, 25th April, 2006)36   The idea of learning is moving from that of a social 
activity to that of information consumption.  Roszak’s definition of education as “the 
unmediated encounter of two minds” (Roszak, 1994, p.63) is an irrelevancy in this scenario. 
 
David Puttnam acknowledges the crucial role of teachers as “trusted learning guides” through 
the “cornucopia of information” provided by the worldwide web (Irish Examiner, 29th August 
2012, p.13).  He says we must prepare today’s students “for a world of increasing 
unpredictability” and unprecedented “competition and complexity” and that digital technology 
is “likely to be the driving force” behind such developments.   Nevertheless, his overall 
argument is for intensive planning and investment to harness the opportunities provided by 
digital technology - in other words, we should invest in more digital technology to overcome 
the problems caused by it.   
 
The circularity in Puttnam’s argument is reflected in Stonier. He says the “basic principle of 
new wealth creation” in the post-industrial economy is “the conversion of ‘non-resources’ into 
useful products” through the application of advanced technology which is based on 
“knowledge, especially advanced science.”  He adds that “its store of information is [society’s] 
principal asset, its greatest potential source of wealth” in a post-industrial economy (Stonier, 
1983, p.12).   He says an expansion of education “is required to upgrade the human capital to 
make the workforce economically more productive […]; to create an informed citizenry capable 
of manoeuvring effectively in an information economy; and to keep everyone from going 
neurotic in a rapidly changing information environment.” (p.13)   He also says that “education 
will grow to become the largest industry in the post-industrial society.” (p.18) The question 
must be asked: in this scenario, is there any element of functional differentiation left between 
education and industry? 
 
                                                            
36 See also, under same heading, on 20th March 2007 
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Puttnam’s call for greater investment in ICT in schools is one that has been echoing through 
the education world for almost four decades.  As soon as the first PCs or ‘microcomputers’ 
came on the market in the late 1970s, there was a major push to get them into the schools.   This 
came, not just from the ICT industry, but from the education and government sectors and, to a 
lesser extent at that stage, from business and industry generally.   Despite the concentrated 
effort to get the machines into the schools there was no clear policy or plan to indicate whether 
the schools were “to teach about computers, or through computers, or by way of computers”  
(Roszak, 1994, p.50) or whether the curriculum was “to adapt to the computer or the computer 
to the curriculum (p.52). 
 
The drive to put computers in schools was part of a wider campaign in many countries to get 
the population generally to accept the new technology.   The campaign in Britain, as a good 
example, has been well documented by Webster and Robins.   In 1978, Prime Minister 
Callaghan spoke of the rapid industrial change that was beginning to happen and which would 
provide the people with “a range of goods and services they could never previously afford.”  
But they had to be well prepared for it because they couldn’t lose any time if they were “to reap 
the maximum benefit from the new technology.” (Webster & Robbins, 1986, p.14) 
 
In 1982, Prime Minister Thatcher’s Conservative Government launched a major campaign, 
IT’82, “offering a program of travelling exhibitions, subsidized conferences, and demonstration 
projects.” (p.15)   Assurances were given that it would “not dodge the issue of social change” 
but, in fact, it was “nothing less than a massive propaganda exercise extolling I.T.” and as it 
progressed it came to define its role as that of “informing and enthusing as many people as 
possible of the benefits of Information Technology” with the Prime Minister herself promising 
that the government would “continue to encourage people to accept the new technology.” (p.15, 
original emphasis)  The campaign pressed many of the clichéd emotive buttons  -  IT would 
help care for premature babies; care for people from birth to old age; eliminate boredom and 
danger from the workplace; provide more leisure time; “Is the technology in your local more 
advanced than the technology in your factory?!” and the call to patriotism: “Without IT, Britain 
will decline.”(p.15) 
 
IT’82 focused particularly on the schools, providing literature, films, posters etc., some of 
which was partly funded by the ICT industry as well as encouraging ‘computer camps.’   In 
parallel with IT’82  other programmes were initiated such as the Microelectronics Education 
Program while in the universities, extra resources were provided for computing and electronic 
engineering “while research funds [were] cut almost everywhere else.” (p.16)   Meanwhile, 
Occasional Papers from the Council for Educational Technology were calling for “an injection 
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of technology into the curriculum [because] the task of education” is to help “our kind to make 
the transition to a new lifestyle.”(p.16)  
 
The circular argument of Puttnam’s above is heard again in IT’82:  “IT is […] helping to 
educate our children and to equip them to exploit fully the information revolution.”(p.15)   
 
Galbraith warns that as far as demand and production are concerned, education “is a double-
edged sword.”   On the one hand “it is essential to the technical and scientific requirements of 
modern industry” (Galbraith, 1970, p.228) while on the other hand, by “inducing more 
independent and critical attitudes, it undermines the want-creating power […] and enables 
people to see how they are managed in the interest of the mechanism that is assumed to serve 
them.”(pp.228-229)  Rather than being a threat to demand, however, a process got underway to 
make ICT an integral part of the educational system once the first personal computers came on 
the market.   This was achieved in three ways.  Firstly, despite the very limited functionality 
and high cost of the early machines, they were introduced into some schools - in many cases 
sponsored by the industry - but they were enough to associate them with a status which other 
schools would feel under pressure to emulate.  Secondly, the schools became part of a system, 
particularly when the Internet arrived and it became more difficult for individuals or schools to 
opt out.   Thirdly, the industry focused on the younger generation, down to the pre-teenagers, 
as providing the gateway to the market.   
 
Games were a very prominent feature in the early personal or microcomputers so even very 
young people were attracted to them and quickly understood how to use them.   Also, they 
didn’t have the inhibitions older people had about possible damage they could cause by 
submitting the wrong command.   Then a series of developments took place such as the 
downloading of games and music once the worldwide web became available, followed by social 
media and then by the marketing of the mobile phone as a  consumer device with attractive 
payment options. These developments maintained the focus on the younger generation as the 
key to the wider market.   This process was not confined to the ICT industry.  Other sectors 
such as the fast food industry as in the example of McDonalds and KFC mentioned above on 
page 96 and the media industry itself identified ways in which they were able to exploit social 
media for their own marketing.   It became obvious that “the cell-phone [could] further 
empower large corporations in shaping the consumerist identity of young cell-phone 
users.”(Castells et al., 2007,p.167) 
 
The situation was exemplified by the launch of the iPhone6 in September 2014.   The advance 
publicity centred on the fact that the screen size would be 4.7” as against the 4” screen on the 
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iPhone5.   The event itself, which included a performance by U2, was headline news across 
much of the world media and received many pages of what was effectively free advertising in 
the newspapers.37  By the following week the product itself was shown to have serious defects 
in the software and in the hardware.   A similar example was the publicity given to the thoughts 
of Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of Facebook, where the radio and television headlines throughout 
the day carried the story that he was considering adding a ‘dislike button’ to the Facebook 
application (RTE and NBC news bulletins, 16th September 2015).  This is about as close as one 
can get to deification. 
 
The role of ICT in education cannot be defined until the role of education itself is defined.   
Postman says that the answer given to the question why computers are considered necessary in 
the classroom, is: “To make learning more efficient and more interesting” and this is considered 
quite adequate because in the environment created in society by the new technologies (i.e. 
“Technopoly”), “efficiency and interest need no justification.”  ““Efficiency and interest” is a 
technical answer, an answer about means, not ends.”   It does not tell us what learning is 
for.(Postman, 1993, p.171)   Sixty years earlier, Russell made the same observation that the 
“narrowly utilitarian conception of education ignores the necessity of training a man’s purposes 
as well as his skill.” (Russell, 2004, p.23) 
 
Russell’s advocacy of the “contemplative habit of mind” is also relevant here since the use of 
computers by children is associated very much with interactivity and in some cases, 
hyperactivity.  For him, “[t]here is in the world too much readiness, not only for action without 
previous reflection, but also for some sort of action on occasions on which wisdom would 
counsel inaction […] Action is best when it emerges from a profound apprehension of the 
universe and human destiny.”(p.24)  One has to ask how there appears to be more intensive 




4.4.3 ICT in Business and Government 
In this section I use the term ‘business’ in the widest sense covering the provision and exchange 
of goods and services in the private, public and voluntary sectors and take account of the 
organisational and economic environments within which these operations take place.  
                                                            
37Coverage in the main Irish newspapers on 10th September 2014, the day after the launch, included front page 
coverage and all of page 3 in the Irish Examiner; a front page banner entry plus half page 2 and all page 3 in 





In the mid-1990s a project was proposed to develop an integrated human resources and payroll 
system for the health boards and health agencies throughout the country.38   The project was 
called PPARS (Personnel, Payroll and Related Systems) and the initial budget estimate in 1998 
was €9.14 million.    By 2002 the estimated cost was €109 million and this had increased to 
€230 million by 2004.39  It is widely regarded as one of the classic project failures in ICT and 
perhaps the most significant one ever in Ireland.40  
 
Looking at it in retrospect, many of the failures in the PPARS project should have been 
foreseen.   However, it highlights the difficulties that organisations generally were, and to a 
lesser extent still are, encountering in changing not just their individual systems but their whole 
environment to accommodate computerised and networked systems.   The response of the 
health agencies (i.e. the project sponsors) to these difficulties would not have been very 
different in many instances to that of other project sponsors/managers in various organisations 
but the scale of the project and the emotive potential of any failures in the area in question (i.e. 
health) ensured that it was regular headline news. 
Some of the problems that became apparent were as follows: 
 
• Even though the project was viewed as a computer system implementation, it was in fact 
part of a change management programme although the programme may not have been 
formally defined.  A new approach to HR management was envisaged which would avail 
of the facilities provided by a networked system to have both centrally managed and locally 
distributed HR services.  However, this had not been thought through fully or articulated 
clearly and these shortcomings were exposed by the attempt to computerise the system. 
 
• Discrepancies arising from failures to implement directives from the Department of 
Finance in relation to pay and conditions in a consistent manner across all agencies over a 
long number of years were also exposed through the difficulties encountered in trying to 
                                                            
38The Health Services Executive would, in 2005,  take over responsibility for the services provided by all of  
            these agencies. 
  
39 These cost figures are taken from the Comptroller & Auditor General’s ‘Report on the Value for Money  
            Examination’ of the HSE’s PPARS project.   In its edition of the 3rd September 2010, the Irish Examiner  
            stated that the project had cost €180 million to that date and was continuing to cost over €6 million per   
            year.    The costs must also be seen in the context of the overall budget for health services which, in  
            2004, was €10.8 billion (Dept. of Public Expenditure & Reform  -  Book of Estimates for 2005) 
 
40 While regarded as a failure, much of the system is in place and delivering the required services although it  




rationalise the systems (Comptroller & Auditor General’s ‘Report on the Value for Money 
Examination’). 
 
• Over 2,500 variations were identified in the way processes or transactions were handled in 
similar systems across the different agencies.    While approximately a quarter of these were 
resolved in the new system, the remainder necessitated the continuation of manual 
workarounds. (C&AG’s Report) 
 
• “Close to 26,000 coded grades” covering approximately 140,000 staff were identified.41  
 
By any reckoning this has to be seen as an organisational management problem rather than an 
ICT failure.  This should have been understood by those sponsoring and managing the project 
and they should have foreseen the problems outlined above, but they didn’t and hence the 
failure to manage expectations.    During a debate on the issue in the Dáil, the Taoiseach insisted 
that what was under discussion was “not an IT system [but a] transition from a payroll system 
to a whole human resource management system” (Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern during Dáil Debates, 
4 October 2005) and for this he was highly criticised and ridiculed.   
 
The transition to a HR management system doesn’t provide the full context either because the 
whole health administration system was being rationalised as the health boards and other health 
agencies were being reorganised under a single corporate body, the Health Services Executive.   
It is very unlikely that this would have been undertaken without strong political opposition at 
national, local and office level.   Also, the exceptionally large number of grades across the 
agencies as well as the large number of variances identified indicate that the administration of 
the individual agencies depended on a substantial amount of local tacit knowledge which would 
not have been immediately available to the PPARS project.   That is not to say that the 
information was deliberately withheld.  
 
Tacit knowledge is of critical importance in any business or any organisation and can have a 
significant influence on the outcome of projects involving the computerisation of existing 
systems.  For any project, it is difficult to ascertain whether the tacit knowledge has been 
accommodated, bypassed by using workarounds, or ignored.   However, if a system is running 
successfully and without difficulty for a long period then this would indicate that the relevant 
tacit knowledge of the users of the replaced system has been taken on board but if the project 
                                                            




fails, then the lack of adequate attention to the tacit knowledge is likely to be at least one of the 
causes of failure. 
 
Brown and Duguid describe tacit knowledge as implicit knowledge and, quoting Michael 
Polanyi, say that “no amount of explicit knowledge provides you with the implicit.”(Brown & 
Duguid, 2002, p.134)  They also mention the need to improvise which many employees do for 
efficiency reasons based on their local specialist knowledge which derives from the division of 
labour.  Improvisation, by definition, will be conflicting to some degree with the rules or 
routines of the firm.   Without improvisation, businesses will stagnate or drown in bureaucracy.  
Yet, deviations from standard practice cannot be recognised officially.   “Employees negotiate 
the gap between their actual practice and recognised routines […and this] helps turn 
unauthorized practice, however effective, into authorized routine, however inept.”(pp.109-110)  
A blind eye is turned and there is tacit agreement on this type of tacit knowledge. 
 
Tacit knowledge falls into the category of expertise or mastery described by Dreyfus above.  
Arthur notes that some tacit knowledge might not be specific to one individual but “derives 
collectively from a shared culture of beliefs, an unspoken culture of common experience” and 
quotes Brian Cathcart’s example of the Cavendish Laboratory during the early decades of the 
twentieth century when “[to] any problem in atomic physics there would surely be an answer 
somewhere in the [Cavendish].” (Arthur, 2009, p.160)  
 
One can be almost certain that much of the expenditure on the PPARS system arose from the 
effort to obtain the tacit knowledge that sustained the existing systems within the various 
agencies.   There is no easy or rational way of extracting this information.   Most of it has to be 
done through trial and error and I would argue that many of the failures that the PPARS team 
encountered were in fact part of this trial and error process and therefore necessary events in 
the HR transformation exercise - there may not have been any easier way to accomplish it.42   
In a study by Fahy and Murphy “Exploring the Tacit Dimension with Manager Developed 
Systems”, they found that 84% of the managers partaking in the study with their own end user 
computing (EUC) systems “were of the opinion that when they developed systems they were 
not just trying to understand what was happening, but rather, were trying to be more explicit in 
describing the problem.”   In some cases the results produced by the system “were secondary 
to the insight and understanding of the problem they got from their systems.” (Fahy & Murphy, 
2000, p.198) 
 
                                                            
42 I am not making any judgement here as to whether the PPARS project was, ultimately, a success or a failure. 
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Many of the failures, budget and schedule overruns, or other project difficulties encountered 
during the computerisation process could be regarded as part of the trial and error exercise or, 
indeed, as prototyping and the real failure is in not recognising it as such in advance of the 
commencement of projects.  Also, the questions arise as to what is lost in the attempt to 
rationalise all the tacit knowledge and why do we tend always to try and transfer to machines 
the management, administrative and clerical tasks which are undertaken in a simpler manner 
by people?    
 
While in the long run the rationalisation which accompanies the introduction of ICT to the firm 
or other concern is aimed at streamlining processes and making them easier to manage, the 
technology and in particular the Internet opens up many new options in terms of reorganisation 
within the firm and across the industry or interest group.   There are conflicting opinions as to 
which direction these developments are likely to take. 
 
Both Carr and McCarthy et al, go back to Coase’s theory on how the boundaries of the firm are 
determined by the cost of transactions with suppliers etc. (Coase, 1937, pp.386-405)  The firm 
will “expand its organization to encompass any activity that it can carry out more cheaply than 
the total of the market price for performing the activity plus the attendant transaction 
costs.”(Carr, 2004, p.100) According to McCarthy et al., developments in ICT  (together with 
an easing of some anti-trust regulations) have “encouraged the proliferation of cooperative 
ventures “which have resulted in a shift towards a more open structure of interfirm network 
relationships and a decline in the relative significance of the traditional pyramid-like structure 
of organizational hierarchy […] Firms became specialist ‘integrators’ of different systems of 
knowledge.”  As subunits within the firm participate independently in different networks, their 
relationships within the network may take precedence over their relationships with other 
subunits within their firm. (McCarthy et al., 2011, pp.4-5)    
 
For Carr, the view outlined above belongs to the “post-company school” which tends to 
“confuse business with information processing.”  Quoting Andrew McAfee, he suggests that 
the vertically integrated hierarchical firm may be better suited to the task of “integrating 
complex information systems” than the “often conflicting interactions of free agents in a 
marketplace.”(Carr, 2004, p.102)   He rejects the idea that industries will “adopt the Hollywood 
model of production” where teams of specialists will form to make a particular film and will 
then disband to reassemble “in new ways as market forces dictate” for other productions 
(p.100).   Carr says that the Internet will allow some businesses “to expand by bringing more 
work inside” while it will make it more profitable for others to shrink by outsourcing more 
work.   Coase had predicted correctly that the telephone and telegraph would “tend to increase 
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the size of the firm” since they reduced “the cost of organising spatially.”  To these Carr adds 
the railroad and the car as further “infrastructural technologies that reduced communication and 
coordination costs [and] brought into being giant, vertically integrated companies.”(p.101) 
 
The type of organisation that McCarthy et al. discussed is seen in its extreme form in what 
Rochlin describes as the heterogeneous system (Rochlin, 1997, pp.69-71) and he gives the 
Eurotransplant system as an example.   The system facilitates and coordinates “the availability 
of human organs, surgical teams and potential recipients” and it does this through a database 
linked to various hospitals, medical personnel, potential recipients, and ground and air transport 
systems.  Other than the coordinating computers and database, the system does not have an 
infrastructure of its own but comprises a heterogeneous assembly “of selected functions of pre-
existing [systems].”    Such systems can be relatively easy to create and modify and can be very 
cost-effective but assuring accountability can be a problem and, in the case of Eurotransplant 
for example, Rochlin asks whether “a computer programmer be sued for malpractice for a 
programming error?”  He adds that as we have been accustomed to having functions arranged 
in a vertical organisation, “we are hard pressed to locate, let alone improvise, means for assuring 
accountability […] as they are dispersed along and across the new networks of 
interconnection.” (p.71) 
 
Reflecting McCarthy et al.’s  view of the firm, Brown & Duguid, discussing the Xerox 
Corporation as typical of any large business, emphasise that employees don’t just become 
members of the particular firm, but “become members of its different communities of practice 
– technical representatives, engineers, research managers, or sales analysts.”(Brown & Duguid, 
2002, p.153)  They add that “while they are linked to other communities in the same firm 
through a relationship of complementary practices, they link to communities in other firms 
through common or shared practices.”(p.162)  
 
The communities of practice tend to be the sources of innovation and probably the best example 
of this is Silicon Valley which, in 2013, attracted 41% of total US venture capital, i.e. over $12 
billion (PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2013, p.9).  Here, despite many of the firms being in direct 
competition with one another, there is a cross-fertilisation of ideas through the communities of 
shared practice which stimulates growth for the industry as a whole.  It is best described in a 
National Geographic article from 1982, twenty seven years after William Stockley established 
the first laboratory in the Valley, as: 
“an incestuous network of suppliers, customers, venture capitalists, brains, research 
institutes, computer and software companies, schools, and headhunters, the 
executive recruiters who move men around the valley at a dizzying rate in a tradition 
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of musical jobs that is a key to the valley’s contagious vitality.” (Johnston, 1982, 
p.468) 
 
This, of course, defeats the general argument of the people who occupy Silicon Valley today 
that, thanks to the Internet, it doesn’t matter to the success of a business how it distributes itself 
spatially.  It also hints at the internal market that exists within the ICT industry and which raises 
a question with regard to the net productivity of the total ICT market, a question I return to 
below.   However, Silicon Valley exemplifies what Brown and Duguid call the “dense 
reciprocity needed to make and maintain […] strong and informative informal links” (Brown 
& Duguid, 2002, p.169) and this cannot be achieved as effectively over a network. 
 
Regarding transaction costs, McFarlan and Nolan (McFarlan & Nolan, 2003) say that “driven 
by Moore’s Law” these have been decreasing continually for every industry such that company 
boundaries “have become permeable, organic and global in scope.”  One manifestation of this 
is the widespread engagement by businesses today in outsourcing their operations which pushes 
down costs for the company but at the social cost in many cases of the lower wages and the 
diminished job satisfaction that result from the division of labour.  The social cost may not be 
very significant, if significant at all, when the outsourcing is on a local or national basis but, 
unfortunately, much of it is international which is only reinforcing the boundary between the 
Western economy and that of the Third World. 
 
McFarlan and Nolan were responding to Carr’s article “IT Doesn’t Matter” (Carr, 2003)43 in 
which he argues that since the cost of information technology has decreased significantly, it is 
now available to most businesses and has essentially become part of the infrastructure so it no 
longer provides a competitive advantage to any one business.  He adds that the “leading IT 
vendors […] are rushing to position themselves as [utilities].” (Carr, 2004, p85)   
 
The problem, according to Carr, is that organisations fail to recognise the point where returns 
on ICT investment diminish significantly.  They continue investing heavily despite having more 
than adequately catered for their needs in terms of processing power, storage, and 
communication networks.   He quotes Gordon saying in 2000 “that the most important uses of 
computers were developed more than a decade into the past, not currently.”(Carr, 2004, p.61 
quoting from Gordon, 2000)  Carr also quotes the chairman of “one of the largest North 
American financial institutions” as saying that their customers and staff use, at most, 20% of 
                                                            
43 This article appeared in the May 2003 issue of the Harvard Business Review and Carr followed up with the  




their ICT capabilities (Carr, 2004, p.61).  More significantly, he refers to statements expressing 
similar sentiments made independently on different occasions during 2003 by three leaders of 
the ICT industry where they were asking if we had seen the end of growth, or at least a serious 
slowdown in growth, in the industry (p.61).44   
 
Carr quotes a study in 1997 by Prasad and Harker of “the impact of IT capital spending on 
business performance in the U.S. banking industry.”  Because of the nature of the business and 
the volume of transactions, banking would be expected to provide a very high return on 
investment in ICT.   Having examined 47 major retail banks, Prasad and Harker “found no 
evidence that spending on IT capital had enhanced profitability, as measured by either return 
on assets or return on equity” but even more significantly found that it “had not even boosted 
productivity as the costs of installing the system outweighed the resulting gains in 
performance.”(pp.64-65) 
 
Numerous studies, and several levels of meta-studies, examining the impact of ICT on 
productivity have been undertaken.   Many of these studies were in response to Solow who, in 
a book review in 1987, noted that the computer revolution had been accompanied by a decrease 
rather than an increase in productivity growth and remarked that “you can see the computer age 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics.” (Solow, 1987, p.36) This became known as the 
‘Solow paradox’.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to find a study that resolves the paradox.   In 
one report, the World Economic Forum  says that “the pace of adoption of [ICT] has been fast 
and recent - thus limiting the validity of longitudinal studies and making it difficult for data 
collection agencies to keep pace with the definition and collection of appropriate metrics.” 
(World Economic Forum, 2013) Also, it refers to the difficulty in isolating  “the impact of ICTs 
as their economic impacts have often occurred when combined with other broad social and 
business changes” and this is a theme running through many of the studies. 
 
Oz quotes Brynjolfsson and Yang who, having completed a survey of over 150 studies, 
“concluded that not only was the link between IT and productivity inconclusive, but also that 
measuring such a link was practically impossible due to lack of data and use of inadequate 
analytical methods(Oz, 2004).” Oz also questions the reliability of data used by Strassman in 
some of his studies.  Many of the difficulties mentioned in various studies arise, it is claimed, 
from the lack of clear definitions  - how is investment in ICT defined?  Precisely what is covered 
by the definition of ICT itself?  In terms of productivity it isn’t always clear whether what is 
                                                            
44 Ibid. p.155 n.36  The statements were made by the CEO of Oracle, Larry Ellison; the CEO of Hewlett-  
               Packard, Carly  Fiorina and the co-founder of Sun Microsystems, Bill joy. 
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being discussed is worker productivity or productivity at firm or industry level, or productivity 
across the whole economy.   It is interesting that an industry which is always ready to offer a 
comprehensive set of the necessary tools for data collection, management and analysis in 
relation to almost any phenomenon is unable to provide a convincing analysis of its own 
contribution to the economy. 
 
Dedrick et al. claim to have undertaken “the largest study of IT and productivity at the national 
level […]  and the first to include data from the post-2000 period.(Dedrick et al., 2013, p.116)”   
Earlier studies from the 1990s had concluded that investment in IT had boosted productivity in 
some countries in the developed world  but not in the developing countries.  Dedric et al. were  
reviewing this in the light of the more recent data and arrived at the following conclusions: 
 
• “There is strong empirical evidence that the positive effects of IT at the country level extend 
to both developed and developing countries”(p.117) but only the better-off developing 
countries were included because of the lack of data for the others (p.118). 
 
• The effectiveness of IT is dependent on, not just the level of use, but also on foreign 
investment, the level of Internet and mobile penetration, and by education levels. 
 
• “There may be some critical level of IT capital stock or some minimum level of 
accumulated experience” required before productivity gains will become evident (p.117). 
 
• The effects of IT depend on the presence of resources and favourable policies to support IT 
(p.117). 
 
• “The greatest effects of IT are realised when IT investment is aimed at economic [or 
revenue] growth rather than cost reduction (p.117)45.” 
 
It is significant that this study refers only to IT and explicitly excludes communications other 
than data communications from the analysis (p.119 n.3) although the authors highlight the fact 
that their study is the first study on this scale to take account of developments in electronic 
commerce, “interorganizational systems” and “rapid globalization.”(p.117) 
 
The above conclusions imply that the development of ICT is dependent on strong state support 
and on the existence of the appropriate infrastructure.   But the nature of ICT is largely 
                                                            
45 Although not stated explicitly, it is implied that this is true at both national and firm level. 
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infrastructural itself and here we have the circularity problem, or Luhmannian self-referencing, 
which causes difficulty in any effort to evaluate the effectiveness of ICT.  Because of the 
ubiquity of ICT, it is difficult to circumscribe it for the purposes of analysis  -  the exclusion of 
telecommunications equipment in the above study was an attempt to do this.  This is analogous 
to the occasional media reports comparing the cost of public transport by road and by rail.  The 
cost of the road infrastructure is rarely taken into account in the former because of the difficulty 
of deciding which road costs to include, but the full infrastructure costs tend to be included in 
the figures for rail transport. 
 
The suggestion above that IT investment is more effective when aimed at economic growth 
rather than cost reduction is in line with the conclusions of other reports such as the World 
Economic Forum report.  But this is again side-stepping the difficulty of establishing, with 
some level of precision, the effectiveness of a technology and an industry which claims to be 
in a position to provide the means for arriving at answers such as this.    
 
A report from McKinsey Global Institute in 2002 examined the relationship between IT and 
labour productivity particularly in the context of the strong economic improvement in the US 
in the latter half of the 1990s which had been widely attributed, at least in part, to investment 
in IT (McKinsey Global Institute, 2002).46  The report found no correlation at economy-wide 
level “between jumps in productivity, and jumps in IT intensity.”  But the study did reveal 
“specific instances where IT failed to raise productivity.” (McKinsey, p.2)  The study also found 
that of the 58 industry sectors examined in the US, 43 “experienced positive productivity 
growth in the 1990s”  but of these,  just “six sectors of the economy, comprising 32% of GDP, 
contributed 66% of the gross productivity gains […] and 76% of net productivity growth  (after 
subtracting out negatively contributing sectors).” Significantly, three of these were ICT 
industries – semiconductors, computer assembly and telecom while the other three, wholesale, 
retail and securities, are likely to have been heavy ICT users.(p.5)   There is strong evidence 
that the ICT industry is contributing substantially to economic growth but there is less direct 
evidence that the industry’s products are doing so.  This again is the circularity issue. 
 
With regard to the financial sector in the U.S., the McKinsey report says that the adoption of 
online banking during the 1990s was significantly lower than that of online trading.  In the 
“securities industry, the emergence of online channels permitted the sector to process explosive 
trading volume growth without adding traders […] who would otherwise have been 
                                                            




necessary.”(p.17)   This was clearly the beginning of the journey towards the financial 
meltdown on Wall Street in 2008.  The meltdown was due to the fact that people did not know 
what they were doing.  This was because the real meaning of what they were doing was lost to 
them in the multiple levels of abstraction manifesting itself in layers of leveraging at the bottom 
of which was very little equity while at the top were phenomena like “the interest-only negative 
amortising adjustable-rate subprime mortgage.”(Lewis, 2011, pp.27-28) 
 
Another relevant aspect of the financial crisis was the performance of the ratings agencies.  
Ratings are coming more into use to help in decision making in situations where there is far too 
much information to digest although in many cases the abundance of information is produced 
to assist the decision making process.  Ratings help us to manage complexity.  The rating 
formulae are usually confidential and the ratings are not, therefore, transparent.  Where they 
are transparent, they tend to be manipulated.   Because of the confidentiality, people on Wall 
Street didn’t know that when they asked for certain rating information, the ratings by the two 
main agencies were based on averages without any consideration of the spread and the averages 
didn’t show up the high risk loans (pp.99-100). 
 
State support for the ICT industry, which Dedric et al. imply is essential for its effective 
development, has been very forthcoming in many countries.   In some cases this support was 
very significant as far back as the 1960s (Webster & Robins, 1986, pp.257-281).   It has been 
effected through government procurement contracts, through government investment in the 
relevant infrastructure, through state-sponsored R&D and through the education system.   In 
some cases these channels have, in Galbraith’s view, enabled a convenient relationship between 
the military and the state technostructure (Galbraith, p.74, pp.310-313)    
 
As a business, ICT has developed the almost perfect model for regeneration through built-in 
obsolescence in which software and hardware leapfrog one another in a constant cycle of 
upgrading where they are both fully dependent on one another.   Triplett illustrates this using 
the following analogy:  “We have the software equivalent of a new toll road for you to drive, 
but you must buy our new Rolls-Royce equivalent computer to use it.    And you can’t drive on 
the old highway, which was already paid for, because we don’t maintain it anymore.” (Triplett, 
1999, p.325) 
 
4.4.4 ICT and the Mass Media 
Chomsky describes two models of the media.  The first, how it should function, is as “a counter-
weight to government […] in order to preserve the right of the people to know, and to help the 
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population assert meaningful control over the political process.”  The second, in contrast, is 
what he refers to as the “Propaganda Model” which “defends and inculcates the economic, 
social, and political agendas of the privileged groups that dominate the domestic economy, and 
who therefore also largely control the government.” (Chomsky, 2003, p.15)  The propaganda 
model is the one followed by the large media corporations which, Chomsky notes, is only to be 
expected since they could not function if they were to do otherwise. (pp.14-15)  He adds that 
these corporations have a product, namely audiences, to sell in the advertising market.   This 
echoes McLuhan’s remark that the advertisers “buy a piece of the reader, listener or viewer” 
and would gladly pay them directly for their “time and attention if they knew how to do 
so.”(McLuhan, 1967, p.221) 
 
According to Chomsky, the propaganda model is supported by the intellectual elite who believe 
it is necessary to control “the public mind” in particular circumstances.  This, he says, can be 
traced back to the English Civil Wars of the 17th century when both the rising landed and 
merchant classes represented by the Parliamentarians, and the traditional elite represented by 
the Royalists, became concerned about the likely breakdown of civil rule generally as more 
radical elements challenging all authority began to appear among the population everywhere 
(Chomsky, 2003, pp.15-16).  The intellectual elite, including political scientists, journalists, PR 
consultants etc., who are concerned about such things are strongly of the view that where “the 
state has lost the power to coerce, elites need to have more effective propaganda to control the 
public mind.” (p.16)   Paraphrasing a PR manual from the 1920s, Chomsky says that 
propaganda is “the conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organised habits and opinions 
of the masses [and] is a central feature of a democratic system.” (p.17) 
 
Conventional wisdom can provide a strong basis for self-verification which in turn facilitates 
the acceptance of propaganda and this circular process continues developing and reinforcing 
itself unless its foundations are undermined by having its lack of authenticity exposed.    
According to Chomsky, reporters when looking for sources listen to vested interests rather than 
expert opinion because the vested interests are self-verifying.  For example, to report “an 
atrocity carried out by guerrillas, all you need is one hearsay witness.  You talk about torture 
carried out by an American military officer, you’re going to need videotapes.” (p.25)  
 
The debates taking place in the media reflect and react to the debates and tensions occurring in 
the political arena.  The politics of government are not controlled by a single monolithic elite.   
There will be different interest groups among the elite and power will shift from one to another 
over time.  Chomsky claims that there is, however, a broad set of assumptions which would 
reflect the views of all of the interest groups and from which “dissident perspectives are weeded 
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out” and what remains  provides a framework within which the media presents “a range of 
debate” which merely “enhances the strength of the assumptions.” (p.13) 
 
A similar message, but from a different perspective reflective of the time, was offered by The 
Hibbert Journal in 1927 which claimed that “[t]he daily press and fictional literature have done 
much to focus the minds of all classes on the subjects of common interest, and to promote that 
sense of mutuality, of membership one with another, which must form the basis of any just 
demand for the establishment of rights and the recognition of duties.” (Nisbet, 1980, p.298)  
 
The specialist media can be more independent and objective in their coverage of current affairs.  
For example, newspapers such as the Financial Times or Wall Street Journal depend for their 
success on their coverage of business and finance issues, much of which comprises mainly 
factual information such as indexes, prices, and other metrics.  When it comes to opinion and 
analysis of current affairs, they are not under the same obligation to their readers to adopt 
particular slants.   In fact their core readership expect “a realistic picture of what’s happening 
in the world if they’re going to make sane decisions about their money.” (Chomsky, 2003, p.28 
referring to the Wall Street Journal) 
 
Price expresses the view that the media, despite their constant calls for action, are in fact “an 
impediment to action” and he says their power “to secure political change is greatly inferior to 
their ability to stand in its way.” (Price, 2010, p.447) Politicians are afraid to speak their minds, 
“raise interesting questions” or depart in any way from the script because if they do they are 
likely to “be crushed by the same negative forces that complain that modern politicians are 
uninspiring, never tell the truth and never engage honestly with the public.” (p.447 quoting 
Guardian columnist, Polly Toynbee)   
 
John Bercow, the Speaker in the UK House of Commons, suggests that parliament is being 
sidelined as a result of the demand for 24-hour news coverage.   The ministers, with their 
departmental resources, are the only ones capable of responding to this demand so the “debate 
on policy or events is essentially a joust between the media and the minister” and the MPs are 
“struggling to catch up with what has been released and to probe the minister about it.” (p.453)   
 
Managing their relationship with the press has become a priority with many politicians and 
probably the priority especially among those on the front benches.    The media set the agenda 
or have been allowed to set the agenda.  An example of this can be seen in the Irish health 
services.  Taking the period since the early 1980s, the predominant topic in the news across the 
whole three decades has been the crisis regarding hospital waiting lists.  The figures, 
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represented in the news by the number of patients on trolleys in emergency departments 
awaiting admission to the hospitals, are quoted regularly.  These figures are a symptom of very 
difficult and complex problems across the health service but rarely does one get any 
comprehensive analysis of these problems.  With the pressure from the media, politicians are 
forced to respond to the figures and are not allowed the space to develop a solution to the deeper 
problems.   The symptoms are addressed so the problems will reappear after a short while and 
the media will continue to have a story.    A special cabinet meeting which took place in May 
2001 to address the issue of funding in the health services became almost an irrelevancy since, 
as described by Wren, the agenda was more or less set and the outcome determined by the press 
briefings beforehand and the statements to the press after the meeting.(Wren, 2003, pp.251-
253)  As Price has commented, “the job of restoring the credibility of both [politicians and 
journalists] would be made easier if prime ministers stopped trying to write headlines and 
newspapers stopped trying to make policy.”(Price, 2010, p.455) 
 
Today, any significant political action will be relayed by the media to the public almost as soon 
as it happens and this is likely to undermine, to a greater or lesser extent, the influence of the 
politicians on subsequent events as seen in the example above.  This is very much a feature of 
the electronic media and bears out McLuhan’s assertion that “[a]s the speed of information 
increases, the tendency is for politics to move away from representation and delegation of 
constituents toward immediate involvement of the entire community in the central acts of 
decision.”(McLuhan, 1967, p.217)  But the community is involved only via the media rather 
than through their elected politicians.   Social media could now be used by all citizens to bypass 
the established media and participate directly in political decision-making.  But some 
mechanism would be required to enable a consensus to be reached or a decision made.   Unless 
each citizen votes directly on every issue, and this is technically feasible, there would again be 
a need for one or more levels of representation or delegation. 
 
It is a paradox of democracy that if power in decision-making is distributed equally to all 
citizens then no one has any effective power other than the individual or institution that selects 
the decisions to be made.  The overall effect was well illustrated in the 1971 British film The 
Rise and Rise of Michael Rimmer, a political satire in which the Prime Minister who was very 
adept at public relations introduced total democracy.   This was achieved by allowing everyone 
to have an input in all government decisions, initially by using opinion polls and eventually by 
providing every house with a telephone hotline through which the occupants could vote 
directly.   But with power distributed equally to all citizens, no one had any real power except 
the Prime Minister himself who decided - as someone had to - what issues were to be voted on.  
He, in effect, became a dictator which suited the citizens who had grown weary of all the votes 
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in which they felt obliged to participate.   They came around to Schumpeter’s preference, quoted 
above, for government approved by the people rather than government by the people.  This also 
illustrates McLuhan’s contention that the “those who control the media “always endeavour to 
give the public what it wants, because they sense that their power is in the medium and not in 
the message.” (McLuhan, 1967, p.231)  Elsewhere he says “ it is the medium that shapes and 
controls the scale and form of human association and action.” (p.16) 
 
Governments, to protect themselves from the intense probing of journalists, maintain a regime 
of the utmost secrecy.   But they can invert this to take advantage of the valuable mechanism 
of ‘kite-flying’ to test public reaction to any proposals they might be considering or, as 
McLuhan puts it, “Top secrecy is translated into public participation and responsibility by the 
magic flexibility of the controlled news leak.”(p.227)47  Kite-flying usually takes place during 
the ‘silly season’, that period of the summer where there is little political activity to report and 
is an indication of governments’ somewhat enigmatic relationship with the press. 
 
McLuhan was primarily interested in the electric, and later electronic, media.   Whereas the 
technology of mechanisation provided extensions of our senses or our limbs, electric 
technology, i.e. the technology of automation,  provides an extension of our nervous system.  
Mechanisation breaks down a process into individual operations but electricity unifies “because 
its speed of operation requires a high degree of interdependence among all phases of any 
operation.”(p.376)   The versatility of electricity derives partly from its speed which makes it 
virtually instantaneous and also from the fact that its source can be located independently of 
the process it’s driving (p.370).  For McLuhan, one is missing the point if they consider the 
application of electricity to a mechanised process as a means of improving the process in terms 
of speed, efficiency, etc.   Rather, it should be seen as “the invasion of the mechanical world 
by the instantaneous character of electricity [which] is why those involved in automation insist 
that it is a way of thinking, as much as it is a way of doing.” (pp.371-372)   Electricity, like 
light, is a “nonspecialist kind of energy or power that is identical with information and 
knowledge.”  While it “illuminates a total field [it] does not dictate what shall be done.”(p.373) 
In this he was anticipating the Internet almost three decades before it became a reality. 
 
McLuhan distinguished between ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ media. (p.31)  Hot media require little 
participation from the listener, reader, or viewer whereas cool media require a high level of 
participation.  The hot medium “is one that extends one single sense in “high definition.””(p. 
                                                            




31)  The telephone is a cool medium while the radio is a hot medium.   In fact he refers to the 
radio as “the medium for frenzy” and to how it can be used for “hotting up tribal blood” (p.331).  
We saw an example of that earlier where radio was used to provoke the Rwandan genocide.   
Hitler used it very effectively in a similar way.   Radio was used for a different type of 
engagement by President F.D. Roosevelt in his regular ‘fireside chats’ with the American 
people.  In these he was using the medium but bypassing the mediators, i.e. the journalists, to 
engage directly with the people. 
 
Most of the mass media depend heavily on advertising with the composition of prominent 
advertisements, McLuhan observed, receiving “more thought and care” than the articles or 
editorials (p.243).48  The same would have applied to TV advertising since TV was a ‘cool’ 
medium requiring greater engagement from the audience and it was therefore less effective at 
a subliminal level, unlike the ‘hot’ medium of radio.   TV was ‘cool’ because it was low 
definition when McLuhan was writing about it  -  indeed he may have been the one who coined 
the phrases ‘low definition’ and ‘high definition’.49  With colour, high definition, and much 
more sophisticated production techniques today, it is likely that TV would now be classified as 
a ‘hot’ medium. 
 
For Luhmann, there is a strong interdependence through advertising between the mass media 
and the economy (Luhmann, 2000, p.66).  Along similar lines, McLuhan describes the aim of 
advertising, almost lyrically: “When all production and all consumption are brought into a pre-
established harmony with all desire and all effort, then advertising will have liquidated itself by 
its own success.” (McLuhan, 1967, p.242)  In his analysis, Luhmann shows the many ways in 
which advertising is manipulative and insincere (Luhmann, 2000, pp.44-50).  He illustrates “the 
appropriation of the opposing motive” in examples such as offering ‘exclusive’ opportunities 
to the public at large and convincing people they can save by spending money.  Advertising 
provides those “who have no taste with taste […since] there is no longer any convincing upper 
social stratum to which one might look to see what is ‘acceptable’ and what is ‘not acceptable’. 
(pp.45-47) Further, he notes that sponsorship “serves the purpose of advertising rather than 
good causes.” (p.46)  
 
There is a strong relationship between fashion and taste.  Sometimes it can be an inverse 
relationship where one or more individuals might express their identity by going against the 
current fashion, since taste tends to be associated with individuals while fashion is associated 
                                                            
48 McLuhan was referring to the print media only  - this was written in 1964 or earlier. 
49 McLuhan uses the terms ‘low definition’ and ‘high definition’ throughout his works. 
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with groups.  However, in most cases fashion and taste are aligned to the point of being 
indistinguishable.  Advertising is a vehicle for disseminating information about fashion.   A 
new fashion for a product may take a few years to develop but once it’s ready for the market, 
information about it must be made available immediately.  Luhmann says that for many people 
fashion “seems to be self-motivating [and for them to] go along with fashion – as soon as 
possible – is almost a must.” (p.47) Advertising conveys the information in time to help them 
achieve this and it helps generate “the speed of change.” (p.48)   Meanwhile the next fashion is 
under development. One of the problems for the supplier is continuously changing products or 
introducing new products while generating and maintaining brand loyalty.  But fashion can 
accommodate this since, “even ridiculousness can temporarily be nullified by fashion.”(p.48) 
 
Continuous upgrading is a feature of ICT installations.    Large installations, for example in the 
business sector, are unlikely to admit to upgrading for the sake of fashion.  Rather, it is more 
likely that they upgrade to keep up with, or ahead of, their competitors even though ICT might 
not be factor in the competition and we could get into an infinite regress asking why the 
competitors upgraded.  At any rate, the line between fashion and competition is very thin, if it 
exists at all.  Fashion is about competition - not competition to come first but competition to 
ensure that one is at least with the pack and not among those left behind.   Fashion is based not 
just on appearance but also on power and on the levels of functionality even though it is likely 
that, in cars for example, neither of these features are fully exploited by most of the purchasers.  
Where upgrades are required because existing ICT capacity cannot cope with increased 
demand, it is likely that some of this extra demand is due to traffic from the increasing number 
of mobiles, tablets and other commodity items in the ICT marketplace.  As we saw already, a 
very high proportion of these are purchased by fashion conscious teenagers.  Leaving aside the 
scale of the event and the fact that only one product (with some variations) was being launched, 
the media event that launched the Apple iPhone 6 looked very similar to a Paris fashion show. 
Ten million units were sold within three days50 while numerous discussions were already 
underway on the Internet speculating on the launch of the   iPhone 7.    
 
For the mass media, communication is essentially one-way.  It is not possible to have interaction 
among all the participants or between the ‘consumers’ and the mass media other than letters or 
phone calls in response to articles or programmes but these are used by the media solely for 
their own purpose of filling space or time  -  otherwise they are ignored.  In Luhmannian terms 
“they are included in the autopoiesis of the system […and…] serve the reproduction of the 
                                                            
50 http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2014/09/22/iphone-6-breaks-record-with-10-million-sold-
even-without-china/#20aba5392543   [Accessed 17th September 2016] 
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system of the mass media and not the system’s contact with its environment.” (Luhmann, 2000, 
p.127) The only feedback the media really take on board are sales figures and “listener or viewer 
ratings, but not as a counteractive influence.”(p.16) Autopoiesis ensures that each piece of news 
will result in more news since news “generates and reproduces future uncertainties” (p.35) and 
this remains the driver for the media. 
 
News, once communicated, is no longer news.  However, today, more and more news items are 
being stored digitally to provide easily retrievable content for in-depth reports.  Different items 
can be combined - some perhaps much older than others - to provide new contexts or to be 
reviewed in the context of new information (pp.35-36).  The reports are constructed as are all 
news items in the media.  When we watch, read, or hear the news in the media, we are observers 
of the media observing reality.   An unbiased account of an event would require every detail of 
the event itself and every detail of the context in which it took place.   Both sets of details would 
be infinite in number so the reporter has to select enough details of the event to compile a report 
which makes sense.  Luhmann describes the likely criteria on which selections for news and 
reports in the mass media are made.   A story is more likely to be selected if, for example, it 
contains an element of surprise, is topical, has local relevance, is about conflict or norm 
violations and morality issues, etc. (pp. 27-35)   To say that the news is manipulated by the 
mass media adds little or nothing to our understanding of it since all information reported to us 
is manipulated.  Identifying the selectors used, however, adds to the context and to our 
understanding of the content. 
 
ICT has the potential to disintermediate the reporting of news.   With email, social media, blogs 
etc., we can get reports directly from individuals at the source of events and we can reciprocate 
by reporting on events of which we have direct experience.   But we face two major difficulties 
in understanding the news we receive from such sources.   The first problem is information 
overload.   If one wants to keep abreast of current affairs throughout the world and is dependent 
on direct reports from the locations of significant events, then the problem of information 
overload arises.   When the volume of information becomes unmanageable, it loses its 
information content and becomes data which needs to be refined and processed before it can be 
assimilated.   
  
The second problem is reliability.   The anonymity of the Internet raises doubts about the 
authenticity of the source of reports.   Also, short-sightedness can be as big a problem as far-
sightedness and a person who is in very close proximity to a conflict situation, for example, 
might have even less understanding of the overall situation than the person far away to whom 




The most important attribute of the mass media is that they provide accreditation.   Journalists 
are trained and qualified.  They will usually report directly from where events are happening 
but they can contextualise these by relating them to other events they have experienced directly 
and they can develop their reports within an environment of other journalists and editors who 
can add to the context through different experiences. They can write a story to convey the 
essence of what is happening.  Just as important is the fact that if one is taking one’s news 
regularly from the mass media, for example from RTE Lyric FM or 96FM, from The New 
Statesman or the Daily Express, from Fox News or CNN, one is likely to be at least somewhat 
aware of how they are applying Luhmann’s criteria in selecting their reportage. 
 
The mass media have taken on the challenge of ICT, particularly that of social media, by 
providing opportunities for their customers to respond to their reports and articles.   While 
‘Letters to the Editor’ were always popular, individual journalists and columnists are 
increasingly engaging with their readers and listeners via social media and many develop their 
reports in their blogs.  It is also becoming increasingly common to see immediate responses to 
programmes via texts or Twitter, on television in particular, and to see votes from the public 
being taken live on issues raised during a programme.    
 
How the relationship between the mass media and the social media will develop is difficult to 
predict.  It could encourage a far richer engagement by the public in current affairs with 
journalists providing an important moderating role.  Alternatively, journalists might find 
themselves gradually becoming just ordinary members of discussion groups.  There is also the 
danger that journalists will just rely on the Internet to gather news rather than going on location 
themselves.  This happens to some extent already but it could develop to a point where the 
journalists abandon their most important role as reporters and become columnists instead and 
it is possible that the value of this role will not be appreciated until it has disappeared. 
 
For McLuhan, advertisements are always good news in contrast to the bad news that tends to 
dominate the rest of the media and it’s this contrast that heightens the awareness of the 
advertisements.   However, he says that the Presidency in the US suffers on the PR front due to 
its efforts “to be a source of good news and noble directive” while Congress can raise aspects 
“of the seamy side so necessary to the vitality of the press.” (McLuhan, 1967, p.224) 
 
 
4.5   ICT and Functional Dedifferentiation 
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As mentioned earlier, the increasing involvement of governments in economic management is blurring 
the boundaries between the political system and the economic system and is causing at least some 
dedifferentiation of these systems.   But this is not confined to politics and the economy, other social 
systems such as the legal, medical, education, science etc. systems are also showing symptoms of 
dedifferentiation.   The implications of dedifferentiation are significant since the functionally 
differentiated society provides access, at least in principle, for every citizen to every functional system 
as required in contrast to earlier societies where differentiation was on the basis of status  -  each 
individual knew their place within the strata of society.   The dedifferentiation of society tends to erode 
democracy. 
 
Thornhill, in his critique of Luhmann, says that “[s]ocieties determined by a condition of realised 
differentiation are always likely to have pluralistic and democratic political systems (King & Thornhill, 
2006, p.90).” Conversely, dedifferentiation of the functional systems in society tends to support the 
centralisation of power and this can lead to more autocratic government.  Verschraegen emphasises the 
human rights aspect of having functionally differentiated systems.  He says, following Luhman, that by 
“equipping individuals with rights and claims to participation in politics, economy, law, education”, it 
is expected that they will decide for themselves how they vote and on the choice of profession etc.   He 
adds that by encouraging them “to participate freely in different function systems and by preventing 
one subsystem or social group from completely controlling [them], human rights strengthen and protect 
the high degree of individual mobility and communicative openness upon which modern society is 
built.” (pp.108-109)  
 
An individual takes on a different role within each of the functional systems so a person can be a voter 
within the political system, a teacher within the education system, a patient within the medical system, 
etc.  This is important as a human rights safeguard since, as Verschraegen says, “[e]qual treatment then 
implies that only functionally specific role expectations and requirements should be taken into account.  
So, consumers should be treated as consumers, voters as voters, […] normally other roles cannot be 
taken into consideration.” (p.118)  He quotes Luhmann’s example “[a]n entrepreneur should not be 
subsidised because he is an adherent of a particular religion; one should not let a student pass because 
his or her parents belong to the city’s nobility” since such personal role combinations are “a violation 
of the principle of equality” and while there can be exceptions, they can be “justified only if they 
indicate specific grounds for unequal treatment.” (p.118) 
 
Differentiation is just one side of the coin as it is usually accompanied by a process of dedifferentiation.   
For example, the development of functional differentiation could not have taken place without the 
dedifferentiation of the stratified, status based, society which preceded it.   Tiryakian, noting that 
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rationalisation and differentiation are the two “master processes of Western social change,”(Tiryakian, 
1992, p.79)51 points to the French Revolution as an example of dedifferentiation (p.92). 
 
Differentiated systems may themselves be further differentiated into a number of subsystems.  For 
example, Luhmann argues for the differentiation of the political system into government, 
administration, and public subsystems as a means of ensuring the separation of powers.   In general, the 
differentiated functional systems should provide the checks and balances to ensure probity and stability 
across society.   This, however, did not happen in the case of the 2008 financial crisis.   Most people 
would agree that the crisis was caused by the lack of adequate or any regulation in the banking and 
financial sector.  Many governments, including the Irish government, had been maintaining a policy of 
‘light touch’ regulation which was being pursued vigorously by President Raegan in the US and British 
Prime Minister Thatcher with the latter being heavily influenced by Hayek. When the crisis hit Ireland, 
the government was blamed because it did not do anything to prevent it, that is, it did not regulate the 
banks and other financial institutions.  But by not taking action, it could be argued that the government 
was merely adhering to what Luhmann and others would have recommended by avoiding a process of 
dedifferentiation. 
 
Some people would use the counter argument that the government was implementing a deliberate policy 
of minimal financial regulation in order to attract investment for the development of the financial 
services industry which was becoming a major player in the Irish economy.  This would mean that with 
the government doing little or nothing, the political system was taking an ‘active’ role in the economic 
system and thereby engaged in a process of dedifferentiation.   So who was responsible?  Perhaps it was 
the legal system for not providing the penalties to deter the irresponsible practices within the financial 
services.   At any rate, this episode would indicate that neither the causal chain nor the differentiation 
boundaries are always as distinct as one would infer from a reading of Luhmann or other commentators 
in this area. 
 
Van Vught examines a number of studies undertaken in different countries52 on diversity in higher 
education and the effectiveness of higher education policies in cultivating diversity through 
differentiation.   The rationale behind these policies is the widely held set of beliefs that a diverse set of 
institutions will be in a better position to meet student needs and the needs of the labour market, as well 
as providing for social mobility, cultivating innovation and making the institutions more effective (van 
                                                            
51 Tiryakian,Edward A.; Dialectics of Modernity: Reenchantment and Dedifferentiation as 
Counterprocesses;  in Haferkamp, Hans, and Neil J. Smelser, editors Social Change and 
Modernity. Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1992  
 http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft6000078s/  [Accessed: 17th September 2016] 
 
52 The countries included the U.S., Canada, Australia, the U.K., Sweden, France and the Netherlands. 
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Vught, 2007, pp.5-6).  The outcomes, however, with the exception of one case,53 were not what the 
policy makers intended.  Rather than increased diversity between institutions, there was significant 
dedifferentiation and homogenisation.  
 
In the Netherlands, where the institutions were granted “enlarged autonomy” by the government, the 
conclusion was, somewhat ironically, that “innovations all seem to go in the same direction of 
homogenisation.”(p.13)   The other significant factors leading to homogeneity were professionalism 
which ensured a “predominance of academic norms and values” (p.14) and competition.   While the 
level of competition in the market for students and academics was as anticipated, the competition in the 
‘reputation race’ was underestimated. (p.17)  Competition has to be towards the one goal54  and this in 
itself will lead to dedifferentiation and therefore to homogenisation.   As institutions compete, they 
begin to mimic one another and in particular, the lower status institutions will mimic the higher status 
ones.   Van Vught refers to Birnbaum’s findings in relation to the U.S. which provide evidence of 
centralised planning and “the application of rigid criteria for the approval of new institutions and 
programs.  Based on this Birnbaum argues that government policies “may be a major factor in producing 
processes of dedifferentiation.” (p.7)  Van Vught notes that DiMaggio and Powell’s three forms of 
institutional isomorphism (p.11) are in evidence here.  The first is the coercive isomorphism, which is 
applied by other organisations such as government in the environment.  The second is the mimetic 
isomorphism, which can stem, for example, from uncertainty or from ranking instruments and the third 
is the normative isomorphism, which arises from professionalisation.   
 
The objective was to achieve greater diversity between higher level educational institutions through 
differentiation.    But competition became the predominant element - competition for reputation and for 
the resources necessary to develop it with the rules being set by governments or their agencies and with 
the leaders, i.e. the elite universities, setting the pace and influencing the direction.  The result was that 
stringent efforts to stimulate differentiation in the higher education sector resulted in dedifferentiation 
in all but one case. 
 
Dedifferentiation - the blurring or gradual disappearance of political, social and economic boundaries - 
is part of the process of globalisation.  Boundaries, according to Kohr, are not barriers. “[O]ur instincts 
drive us constantly to create boundaries, not to tear them down.” (Kohr, 2001, p.173)  Boundaries 
protect us, like the pier in the harbour, it protects us from the storm but doesn’t block the sea.  Kohr 
                                                            
53 California was the exception where a master-plan succeeded in preventing homogenisation.  
54The goal could be reputation although there can be secondary goals such as size.   The greater the  
           reputation of an institution, the more control it can exercise over its size but, on the other hand, its  
           reputation could be dependent, at least partly, on its size.  Size is also related to available resources  
           which provides another driver to compete. 
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was arguing for having things on a ‘human scale’ twenty years before Schumacher took up the theme 
in ‘Small is Beautiful’.   For Kohr, the “ideal state of competitive capitalism [is] where every business 
unit casts its own boundaries until it is automatically checked by the forces of competition.”   He paints 
a picture of a world of small states where the aggregation of power would be minimised and which 
would be an area full of breathing, changing and self-controlling business boundaries, but free of all 
obstructing unnatural obstacles such as customs and traffic barriers.” (p.173)  This would be a fully 
differentiated un-globalised world.` 
 
In contrast, Berthon describes the undifferentiated world created by the Web which “dissolves 
perimeters of time, place, and culture.  Boundaries between nations, home and work, intimate time and 
business time, between night and day, and between individuals and organizations.” (Berthon, n.d.)  
More and more individuals can, from their computers at home, do their work; undertake the domestic 
transactions of paying bills and ordering groceries and household goods for delivery; submit their tax 
returns; pay their insurance premiums; claim their health benefits etc.   The interfaces through which 
the individuals undertake most of the transactions are broadly similar and each fits on the same screen 
and the differences between them are, by and large, hidden behind the screen  -  the user sees only the 
dedifferentiated world on the screen.    
 
Thirty years ago when it became apparent that there were few, if any, technical barriers to having the 
Revenue Commissioners and the then Department of Social Welfare share data from their respective 
databases or indeed from a common database, the strongly held view was that this would not be 
acceptable.   But now the situation has changed and the departments share some of this information 
while each citizen is assigned a PPS number through which they can be identified by any department 
of state.  The individual’s relationship with the private sector services is somewhat similar although not 
as complete.   Shops and other services are building up profiles on CRM databases of their customers 
from which they can deduce some of the customers’ likes and dislikes and behavior patterns.  We are 
arriving at a situation where citizens are dealing with what they see as an undifferentiated mass of 
organisations in ‘the cloud’ while these organisations can clearly identify each distinct individual.   The 





The elimination of intermediaries, or at least reduced dependence on them, was promulgated early on  
as one of the most beneficial features of the Web.   With direct access to the  relevant information on 
the Web, one could in many cases, when looking for products, services or assistance,  bypass the experts 
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and specialists ranging from retailers and wholesalers to the professions including medicine, education, 
law etc.   This is often compared to the ‘democratisation’ that occurred following the development of 
the printing press and the translation of the Bible which resulted in “the whole classical curriculum and 
the conventions of academic argument” being called into question and people started asking “were the 
universities of any use at all?” (Hill, Christopher, 1994, pp.198-199)  Faint echoes of this can be heard 
in some of the predictions for e-learning. 
 
Disintermediation via the Web is seen by purchasers as simplifying the shopping experience while at 
the same time providing them with ready access to a global marketplace which, of course, is also a 
major attraction for the sellers.  Disintermediation eliminates the physical marketplace thereby 
diminishing what is not just a commercial outlet but is, furthermore, a major social outlet in the 
community and has been such throughout history.  This is an element that has been taken so much for 
granted that it is rarely alluded to in the literature.   However, the growth in popularity recently of local 
markets such as farmers’ markets, are evidence of a feeling that something in the community is in 
danger of being lost.  Interestingly, and perhaps even ironically, these markets provide the clearest 
possible examples of disintermediation. 
 
One of the best examples of effective disintermediation on the Web is provided by Dell where they, as 
computer manufacturers, deal directly with the end-user customers. Within their product range they  
tailor the configurations to each individual customer’s needs.   They have been successful in this because 
selling directly to end-users was a key element of their business plan from the beginning and therefore 
their business was built around it.   In contrast, the jeans manufacturer, Levi Strauss, provides the classic 
example of failure when they abandoned their attempt to bypass wholesalers and retailers and deal 
directly with their individual customers. (King, Julia, 1999)   Although they had invested heavily in this 
initiative, they found that dealing in individual pairs of jeans rather than bulk orders was not cost-
effective.   This was probably due to the fact that they were a well-established company that could not 
fully adapt itself to the new way of doing business and also due to the nature of the product since in 
most cases people need to try on clothes before they buy them. 
 
The expected advantages of disintermediation for the purchaser are a saving of time and travel while 
having access to a wide range of sellers which should result in much lower prices.  The advantages for 
the seller include higher profits since they are no longer shared with the wholesalers etc. and, very 
significantly, direct sales provide the manufacturer with far more detailed and comprehensive market 
information.   In the case of many products it might be difficult to sustain direct sales in the long term 
due to the phenomenon whereby consumers go window shopping on the ‘high street’ to see what items 
are available and to check them or try them out and then return home to order them from an online store.  




Leaving fewer intermediaries, disintermediation tends to centralise control as we can experience, for 
example, in the case of Google and Amazon.   The various takeovers and partnerships in the ICT sector 
over the years are due, according to Brown and Duguid, to the struggle between the various corporations 
to ensure that they remain among the few intermediaries left.(Brown & Duguid, 2002, p.28) 
 
Strategies of disintermediation are rarely as clearcut as the Dell example.   Amazon is often seen in a 
similar way as eliminating the middleman.   But Amazon is an intermediary  -  it is an additional link 
in the chain.   Amazon, while it holds some stock in the manner of a wholesaler, could in most cases be 
said to act as a broker or agent between the buyer and the retailer.  Amazon started out as an online 
bookseller but today, with over one hundred and seventy ‘departments’ on its website, it sells anything 
from books to bathroom fittings and from wine to car wheels and tyres.  With its huge customer base 
which keeps growing in tandem with its product range, Amazon is an attractive intermediary for any 
producer seeking a global outlet. Amazon’s role is an example of reintermediation.    
 
The experience of disintermediation highlighted the somewhat transparent role in the value chain of 
intermediaries such as wholesalers through marketing and logistics including warehousing, inventory 
management, distribution etc. But there are also the internet intermediaries who support the 
infrastructure for e-business.  These include “[i]nternet service providers (ISPs), hosting providers, 
search engines, e-commerce intermediaries, payment intermediaries and participative networked 
platforms.”  (OECD, 2013)55    
 
Recognising fully the role of the intermediaries, producers are now more likely to develop a new 
relationship with their distributors, a relationship which takes account of the e-business environment.   
Among the typical outcomes is the development of online sales and marketing systems by the 
wholesalers and retailers and quite likely in collaboration with the producers.  This strengthening of the 
role of the intermediaries is an example of reintermediation as alluded to already in the case of Amazon. 
 
Carr goes a step further and has coined the phrase ‘hypermediation’ in reference to the proliferation of 
intermediaries in the typical e-business process. (Carr, 2000)   He provides an example of a typical 
online transaction for $8.97 which involves nine intermediaries with each of them making some profit 
on it.  He explains that the effectiveness of e-business is dependent on the high volume of transactions.   
                                                            
55 The OECD report also lists the functions of these intermediaries as “ i) to provide infrastructure; ii)  
           to collect, organise and evaluate dispersed information;  iii) to facilitate social communication and   
           information exchange; iv) to aggregate supply and demand; v) to facilitate market processes; vi) to  





It is only in very rare circumstances that one could make a profit on “penny transactions” in a physical 
business, but online, once the appropriate system has been developed, “the incremental cost of an on-
line transaction is basically zero” and the takings are “almost pure profit.”   With a high volume of 
transactions where “people make billions of clicks on the Web every day, and because each click 
represents a personal choice, each also entails the delivery of value and thus an opportunity to make 
money. A penny isn't a lot of money in itself, but when you start gathering millions or billions of them, 
you've got a business.” (Carr, 2000) 
 
Disintermediation empowers people by giving them greater access to information relevant to them.   In 
doing this it disempowers the institutions, professions, experts and others on whom people depended.   
This can be seen as democratisation but individuals can be over-confident with their new-found 
expertise and this can lead to problems such as misdiagnosis of ailments etc.   Like the intermediaries 
in the business value chain, the role of professionals can be under-appreciated.   Problems arise because 
of the volume of information and the unreliability of some of the information on the Internet.   In many 
cases intermediaries are introduced to help manage the volume of information and this is often done 
using ratings and rankings.   The rating and ranking sites include tripadvisor.com, ratemyteacher.com, 
ratemysolicitor.com, and ratemds.com(for doctors).  Some of these are useful although none of them 
can be relied on completely while others have been totally discredited since there is little or no control 
to prevent the manipulation of the ratings.  
 
The wider issue is that most information needs to be mediated.  This is the fulltime job of journalists 
although the role is by no means theirs exclusively and everyone puts their own ‘spin’ or interpretation 
on the information or presents it in their own context.   Rarely is information totally objective. 
 
Disintermediation also occurs where suppliers and manufacturers, particularly in the ICT sector,  focus 
their advertising campaigns on children thereby bypassing their parents.   The children generate the 
market initially, the products become embedded in the ICT environment as system components  which 
the adults are left with little real option except to follow.  This is enabled by the fact that many of the 
consumer products in the ICT market are fashion items.   Producers control markets based on fashion; 
customers control markets based on needs. 
 
 
4.7 Virtual Reality 
Virtuality is a concept which has been part of computing for half a century.   Early applications included 
‘virtual storage’ where a portion of relatively plentiful disk storage was used as a virtual extension of 
the more expensive main storage (i.e. central processor memory), and ‘virtual machines’ where a single 
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computer could accommodate a number of differently configured virtual computers with different 
operating systems running simultaneously.   More recently, such machines could be ‘delivered’ over 
the Internet from suppliers such as Amazon and they are now becoming available via cloud computing.   
These applications used software to overcome the physical constraints of the hardware56  or one could 
say that they marked the beginning of a shift from a tangible reality to a software-generated virtuality. 
 
It is tempting to define virtual reality at its simplest as a software-generated simulation of some aspect 
of reality.  But this would not be correct since virtual reality can provide representations of objects, 
people, events, or other phenomena which do not exist in the ‘real’ world as we know it and therefore 
it is not a simulation in these cases since it is not simulating anything.   This gives some idea of the 
enormous difficulty one faces in trying to define virtual reality.   If it is not directly related to reality as 
we know it, then perhaps it is not a reality at all but, if it isn’t, then what is this phenomenon that some 
people experience as a virtual reality?   If it is an alternative reality  -  and as I will illustrate below this 
cannot be ruled out  -  then we need an alternative lexicon to define it because a lexicon is derived from 
the reality of our experience.     
 
For Søraker, virtuality is a defining characteristic of the new media.  To make his point, he gives  
mundane examples such as the fact that “a virtual document can be within a virtual folder and moved to 
another, you can go back and forth between Web sites, a hard drive can be full or empty.”    While we 
are used to thinking of media in terms of channels, these examples illustrate how the new media are 
“more akin to places [where virtual] entities can be located in a geometric three-dimensional 
environment.” (Søraker, 2011, p.46) But they are also topological spaces where entities are ordered or 
‘indexed’ (p.56) so that their location is defined “in relation to other virtual entities.” (p.46) So, rather 
than having information transferred to the user through a channel, it is made available in the virtual 
environment and Søraker quotes Steuer suggesting that in the new media, the focus is on “the 
relationship between an individual who is both a sender and receiver, and the mediated environment 
with which he or she interacts.”   There is, therefore, “no clear distinction between the medium and the 
information” so “the message is the medium.” (p.47)  
 
There is general agreement that, as Steuer suggests, interaction is a key element of virtuality.   Søraker 
defines virtuality as “interactive computer simulations” (p.58) while noting that there are “entities that 
are interactive without being computer simulations,” such as a car “and entities that are computer 
simulations without being interactive” such as “calculations performed on the basis of pre-programmed 
parameters without human intervention.” (p.50) 
                                                            
56But there had to be some hardware available somewhere.  Also, it was often a matter of substituting a 
different type of hardware. In the case of virtual storage, disk storage was substituted for RAM and high-speed 




Stanovsky would agree with Søraker’s definition but would see it as incomplete.  For him, a very 
significant feature of virtual reality is the facility to allow a number of users to share the experience by 
interacting simultaneously via the network with the simulations.  This, he says, “is one of the features 
by which virtual reality can be distinguished from fantasy [since] one of the tests of reality is that it be 
available intersubjectively.” (Stanovsky, 2004, p.169)  This would appear to have been overlooked by 
many of the other writers on the subject. 
 
Virtual reality has now developed to a point where one can, not just interact with it, but can become 
immersed in it.   Wearing the appropriate equipment, virtual reality “aims at being able to produce and 
reproduce every aspect of our sensory world with users interacting [….] through looking, talking, 
listening, touching, moving, etc.” (p.169)  Stanovsky notes dreams are also immersive “matching in 
sensory clarity and distinctness even the most optimistic science fiction accounts of virtual reality” 
(p.171) and this underlines the importance of the intersubjective element mentioned above and 
Søraker’s emphasis on computer based simulation when defining virtual reality.  He says “it is the 
computer that underpins the virtual world that facilitates its epistemological objectivity and, in that 
respect, makes virtual worlds similar to the physical world and dramatically different from dreams, 
hallucinations, and other products of the mind.   At the same time, there are clearly differences between 
the virtual and the physical, precisely because a computer simulation is a necessary condition for the 
existence of the virtual world.” (Søraker, 2011, p.55)  
 
Immersion is taken a step further in what Heim refers to as ‘full-body immersion’.   This is virtual 
reality “in which the user moves without encumbering gear.”  The user doesn’t wear anything special 
but is followed by cameras which capture the user’s movements and these are then synthesised with the 
artificial environment. (Heim, 1997 in  Scharff & Dusek, 2003, p.549)  
 
Lanier, who coined the term ‘virtual reality’, describes how, “when you are in VR […] you are no 
longer aware of your physical body.   Your brain has accepted the avatar as your body.”   He adds that 
“[t]he body and the rest of reality no longer have a prescribed boundary. […] You are floating in there 
as a centre of experience.  You notice you exist because what else could be going on?  I think of VR as 
a consciousness-noticing machine.” (Lanier, 2010, p.187) 
 
Something that militates against immersion is the fairly widespread emphasis on the visual aspect of 
virtual reality.   As Heim puts it, the “visual bias of current VR brings out a possible detachment in the 
user’s sense of the world.   Seeing takes place at a distance, whereas hearing and the other senses are 
more intimate to our organic life.” (Heim, 1997, p.554)  It is significant that Negroponte, in discussing 
virtual reality, deals almost exclusively with the visual aspects (Negroponte, 1996, pp.115-126) and 
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while the situation may have changed somewhat since Negroponte and Heim wrote the pieces 
referenced here - i.e. 1996 and 1997 respectively -  the significance of the non-visual sensory aspects 
are still not adequately appreciated. 
 
Another feature of virtual reality is ‘telepresence’.   In the broadest interpretation, this can include 
videoconferencing, e-learning and even phone calls.  However, in the context of virtual reality, it is 
usually taken to mean the performance of tasks such as controlling tools, instruments or other 
technology at a location where one is not physically present.   A common example today is in medicine, 
or ‘telemedicine’, where “surgeries are […] performed via computer-controlled instruments, and 
surgeons interface with a video screen rather than a patient.” (Stanovsky, 2004 p.170)   Heim gives the 
example of gall bladder removal “without the traditional scalpel incisions.”  He says that since 
telepresence allows immersion, it provides the operator with greater control over the process.  But, on 
the negative side, he adds that “a psycho-technological gap opens up between doctor and patient.  
Surgeons complain of losing hands-on contact as the patient evaporates into a phantom of bits and 
bytes” (Heim, 1997, pp.548-549) although there would appear to be a conflict between this gap and the 
immersion aspect.   
 
Telepresence is very much part of space exploration such as on recent missions to Mars.  It is also used 
extensively by the military for example in bombing raids particularly in drone-type raids which are 
becoming increasingly common.   In these exercises, while the operator can be totally immersed in what 
they are doing with the controls, the remoteness or abstraction provided by the psycho-technological 
gap is likely to be one of the reasons that makes this a popular application since it shields the operator 
from the effects of their actions.   
 
Understanding and defining reality is the key pursuit in metaphysics and has occupied philosophers 
since the time of Plato and his Theory of Forms and even further back.  But, what reality is, is still an 
open question and while some of the arguments about this would seem worthy of inclusion among what 
Russell calls “the infantile diseases of philosophy”, (Russell, 1984, p.143) virtual reality forces us to 
look again at some of the dominant theories.   In the words of Stanovsky “[v]irtual reality presses at the 
very limits of the metaphysical imagination and further tangles and troubles long standing problems 
concerning how things seem versus how they really are.” (Stanovsky, 2004, p.170)  One must add that 
developments in areas such as quantum physics and complexity theory are intensifying the need for a 
resolution to this question. 
 
Stanovsky suggests that  “[v]irtual reality may turn out to provide a laboratory for the exploration of 
Kantian metaphysics” (p.173) while Søraker points to the similarity between Kant’s view of the need 
for “certain organizing principles (time, space, causality, permanence, etc.) […] as conditions of 
159 
 
possibility to make our experiences intelligible” (Søraker, 2011, p.55) and the “stability, persistence, 
predictability, and intersubjective availability” which are provided by computer simulation and, as 
mentioned earlier, “separate the virtual from mere dreams.” (p.54) 
 
 
4.8   Identity in Cyberspace 
Identity theft is now a major problem.   Saying that we can define our identity and package it in such a 
way that it can be stolen must be one of the most significant statements we can make about the age in 
which we live.   Our identity defines us.   It is how we see ourselves, how others see us individually and 
collectively and how we would wish others to see us.  One’s identity is not clear and rational  -  there 
are many versions of it depending on the contexts and the observers.  Identity theft is not a new 
phenomenon.   There have always been impostors, at least as far back as Jacob posing as his brother  
before Isaac in the Book of Genesis but there is no evidence that it was a common occurrence in the 
past.   Today, however, identity theft is a concern whenever we enter cyberspace and it is there that we 
are spending more and more of our time.  
 
A person’s identity, according to Arendt, distinguishes them as a “unique being among equals.” (Arendt, 
1998, p.178)  She differentiates between one’s physical identity which manifests itself  through one’s 
appearance and the sound of one’s voice, and the identity a person reveals through acting and speaking.    
Further she refers to the who and the what aspects of identity.   The what aspects comprise the “qualities, 
gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which [a person] may display or hide” while the who  “is implicit in 
everything somebody says and does.  It can be hidden only in complete silence and perfect passivity, 
but its disclosure can almost never be achieved as a wilful purpose.”(p.179) It is “the essence of who 
somebody is.” (p.193)  
  
Floridi describes three identities which we possess, or three aspects of our one identity – personal 
identity, self-conception and social self.   The personal identity and the social self should influence and 
“support each other in a mutually healthy relationship.”  Floridi quotes Proust saying the social self “is 
created by the thoughts of other people.”   The social self, that is how others see us, influences our self-
conception but significantly, according to Floridi, “the social self is the main channel through which 
ICTs, and especially interactive social media, exercise a deep impact on our personal identities.”  
(Floridi, 2014, p.60) 
 
Castells describes three “forms and origins of identity building” namely, “legitimizing identity”, 
“resistance identity” and “project identity”. (Castells, 2010, pp.7-8)   Legitimising identity “generates 
civil society” which comprises the organisations, institutions and “social actors” that reproduce “the 
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identity that rationalizes the sources of structural domination.” (p.8) Castells says that civil society is 
an ambiguous concept since it “generally suggests a positive connotation of democratic social change.”   
He follows Gramsci’s formulation of civil society as the “series of ‘apparatuses,’ such as the Church(es), 
unions, parties, cooperatives, civic associations and so on” which sustain the state while being “deeply 
rooted among people.”(pp.8-9)  Althusser, uses the term “ideological state apparatuses” -  as distinct 
from the “repressive state apparatuses” comprising government, administration, police, courts, prisons 
etc. -  to cover a somewhat similar list of institutions.  However, he argues that the “educational 
ideological apparatus” is the dominant one since “no other Ideological State Apparatus has the 
obligatory […] audience of the totality of the children in the capitalist social formation, eight hours a 
day for five or six days out of seven.”57  Following this line of argument, the schools become, overall, 
the most powerful influences on the formation of legitimising identity. 
 
Resistance identity is described paradoxically by Castells as “the exclusion of the excluders by the 
excluded.” It is constructed by well-defined groups (e.g. in terms of ethnicity, territory, gender, 
religion,etc.) as a form “of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression” (Castells, 
2010, p.9) “on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of 
society.” (p.8)  Resistance identity reinforces boundaries, can develop identity politics but can also 
manifest itself in the fundamentalism and extreme nationalism we see today. 
 
Project identity is a development of resistance identity.  Castells uses the example of feminism as it 
moves from resistance based on women’s rights and identity  “to challenge patriarchalism, thus the 
patriarchal family, and thus the entire structure of production, reproduction, sexuality, and personality.”  
In pursuing this women are seeking to redefine “their position in society and, by so doing, seek the 
transformation of overall social structure.” (p.8) 
 
Identity, according to Castells, “is people’s primary source of meaning and existence” and is constructed 
by them “on the basis of a cultural attribute” or attributes.(p.6)  Both individuals and groups can possess 
an identity or identities.  Identities must be distinguished from roles such as a mother, a churchgoer, a 
worker, a union member etc.   Roles “are defined by the institutions and organizations of society” while 
identities are defined by the subjects themselves.  “[I]dentities organize the meaning, while roles 
organize the functions.” (p.7)    
 
                                                            
57 Althusser, Louis; Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation); 
Trans: Brewster, Ben; First published in La Pensee, 1970  





The more Castells elaborates on the meaning of ‘identity’ in The Power of Identity, the more complex 
and obscure it becomes and this merely highlights the difficulty in getting reasonably succinct definition 
of the term.  However, he concludes the volume by suggesting that the reason identities are so powerful 
is “because they build interests, values, and projects, around experience, and refuse to dissolve by 
establishing a specific connection between nature, history, geography, and culture.” (p.425)  He senses 
the power of identity creating the “embryos of a new society” in “alternative electronic networks or in 
grassrooted networks of communal resistance […] away from the halls of power […] in the back alleys 
of society.” (p.428) 
 
Svendsen doesn’t make the distinction between roles and identities and emphasises the fundamental 
importance of work in giving meaning to our lives and defining our identity (Svendsen, 2008, pp. 2, 
96).   For example, on meeting people for the first time we tend to ask them “what they do for a living, 
as if that gives us instant access to what sort of people they are.”  He also notes that in a person’s 
obituary, their work “is usually prominent in the description of their life.” (p.10)  He says that “since 
very few people in the West have to struggle for their survival, […] instead they search frantically for 
their identity” and this manifests itself in increased consumption (p.98). 
 
Moeller, quoting Luhmann, also emphasises the significance of work to one’s identity.  “[In] modern 
society the career […] has advanced to become the most important mechanism for the integration of 
individuals and society.” (Moeller, 2006, p.92)   He adds that even what would be regarded as a failed 
career, such as being a criminal, would still provide an identity.  Although he says that one makes a 
career within a function system, it can be across a number of function systems.   For example, the work 
of a professor of science in a university would have her participating in the science and education 
function systems as well as in the economic function system since she would be spending her earnings 
in the economy. 
 
One’s identity within the stratified society of the past was much clearer since it was, in part, determined 
by status or class and was therefore defined within relatively narrow constraints.   Functional 
differentiation should go a good way towards eliminating the inequalities of this system since it provides 
a greater number of access routes into society and it should be easier, therefore, to build a positive 
identity as seen by oneself and by others.  However, Wilkinson and Pickett found that “crude differences 
in wealth gradually become overlaid by differences in clothing, aesthetic taste, education, sense of self 
and all the other markers of class identity.” (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010, p.28)   That inequalities exist 
which leave some communities marginalised, is no surprise. What is significant here is the maintenance 
of what is essentially a class structure and the role of symbols, in other words fashion, in this structure.  
The symbols are derived from the structure but they are also developing and reinforcing it.   What is 
even more noteworthy is the failure of the functionally differentiated society.   The stratified society as 
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represented by status derived from wealth is still in existence because one functional system, the 
economy, appears to be dominating all others or determining access to all others based on economic 
means.  
 
We take part in many different activities and play different roles in our lives and in metaphysics there 
have been different interpretations of reality but, to quote Stanovsky “[w]hether Platonist, or Cartesian, 
or Kantian in orientation, in all of these systems there is a unified, and unifying, subject whose existence 
provides a ground for knowledge, action, and personal identity.” (Stanovsky, 2004, p.174) The subject, 
or self, provides the anchor for our identity.   The identity reflects something that is real.  But virtual 
reality and social media etc. undermine again our understanding of reality and since we can represent 
ourselves and see ourselves through these media, we can provide or can have different identities. 
 
Databases held by shops, online stores etc. hold various pieces of statistical and demographic 
information about us or our ‘identity’ as seen from their perspective in the marketplace.  Negroponte 
rails against this, objecting to being classified as “a statistical subset”.   The digital ‘me’ he envisages 
in the ‘post-information age’ would provide enough information to allow machines to understand 
“individuals with the same degree of subtlety (or more than) we can expect from other human beings, 
including idiosyncrasies.” (Negroponte, 1996, p.164)  That means knowing everything about us but in 
the resulting information overload the real meaning or ‘essence’ of our lives would be lost.  That, would 
be best represented in a narrative, different to Negroponte’s narrative.  In the words of Arendt, the 
essence of someone’s life “can come into being only when life departs, leaving behind nothing but a 
story.” (Arendt, 1998, p.193) 
 
We have seen earlier, particularly in the mobile communications case study, the significant role 
commodified ICT products such as mobile phones play in defining fashion and in presenting or 
projecting identity.  But ICT plays a further role by allowing us to build a virtual identity or identities 
which might not bear any relation to the embodied subject or self and of which the person perceiving it 
might have no inkling that it is a virtual rather than a ‘real’ identity.  There are, therefore, three 
perspectives from which identities can be constructed or described - how others see us; how we see 
ourselves; and how we would like others to see us.  It is for this last one that we are likely to rely most 
on the virtual identity. 
 
I have control over my virtual identity and it could be a complete misrepresentation of my real self but 
then it would not mean anything since it would not represent anything other than the fact that I 
intentionally misrepresent myself.    Others can develop a virtual version of my identity as they see me 
but this would be undertaken in most cases by parties representing state authorities such as those 
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responsible for security, taxation, social services, etc.   Such identities are built, in most cases, from 
formal, objective information but they can also include informal information some of which may come 
from hostile or, at least, less than friendly sources.   Since this information, or changes in the 
information, can trigger actions affecting me directly, issues such as privacy and the accuracy, validity 
and security of the information become critical.  That security is threatened by  “[cookies], monitoring 
software and malware [which] have made more and more of us realize that the screen in front of us is 
not a shield for our privacy […] but a window onto our lives online, through which virtually anything 
may be seen.” (Floridi, 2014, p.111) 
 
According to Floridi, approximately ten million Americans annually are victims of identity theft (p.121) 
but he assures us that “digital ICTs are already providing some means to counterbalance the risks and 
challenges that they represent” and that they can even protect our privacy.”(p.115)  This is technology 
providing solutions for the problems it creates, solutions which generate further problems.   In other 
words, it is the security industry gearing up within the ICT sector and intensifying the fears of users in 
the process.   This is exemplified by Google as represented by Schmidt & Cohen who tell us that our 
identities will be our “most valuable commodity”, will “exist primarily online” and are likely to come 
into being before birth (Schmidt & Cohen, 2013, p.36).  They advise parents to help their children by 
having “the privacy-and-security talk even before the sex talk” and suggest that in selecting a child’s 
name, the “parents will […] consider how online search rankings will affect the child’s future.”(p.37)  
Our online identity will, according to Schmidt & Cohen, become a “powerful currency” (p.39) but 
companies will provide insurance protection against identity theft or hacking or “against reputational 
damage caused by what [our] children do online.”  Additional security services will be provided by 
“identity managers” and “online reputation companies.”(p.38)   
 
Discussing the concept of identity in the type of language and expressions employed by Schmidt & 
Cohen, is inducing in people a fear58  which is likely to push them towards searching for the  solutions 
and services envisaged by Schmidt & Cohen whose ‘vision’ thereby becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.   
This process reflects to some extent Heidegger’s idea of technological ‘enframing’.  
 
One’s identity reflects the meaning of one’s life.  As mentioned already, it is the narrative or story of 
one’s life.  To speak of it as a commodity or currency liable to theft or being exchanged is to remove 
much of its substance.   If our identity is, as in Castell’s words quoted above, “our primary source of 
meaning and existence”, and if it can be traded in the market as a commodity or currency - which is 
                                                            
58 An example of such fear is provided by the reaction to the request by Irish Water Ltd. for the PPSN  
     (Personal Public Service Number) of every householder in the state, availing of public water supply or  




likely since this is what the prophets of technology are telling us and they would seem, based on past 
experience, to have the power to bring it about  -  then we have reached a very significant limit where 
money becomes the single measure and medium for everything including our inner selves. 
 
Floridi, in a somewhat similar vein, says “’you are your information’, so anything done to your 
information is done to you, not to your belongings.” (Floridi, 2014, p.120)  If this is so then we are 
reduced to something resembling Negroponte’s ‘statistical subset.’   It is rhetoric which, if not 
deliberately intended, at least tends to predispose us towards accepting the primacy of ICT and its 
development in our lives. 
 
The right to be forgotten, to have one’s online identity or versions of it removed from the Internet is a 
contentious issue.   It is a right to privacy which Floridi says also gives one the right to a fresh start, to 
renew one’s identity “without having records that mummify your personal identity for ever taking away 
the power to form and mould who you are.” (p.124)  This, however, does not accommodate Proust’s 
‘social identity’ which, as mentioned earlier is “created by the thoughts of other people.” 
 
If we are very active online, then our online personal identities are likely to be under constant 
development and, according to Floridi, we arrive at a paradox which is best illustrated by Plutarch in 
the paradox of Theseus’ ship which had various parts replaced over time as they decayed until 
eventually all the part had been replaced.  The question then arose, and it can be asked about anything 
that develops - was it still the same ship? (pp.65-66)   Floridi doesn’t answer the question directly in 
relation to identities but says it depends on the “context, purpose, and perspective” since otherwise it 
“leads to paradoxical nonsense.”  He adds that such “[q]uestions about identity and sameness through 
different times are really goal-directed questions, asked in order to attribute responsibility, plan a 
journey, collect taxes” etc. (p.67)  But then, personal identities are about people as active agents.  This 
argument, like many of the issues around online identity, may sound like sophistry but it is important 
because it is not unlike some of the arguments relating to virtual reality.   We saw earlier the difficulties 
encountered in trying to arrive at definitions which clearly distinguish ‘reality’ from ‘virtual reality’ 
even though instinctively in nearly all, if not all, cases we have no problem distinguishing them from 
one another.  
 
Floridi, in discussing privacy, compares the situation in the local village community to that in the digital 
global village and says there is little privacy within small communities but little transparency between 
communities.(p.110)  What is significant, however, about small communities is that a person has a fair 
idea of how much is known about them and by whom.   This is no longer the case in the ‘Big Brother’ 
environment of cyberspace.   Floridi also raises the question “whether a society devoid of any privacy 
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may not be a better society after all, with a higher common welfare […] since the defence of privacy in 
the home may actually be used as a subterfuge to hide the dark side of privacy; domestic abuse, neglect, 





I have highlighted the embodiment/disembodiment relations between technology and people in this 
chapter.   In Ihde’s description of the way we relate to technology, he shows how we become so familiar 
with using the technology that we no longer notice it  -  it ‘withdraws’.   It becomes embodied.   In the 
applications of ICT in different sectors of society,  I have noted the concerns of Dreyfus and others that 
we are becoming detached spectators rather than involved agents in the world as we are allowing ICT 
to take on an increasingly greater role in our lives.  We ‘withdraw’, our relationships are via ICT.   They 
become disembodied.   We can also see from the foregoing the difficulties involved in maintaining an 




Chapter 5     Analysis  
Chapter Introduction 
Having completed the literature review for democracy, technology, and ICT, I proceed in this chapter 
to identify from the review, the main themes we encounter in the development of ICT and which also 
have implications for democracy and the main themes in democracy which are affected by or related in 
some way to ICT.   These themes then provide me with the material from which I draw the overall 
conclusions that follow this chapter. 
 
 
5.1 ANALYSIS - ICT 
In a recent book, the Editor-in-Chief and the Managing Editor of The Economist praised the introduction 
of CCTV cameras to monitor public behaviour and thereby reduce crime (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 
2014, p.182) while some pages later they are critical of the same CCTV cameras through which the 
police of the “nanny” state keep “a permanent watch on citizens”. (p.226)   They overlook this simple 
contradiction but it is symptomatic of how we view ICT  -  some aspects, as they affect us, are good 
and some are bad.   This applies, not just to ICT, but to most technologies.   We cannot select just the 
good parts because technologies as systems have interconnections and interdependencies and we must 
therefore be prepared for the wider and unanticipated implications.  These interdependencies are not 
just within systems but also between systems.  An online computer user is dependent on the Internet 
but this in turn is dependent on ‘shadow’ systems such as the electric grid which is dependent on a 
primary energy supply system.    
 
Almost any act we undertake has consequences beyond the intended purpose because everything in the 
universe is part of one or more systems as exemplified in the ‘butterfly effect’ and we may not have an 
immediate or acute awareness of the effects of our individual actions on the more remote ‘shadow’ 
systems.   This, for example, is the main difficulty in motivating society to address climate change.   
Also, depending on the particular systems, it may be difficult over time to keep track of the 
interdependencies.   This is why it is usually less problematic to add components to a system than it is 
to remove them or to reconfigure or redesign the system  -  the implications of adding a component are 
generally easier to identify.   Evidence of this can be seen in the frequency of software patches and 
updates. 
 
A system must be kept in balance, otherwise it could become overloaded causing a bottleneck or a 
breakdown.   Yet with many of our social systems there is a very strong urge to push them to the limit 
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resulting in economic, political or other crises.    It is part of my thesis that within society we are pushing 
ICT development to the limit and we are also pushing some of our political systems, particularly 
democracy, to the limit and therefore we are seriously endangering society as we know it.   More 
particularly, in spite of the rhetoric, we are doing little to develop effective interconnections between 
the ICT and democracy systems. 
 
What drives the development of technology?   The drive is not initiated by the users, it comes from 
within technology itself, that is, if we take technology in the Heideggerian sense or in the sense of 
Kelley’s technium.   While producers will try and convince us about the high demand for their products 
and this might or might not be true, it would be difficult to identify a demand for a product before it has 
been invented or produced.   The impetus comes from the technologists who identify opportunities for 
technologies or devices they have discovered, invented or consider developing.   
 
ICT is now the major driver of technological development particularly since the definition of 
information has been stretched beyond the requirement for meaning with Claude Shannon’s assertion 
that meaning is “irrelevant to the engineering problem.” (Gleick, 2012, p.416)59  Large volumes of 
information can be embedded within devices and machinery to manage and control them with no need 
for humans to receive or access it.   Because there are few areas of technology where ICT cannot be 
applied through embedded chips, it is applied. 
 
ICT is based almost exclusively on digital technology or, to be more precise, on binary digital 
technology.  This takes it to the absolute limit of abstraction, at least as we can envisage it today, and 
the more abstract a phenomenon, the wider its applicability.  Hence, the ubiquity of ICT and it was 
attained in a relatively short period. 
 
As an indication of its significance, the total spending worldwide on ICT in 2013 was $3.5 trillion 
(Gartner Worldwide IT Spending Forecast).60   To put this figure in context, the total spending on food 
worldwide in 2012 was $4 trillion.61  The ICT industry has been developing rapidly since the 
introduction of the earliest personal computers or ‘microcomputers’ in the late 1970s and development 
accelerated with the commercialisation of the Internet from the mid-1990s onwards.  Despite many 
shortcomings including numerous high-profile ICT project failures, user frustration with unfriendly 
                                                            
59 Shannon had some reservations about using the term ‘information’ in this context and considered using 
‘communications’ instead while John von Neumann suggested ‘entropy’,  but the  term ‘information’ won out.  
According to Warren Weaver, Shannon insisted that “information is only a measure of the difficulty in 
producing the sequences produced by some information source.” (Scientific American, July 1949, p.12)  quoted 
by Roszak, 1994.  
60 The IT figure includes spending on telecommunications. 
61 US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 
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interfaces and difficulty generally in getting to grips with the technology, the achievements have been 
spectacular.    A number of features have contributed to the growth of the industry.    They are as 
follows: 
 
5.1.1   Primacy of Means over Ends 
The most significant feature driving the development of ICT is the primacy given to means over 
ends.  This was highlighted by Ellul who, as noted above, stressed the interdependence of the 
different technological systems and components to the extent that they cannot be separated.   In 
other words, this accumulation of technology or the technological ‘milieu’ develops from a 
causal process which is not related to ends.   Feenberg takes this further claiming that when 
using technology we focus on goals rather than meaning.   For example, once it’s decided to 
computerise a system, the technical people with a focus on the computerisation process itself 
are employed and the wider implications and social issues are neglected.  And, with the ubiquity 
of ICT, there are few aspects of life that can escape this focus.  In ICT we can see how this 
came about initially in the mainframe era when, for any business, the cost of a computer was 
enormous and the initial applications rarely exhausted the capacity of the machine.   To improve 
the cost-effectiveness of the computer, other applications were identified and developed until 
100% utilisation was achieved.  The full costs were rarely allocated to the ‘owner’ departments 
within the organisations so the relationship between cost and return disappeared or became very 
unclear.   The primary emphasis was on the technology rather than the applications which bears 
out Heidegger’s theory that the impetus behind the spread of technology comes from within 
technology itself.   The ICT environment has changed enormously since the mainframe era but 
the emphasis on means has lost none of its force although it is more subtle.    
 
Speaking of machines generally, Arendt gives a slightly different perspective when she says 
“where production consists primarily in preparation for consumption, the very distinction 
between means and ends […] simply does not make sense.”(Arendt, 1998, p.145) 
 
 
5.1.2 Technology Generates the Need for More Technology 
Once ICT products go on the market, they create a demand for other new technologies.   They 
require supporting technologies; many of them require an infrastructure which can sometimes 
be very extensive, and they can provide an opportunity or create a demand for accessories.  
Another aspect of this is when a problem arises with a technology, the solution is usually more 
technology  -  i.e.  the toolkit or instrumentation required to fix the problem, the replacement 
part to rectify it or the additional technology to enhance or upgrade it.   When a particular model 
169 
 
of computer is no longer adequate to run the standard applications, a new model is introduced 
with more power, memory etc.  But with the additional capacity, the opportunity is taken to 
enhance the applications and within a short period of time the applications are again exhausting 
the capabilities of the machine and there is a never-ending cycle of technology demanding more 
technology as illustrated (p.133 above) by Triplett. 
 
Crowd psychology within the user community sustains this phenomenon and carries it along.  
Take the example of ‘The Cloud’.   The concept is not new.  It is unlikely to provide the most 
cost-effective data storage solution for most organisations.  And it is doubtful if it provides a 
higher level of security when the owner does not have possession of the data.   However, once 
it was launched by the industry, users saw it as the direction for the future and from a fear of 
being left behind and the fear of trying to upgrade from an obsolete infrastructure later on, they 
started to upskill in preparation for new technology since that is what everyone else appeared 
to be doing and then there was no turning back. 
 
 
5.1.3 Circular Arguments Supporting ICT 
There is a circularity about the manner in which ICT is used to solve some of the problems it 
creates.   For example, the whole software element of the ICT environment is built from very 
simple routines used recursively (autopoiesis).  The same does not apply to the hardware 
element but most of the essential hardware is built from the same basic electronic elements 
repeated and combined in huge volumes. 
 
As noted above (p.122), Puttnam emphasises the need for an adjustment of our education 
systems to prepare students for the complexities of the information age  -  the complexities 
being caused by the increasingly dominant ICT environment.   In addition, he says we should 
be using the facilities ICT offers to deliver this education.   The implications of  Stonier’s 
argument is that knowledge will be our greatest asset and we must therefore train our students 
so that they will be equipped to manage the technology and that education should become the 
primary industry in the knowledge economy.  These arguments are not merely circular, they 
present ICT as a vortex sucking the energy from everything around it.   But Puttnam and Stonier 
are merely expressing the general views held by most people in the ICT industry, in government 
and in education. 
 
Another area of circular argument is the role of ICT in productivity improvement.   As we saw 
(p.132 above), it was assumed that productivity improvement in the U.S. in the 1990s was 
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largely due to the adoption of ICT in industry and business.  It was found however, that a major 
proportion of the improvement in the U.S. was within the ICT industry itself and, because of 
its size, it contributed hugely to the overall productivity improvement figures for the U.S. 
 
5.1.4 Sub-Standard Software Engineering 
The offer of unlimited choice in the configuration of ICT products is possible because they are 
software-based, integrated circuit memory is cheap and getting progressively cheaper, and 
processors are getting faster.   When these were more expensive there was a greater incentive 
for system designers to be more selective and for programmers to be more rigorous in 
developing efficient and robust software since it had to run in memory and processors which 
were severely restricted in size and speed respectively.  Today, the constraints of memory size 
and processor speed have diminished very significantly but the time taken to engineer software 
is getting more expensive so the business imperatives determine that software quality is less of 
a priority since the deficiencies can be compensated for with more memory and processing 
power.  It is easier and faster to write long inefficient software programs than short, tightly 
coded, efficient ones.   And the inefficient software generates further demand in the market for 
memory and processing power, the addition of which will usually allow enough capacity to 
accommodate more software features and applications and so begins the upgrade cycle.   Also, 
due to an absence in many areas of effective software design, there tends to be a very large 
amount of redundant software on most systems (see below). 
 
The poor quality of  much of the software is revealed through the need for frequent system 
updates and ‘fixes’ as well as regular reports of security breaches.  The software fixes that are 
applied, however, while probably solving the immediate problem, exacerbate the situation by 
adding to the size and complexity of the system overall and this contributes to the 
software/hardware upgrading cycle.   In the majority of cases the fixes are applied by the 
software vendor on the user’s computer, usually independently of the user.   Often, their purpose 
is to patch security holes and prevent hackers from gaining access to the machine.  In effect, 
the user’s machine is a battlefield where the suppliers and the hackers challenge one another in 
a contest over which the user has no control and from which the supplier, and sometimes the 
hacker, benefits. 
 
The owner of a system can block the software updates but they usually happen by default since 
most owners have neither the time nor the competence to make a judgement as to whether the 
updates are really for their benefit.   It might be argued that this is no different to taking the 
advice of any expert but in nearly all other cases advice or assistance is requested from the 
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expert  -  they don’t just appear inside one’s house to fix a problem of which the owner is 
completely unaware.  
 
The constantly repeating hardware/software upgrading cycle is a significant driver of ICT 
development in the market.   This is somewhat paradoxical since defective software products 
are, more than likely, the principal cause and should, by the normal laws of economics, be 
inhibiting development.   But, instead, the industry benefits materially and its reputation suffers 
little damage since, in most cases, there is practically no evidence of critical comment from the 
user community. 
 
The frequent upgrades support a culture of consumerism and built-in obsolescence and this puts 
the focus on the technology per se rather than on its use.   The focus on technology feeds into 
the masculine psyche and then is often channelled through the corporate world.   Perhaps, even 
more significant where mobile technology is concerned, the constant upgrades feed into the 
youth culture and the need to identify with the latest fashion which is always ready to be 
exploited by the ICT industry.   The focus on consumerism and technology fit in with the 
principles of Archigram62 - a movement in the 1960s which influenced the design of the 
Pompidou Centre in Paris and the Lloyds Building in London in both of which the technology, 
i.e. the electrical, elevator, plumbing and heating infrastructure, was installed on the outside to 
prevent it cluttering the interior space but resulted in the technology itself becoming the most 
notable feature of the buildings. 
 
It is perhaps unfortunate that the poorly designed software provides the strongest link between 
the human character and the computer since they’re both fallible and somewhat unpredictable.   
The hardware of any technology is determinate.   It is completely predictable until it begins to 
wear out.   Software, however, reflects the human being.  It actually is the thinking of a human 
being in a particular situation at a particular point in time.   It could be argued that the software 
is totally predictable if one examined it thoroughly in advance, but the same could be done with 
the thinking of a human provided all the ‘if-then-elses’ and other conditions are taken into 
account.   It would be difficult but not impossible.    In a paradoxical way, such fallibility is 
probably one of the strongest arguments in support of artificial intelligence.  
 
5.1.5 Design, Fashion, Personalisation 
One of the great marketing achievements of the ICT industry is the way in which it has been 
able to exploit concepts of design, personalisation, and fashion, particularly in the mobile 
                                                            
62 http://archigram.westminster.ac.uk/  [Accessed 17th September 2016]   
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technology market.   A good design addresses a set of constraints to provide something which 
is productive, protective, satisfying or pleasing to the senses or some combination of these in 
the simplest possible way.  There is always some conflict between these requirements which 
generates additional constraints resulting in trade-offs between them.  Design involves 
creativity and the more severe and numerous the constraints, the more creative and elegant the 
design that addresses them.  However, this concept of design has been turned on its head by the 
ICT industry.  For example, rather than tailoring the PC or mobile phone to suit the 
requirements of the majority of users, or different categories of users, the suppliers include 
everything they have available for each system and leave it to the user to ‘personalise’ it on 
their PC.   As a result, in preparing this document there are thirteen menus and twenty six sub-
menus open on the screen at present and each of these has up to sixty options, very few of which 
are ever used.  Along with the time wasted by the user in making the selections, all of these 
features result in a large proportion of redundant software on the machine.    The redundant 
software uses memory and therefore adds to the cost of the PC and, more importantly, it 
increases the complexity and therefore the vulnerability of the system overall.   
 
With mobile technology the facility to personalise one’s phone has been propagated as one of 
the outstanding and beneficial attributes of the technology, with fashion being the 
accompanying subliminal message.   The essential requirement of a phone is to enable one to 
communicate with others through voice, text or via the Web and the most effective way of 
providing this service would be through the simplest, most easy-to-use device.  Instead, most 
of the design work is omitted by the producer and left to the user and this omission is traded as 
one of the key benefits. 
 
In most cases the users cannot define what they want because they are not fully aware of the 
facilities or services available or of the implications of various combinations of these.  The 
omission by the ICT industry of the user requirements determination meant the abandonment 
of the traditional standard approach to design.  The promotional language was adapted to 
support the new approach.   What is really an unfinished product is now a product that offers 
‘choice’ to the purchaser who can ‘personalise’ it  to show their individuality as they buy into 
the latest fashion, a fashion that has now become part of our culture.   The focus is no longer 
primarily on the utility of the technology.  Even Castells et al. fall into the trap reciting the often 
repeated sentiment that “users are no longer just users; they are also producers or “co-
creators”.” (Castells, p.107)  They imply that this promotes inclusiveness since “mobile 
technologies are woven into the everyday behaviour of consumers, sometimes by formerly 
neglected groups, such as women, in ways not envisaged by manufacturers or service 




Choice involves decision-making.  With the ICT commodity market extended to include 
fashion items such as ringtones and mobile covers, the range of choices is enormous.  Making 
a decision costs time or money or both but with ICT this is sold, in every sense of the term, to 
the user under the personalisation label.   In other words the user pays for the work the designer 
didn’t do.   It could be argued that personalisation democratises the technology and there is 
some validity in this but the decision-making for the user is confined mainly to details 
concerning appearance and presentation rather than function.   Also, the range of choices and 
the complexity of the technology make the decision-making process much more difficult.  The 
effort involved in making the choices could be seen as an attempt by the industry to increase 
the penetration of the technology into our lives with personalisation as the bait. 
 
5.1.6 The Subtle Use of Language 
As mentioned above, Hill’s analysis of technological development centres on the alignment of 
the technological culture with the wider culture of society.  This is achieved in ICT  principally 
through language, not just through the language  of marketing and advertising but specifically 
through the appropriation by the ICT industry of common  everyday English words to the extent 
that, in many cases, people begin to associate them more with their new technical meaning than 
with their original meaning.  Examples include menu, home, architecture, protocol, virus, the 
cloud, memory, patch, utility, routine, hardware, etc.  Language reflects culture and culture is 
influenced by language as can be seen today in the emphasis placed on the political correctness 
of language.   The use of terms such as those just mentioned enables most people to ‘speak the 
language’ of ICT whether or not they understand the full specific meaning of the terms.   They 
do not feel as excluded as they do from other specialist or professional environments.  This 
helps in presenting the ICT revolution as a social movement. 
 
Language is also used in an effort to give pre-eminence to the role of information in today’s 
world.  This can be seen in terms such as ‘the Internet of Things’ which, I argue below, is not 
a rational concept.   However, the term places greater significance on the information about any 
thing than on the essence of the thing itself.    In a similar manner, DNA is often referred to as 
information.   But DNA is not information, it is a molecular structure which determines our 
physical makeup and provides important information.   DNA is matter and could not be more 
physical but the tendency is to stress the virtual in the language we use as though we were trying 





5.1.7 The Teenage Market 
Much of the ICT market has been captured indirectly through the younger generation.   Being 
more open to novelty and to experimentation without the caution shown by the older generation 
towards computers, they embraced ICT mainly through games on the early PCs, then through 
music and other downloads and finally through social media.  It didn’t take too long before the 
mobile phone was brought within their budget.  It helped to give them independence and 
identity and the industry was quick to deliver applications and accessories to satisfy their wants.    
Many of the applications were developed by their peers and indeed many of today’s major 
software companies were started by people in their early twenties or even younger.    
 
Once the industry was in a position to make ICT devices available as handheld consumer items, 
the teenage market was a relatively easy one to capture.   With that accomplished, there was 
effectively an army of evangelists ready to convert the reluctant adults who now saw the 
increasing dominance of ICT in day-to-day living or parents who began to feel somewhat 
excluded from their childrens’ lives if they didn’t have access to the Internet or have mobile 
access to them.  Even more significantly, the demands on datacentres and telecommunications 
providers is increased enormously not just by the number of teenage users but also by the type 
of information they are likely to be transmitting, much of it being graphical or video material.   
The ICT industry, therefore, leverages the teenage market to increase the demands across all 
sectors of the business. 
 
5.1.8 Security and Privacy 
Protecting the privacy of information is a difficult task due to the volume of business that most 
individuals and organisations conduct on the Internet.  Most money is now virtual.  It exists on 
servers and in various parts of the Internet rather than in banks, safes or banknotes and money 
is only a fraction of the valuable high-risk information on the Internet.    
 
Fear is a great motivator and as such, it is exploited fully by the ICT security industry just as it 
is in the security industry generally.  The fear of theft of money or information on the Internet 
is much more prevalent now than theft from homes or cars etc. because of people’s uncertainty 
or a lack of knowledge about the security of regular transactions.  Such fears are not without 
justification considering the reports of security problems in the systems of established and 
respected banks and other institutions.    
 
Theft, however, is not the only security concern in relation to ICT.  Privacy in some cases is an 
even greater concern as it is likely that records are kept by state agencies about most individuals 
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in the world and if they don’t receive it voluntarily from the individuals themselves, they get it 
through their intelligence services.  In 2013, details of the US National Security Agency’s 
PRISM project were leaked to the press.  PRISM provided the NSA with “direct access from 
the servers of […] Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, Paltalk, AOL, Skype YouTube, 
Apple.”63  In most cases the companies denied any knowledge of the Prism project although in 
a few cases it was admitted that information was provided on the basis of court orders. 
 
Security is one of the top concerns for large organisations who do a lot of business on the 
Internet.   The total expenditure worldwide on ICT security was estimated by Gartner at over 
€120 billion in 2012 (Wheatman, 2011) while Forbes predicts expenditure on security to 
increase tenfold over ten years (Stiennon, 2013).64   It is becoming a very significant element 
of the ICT industry.  Security could be greatly enhanced through more rigorous software design 
and engineering and therefore less complex systems although this would not necessarily be to 
the short-term benefit of the ICT industry.   Instead, the ICT security industry is likely to 
continue growing with the fear factor as the driver and investment as the proposed solution. 
 
5.1.9 Moore’s Law 
As indicated at 5.1.4 above, when software systems need to be modified to correct errors or to 
provide for new functions etc., there is a tendency to add to the existing programs without 
refining or fine tuning them to maximise their efficiency.  The result is that inefficient and 
possibly redundant software accumulates in the system and wastes resources.  This can be 
accommodated because the cost of memory and processing power is constantly falling in line 
with Moore’s Law.   The ‘law’ began simply as an observation Moore made in 1965 on the 
development of transistor technology up to that time.  The observation was taken as a law by 
others sometime later with the result that the doubling of power on a chip every two years has 
become a target for the industry.   Therefore, instead of using brain power to design and build 
efficient software, the industry instead uses memory and processing power.   Moore’s Law has 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy as Moore himself had predicted and has become essentially 
a driving force for the industry. 
 
5.1.10 State Sponsorship of ICT Industry 
                                                            
63 Guardian, The; 6th June 2013;     www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/prism-tech-giants-
shock-nsa-data-mining  [Accessed: 17 September 2016) 
 
64 The baseline figures quoted in this article are at variance with the Gartner figures. 
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ICT is an ideal industry from the politicians’ point of view.   The main resource it requires is a 
skilled workforce, the provision of which is a choice open to most governments, at least in 
developed countries.   On the software and services side it is adaptable, relatively mobile and 
requires little, if any, raw material.   Most importantly, almost every citizen has a vested interest 
in it.   Very simple ideas can generate enormous wealth and citizens tend to be very tolerant of 
whatever direction the industry takes once it has positive economic outcomes.  Governments 
are prepared to invest heavily in the ICT industry and are concerned with the means, not with 
the ends.   There is little or no evidence of prioritisation or discrimination regarding different 
products or different sectors of the industry.   For example, the following statement by the Irish 
Minister for Communications when launching the rollout of a new €11m. broadband network 
for the Midlands, provoked no public comment, as far as one can determine.  In the course of 
an interview on national television  he said:  “We will be able to put on new services such as 
music streaming, video streaming  -  you see, in Korea where they are completely interactive 
across the Internet from the games point of view, that hasn’t really happened here in Ireland or 
indeed in Western Europe to a large extent but it has in those places like Korea and Singapore 
and we’re trying to emulate those.”(Ahern, 2003)  The only real concern is for the impact on 
employment and GDP figures and they usually show a readiness to adjust any of the state 
resources to suit the industry.   
 
5.1.11 Rationality 
ICT is a product of rationality.  Bureaucracy - within which for this discussion, I will include 
technocracy - being a completely rational process has been greatly strengthened through the 
application of ICT.   Computer processing is a perfect fit for Weber’s idea of bureaucracy with 
its  purely objective ‘dehumanised’ processes and comprising calculable rules, information 
management and technical (in the sense of tekhnē) expertise.   Even before the era of the 
computer, bureaucracy was sometimes referred to as a machine, and it is interesting to note that  
it was the introduction of machinery into the factories that caused a rapid development of 
bureaucracy because of the need to manage the investment, the technology and the organisation 
that resulted from the division of labour.  The major expansion of state bureaucracy occurred 
with the development of the welfare state. 
 
With bureaucracy comes regulation.  The larger the bureaucracy, the greater the potential for 
identifying areas of regulation.   Regulation can be expanded both in the scope and in the detail 
of the targeted areas.   It can also be expanded, virtually without limit, in the intensity of the 
recordkeeping.   With electronic sensors and wireless technology the auditing of regulations 
can, in many cases, be automated and it is possible that in the future the implementation of 
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most, if not all, regulations could be fully automated.   This would reduce or remove completely 
the role of law enforcement and state bureaucracy in the implementation of regulations.  The 
implications of this would be very serious in terms of autocracy and centralisation and, if done 
effectively, should reduce the size of the bureaucracy but increase its power. 
 
There were some constraints on the rate of development of bureaucracy before computers were 
available but once they came on the scene, the interdependencies between ICT and bureaucracy 




There is the generally unquestioned belief in efficiency.  The individualism of our liberal 
society diminishes social cohesion and reduces considerably the likelihood of shared values.   
One of the few exceptions to this is efficiency which, as Feenberg, quoted above, said “is a 
universal value and as such subject to rational agreement.”    If it is, then it must be assessed 
against other generally agreed values such as, for example, survival, quality of life, protection 
of natural resources.   Some of these will be in conflict with one another so they cannot all be 
accommodated equally but they are all concerned with ‘ends’ whereas efficiency has to do with 
‘means’.   The difficulty is that the positive aspects of efficiency are easily and more 
immediately quantifiable in productivity figures whereas the potentially negative aspects such 
as impaired working conditions and less social interaction etc. are difficult to quantify.   
Therefore it is much more difficult to make the case against efficiency than for it, even though 
the negative effects might be far more significant in intensity, in distribution, and in long-term 
consequences.   For Taylor, efficiency provides a measure for the success of instrumental reason 
which, together with the increasing emphasis on individualism, have resulted in “institutions 
and structures of industrial-technological society [that] severely restrict our choices” and “may 
even be highly destructive.”(Taylor, 1991, pp.2-8)  These are the “malaises of modernity” (p.1) 
that are of particular concern to Taylor. 
 
Potential levels of efficiency, particularly in business, are generally seen to be almost limitless 
and the goal of efficiency thereby provides seemingly endless opportunities.  The levels can be 
stretched upwards through faster production, faster delivery of services, higher quality, or by 
providing for a larger numbers of customers.   Technology enables these enhancements in 
nearly all cases and ICT is extremely effective in expanding the customer base and speeding up 
delivery at practically zero incremental cost for many types of service as illustrated by Carr 
above.  So for many of today’s internet services, production and delivery are simple issues, in 
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fact they are almost transparent or incidental.  Attracting customers is the major problem but 
some of the other features above take care of that.    
 
Using a spreadsheet is not always more efficient for simple calculations than doing them in 
one’s head or on paper nor is customer service always more satisfactory via a call-centre or 
online as against direct personal contact.  Also, the spreadsheet provides an example of a fairly 
common problem which is that the widespread use of spreadsheets has all but eliminated the 
arithmetic skills which most people used to have, so they are now dependent on the technology 
for even the simplest calculations for which it is not well suited.   Nevertheless, when looking 
for business, the proposal which offers the highest levels of efficiency is the one most likely to 
be accepted because efficiency is easy to explain, illustrate, and benchmark.   
 
While the above are features that have been used in the market as drivers for the development 
of ICT, there are other features which may also be drivers, but have a special significance since 
they provide us with major benefits or present us with serious dangers or indicate the likely 
direction of development in the future. 
 
5.1.13 Abstraction 
As we saw, with binary digital technology we have taken abstraction to the absolute limit and 
this allows for the widespread applicability of the technology.   This is similar to the situation 
with Hayek’s rules of just conduct.   He insists that these should be developed in the abstract to 
ensure that they are not biased towards any particular situation but are general enough so they 
can be applied to any situation that arises.   However, this means that it is not possible to predict 
the type of situations in which they will be used.   Similarly, we are often surprised at the types 
of applications for which ICT can be usefully employed.  
 
While abstraction allows one to generalise, it also, paradoxically, tends to confine one’s 
conceptualisation to a particular framework or at least steer it in a particular direction.   It is a 
commonly held view that many of the disciplines within the humanities are tending towards 
those areas which are easily computable, particularly in history, sociology, political science and 
literature. In many of these cases the computer is being used to process statistical data to provide 
empirical evidence.   But it could also be argued that the empirical evidence, although it might 
be in a different form, is missing because it has been discarded in the process of abstraction.   It 




Steering one in a particular direction is what gives rise to Lovell’s concern about computers 
being ‘antiserendipitous’ (p.109 above) since they must be programmed to receive results of 
particular observations and this can result in reinforcing existing knowledge rather than 
discovering something new. 
 
Abstraction takes the person studying a particular object or phenomenon further away from the 
entity itself so that they often have access only to a model or analogue of the real entity.   This 
is probably nowhere more pronounced than in the financial markets where the “electronic 
money transactions […] have become decoupled from the stock of underlying reserves” 
(Rochlin, 1997, p.95) and are therefore unconstrained by them.  As a result, the transactions 
make sense only within the financial services system itself which, in Luhmanian terms, isolates 
itself from its environment and ignores the signals or ‘irritations’ from the environment which 
would help it to forestall the otherwise inevitable crash.   
 
Abstraction underlies telemedicine where, for example, a surgeon can perform an operation 
remotely on a patient at another location.   This has great advantages where there is a shortage 
of expertise.   Despite the nature of the task, however, the experience is a disembodied one and 
the doctor - patient relationship suffers somewhat as a result.   Nevertheless, the technology 
does not   replace the expertise of the surgeon or reduce in any way their ability to do their work 
-  it only enhances it.   
 
The most worrying application of performance at a distance is remote controlled warfare 
through drone and similar technologies which allow the operator to be detached from the results 
of their action or, as Sclove describes it, the “psychological distancing from moral 
consequences.” (Sclove, 1995, p.80) The history of remote controlled warfare stretches back to 
when the musket or even the longbow replaced face-to-face combat.   However, the availability 
today of low cost drone technology with a capability for extensive destruction undertaken 




5.1.14 Big Data and The Internet of Things 
There are a number of estimates of the amount of information we have accumulated in the world 
throughout history but it is difficult to find an unambiguous one.65   However, an indication of 
                                                            
65 For example, Schmidt and Cohen (2013, p.253) say that “[e]very two days we create as much digital content    
      as we did from the dawn of civilisation until 2013”.   Floridi (2014, p.13) quotes research from Berkeley’s   
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the magnitude involved can be discerned from Floridi’s estimate that the total amount of data 
“is expected to grow fourfold approximately every three years.” (Floridi, 2014, p.13)   Most of 
this data is generated by computers and related digital equipment from existing information and 
data.   More computers are needed to process the data so it generates a self-reproducing 
(autopoietic) process.  This is the milieu in which we find big data.   
 
Big data and the internet of things (IOT)  support and reinforce one another.  The objective for 
the IOT is to have a processor, monitor or sensor in every possible object to control the objects 
themselves.  But the information produced by these processors etc. can then be accumulated 
and processed further using ‘big data analytics’.   Gartner estimate that the IOT will have 26 
billion things connected within the next five years (Gartner Report, March 2014) while Cisco 
estimate that it will be 50 billion (Anderson & Rainie, 2014). 
 
Much of what we call information is independent of human intervention.  It is generated by 
machines to drive other machines or other parts of the same machine.   Is it any different to the 
levers of an old-style typewriter or the springs of a clock and are these any different to the 
camshaft of a car or the PTO of a tractor?   Are these really transmitters of information?   If 
they are, then everything can be information, i.e. the Internet of Things. 
 
With the Internet of Things, we have again pushed innovation  -  if  the term is even appropriate 
here -  to the limit just, as noted above, as we have done with abstraction and with the speed of 
communications.  For a technology based on strict logic and the applications of which are meant 
to follow a rational analysis of needs, we have taken it beyond the rational.  In the Internet of 
Things, there is no defined purpose other than to connect everything, which tells us nothing.   
There is no identifiable analysis of user needs, only of the needs of the technology producers. 
We abandon rationality and cover everything indiscriminately with the technology. 
 
There isn’t a clear definition of the term ‘big data’.   It is one of those things which, Floridi 
says, is “difficult to define”, but you recognise it when you see it (Floridi, 2014, p.13).   The 
same could be said of the IOT.  One of the purposes of a definition is to clarify boundaries.   
But big data and the IOT do away with boundaries.  They are anti-definitions and as such their 
                                                            
      School of Information that found that 12 exabytes of information had been accumulated by humanity  
      throughout history until the commodification of computers, “but that it had already reached 180 exabytes  
      by 2006.”   Unfortunately he doesn’t give a date for the commodification of computers  -  it could have  
      been anytime from the launch of the Apple Mac in the early 1980s to the introduction of the Pentium  
      processor in the mid-1990s. 
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contribution to decision-making, to knowledge, and to management technique would be 
negative. 
 
It is very likely that much of the data in big data will be generated from information on other 
systems.   This would result in more and more data being produced from the same original 
source leading to an increase in volume without an ultimate increase in value or meaning.   
Since one of the big problems we have is information overload, this will add to the problem 
and greatly impair our ability to make decisions.    
 
Luhmann shows how the decision paradox inclines us to keep putting back decisions and we 
end up making decisions about decisions because we try to have certainty about the future.  Our 
main  concern then is to manage risk.  But he also showed that the volume of information we 
generate in trying to manage risk only complicates the situation further and increases rather 
than decreases the likelihood of a bad decision (pp.53-54 above).   He advocates the adoption 
of March and Simon’s idea of “uncertainty absorption.”   Uncertainty absorption, which 
manifests itself in ‘authority’ means that the later decisions “are guided only by the results and 
no longer by the evidence from which the conclusions [of the previous decisions] were drawn.” 
(Luhmann, 2013, p.224)   As a further means of simplifying and rendering the decision making 
process more efficient, Luhmann advocates an approach to risk management which he says 
could best be described as “prudence in the face of hazard.” (Luhmann, 1996, p.4) 
 
Luhmann’s recommendations above would greatly streamline the decision making processes 
within organisations.  But his advocacy of a greater reliance on authority within the organisation 
would have a negative impact on the growth of regulation and the size of our bureaucracies just 
as his advocacy of uncertainty absorption would have a negative impact on the development of 
the big data market. 
 
Human beings do not appear to be capable of matching the speed or memory capacity of 
computers but, in the real as opposed to the virtual world,  they can bring many strands of 
diverse information together very quickly and they can make successful decisions within their 
area of responsibility most of the time.  Of course they make mistakes sometimes.  Machines 
are seen to be more reliable.  But individuals can also make mistakes in programming the 
machines or in interpreting the results. We saw above how the meltdown on Wall Street in 2008 
was at least partly due to the rating agencies taking decisions on the basis of averages without 
taking account of the spreads.   The Irish sugar industry was shut down in 2006 by the European 
Commission following a WTO  investigation of the market and of the sustainability of the 
industry.  The shutdown affected thousands of farmers who between them earned €150 million 
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annually from beet growing.  After the shutdown and the decommissioning of the factory, the 
EU discovered that they were using out-of-date figures and that the industry had in fact been 
profitable.   In another example, Dermot Gleeson, who was chairman of Allied Irish Banks 
during the banking crisis in 2008, told the subsequent Oireachtais Banking Enquiry that the 
Board relied too heavily on sophisticated computerised risk management models rather than on 
their own sense of what was happening and the risk models were not up to the task. 
 
Big data and the IOT go to the extreme in being all-inclusive.   We no longer have to select, to 
discriminate or to engineer, we just collect all the data available and connect all the systems we 
have access to.   In other words, we can avoid making decisions.    One of the most important 
guidelines in systems development used to be that the greater the investment in terms of time 
and effort in the early design stages and therefore the earlier that decisions are taken, then the 
earlier the project will be completed, the less the overall cost and the better the quality of the 
finished product.  This again points back to importance of disciplined design. 
 
 
5.1.15 A Liberating Technology? 
When the word processor was introduced on PCs in the early 1980’s, it was regarded by many 
as a revolutionary technology and a democratic technology.   It was available at that time only 
on standalone computers since the Internet was not yet available to the public. Along with 
simplifying the production, storage and editing of single copies of documents, the word 
processor allowed individuals to print multiple copies of posters and circulars.  They could 
make themselves heard in public.   It is difficult now to appreciate the impact of this technology 
which today would seem very rudimentary.  
 
The real revolution, however, came with the widespread availability of the Internet and the 
World Wide Web.   These were set to provide most of the world with greatly enhanced 
communication facilities, richer social interaction, greater productivity leading to shorter 
working hours and more leisure time, more participative and active democracy.   In short, it 
would give people more power over their own lives and would allow them develop a better 
sense of community and to contribute more actively to their communities.   Certainly, the 
Internet has provided much greater access to information generally and this is a significant 
democratic enhancement to our lives.   The abundance of information brings with it, however, 
the difficulty that when the volume gets too large, the information reverts back to data and 




The ICT philosophy of ‘anywhere, anytime’ has undermined the possibility of shorter working 
hours and more leisure time.  In this context, borders and time zones, rather than being barriers 
to restrict us, are there to protect our freedom.  Breaching or ignoring them violates our 
circadian rhythms of activity and rest and in the long term could be as detrimental to our 
wellbeing as climate change is to the seasons. 
 
 
5.1.16 A Clean Technology? 
Many thought that ICT would allow for major savings in energy use throughout the world by 
providing low energy alternatives for many types of communications.   It was also expected to 
provide us with the paperless office and to reduce substantially our dependence on paper 
overall.   Unfortunately neither of these have happened.   A recent IEEE report states that: 
 “the ICT industry today is generating approximately 2 percent of global CO2 
emissions […and] the sharp growth curve forecast for ICT-based emissions is truly 
alarming and far outpaces aviation. ICT is forecast to account for about 4 percent 
of global CO2 emissions in just five years.” 66 
 
According to a 2008 report by Gartner, the CO2 emissions caused by ICT systems across the 
globe were the equivalent of the total international air travel or 25% of the emissions produced 
by passenger cars worldwide and the energy consumption was increasing at a rate of 16% per 
year.   This rate is likely to have increased more recently with the development of large server 
farms and datacentres around the world and further increases are likely with the development 
of ‘big data’ and IOT applications. 
 
According to an Economist report in 2012, paper consumption throughout the world increased 
by 50% since 1980 (The Economist Online, 2012) which would have been the time when the 
idea of the paperless office was first promulgated and used as a major marketing slogan for 
office automation systems.    The report shows Belgium as having the highest per capita 
consumption of paper as a result of the EU headquarters being located in Brussels. 
 
 
5.1.17 ICT Revolution - the End or the Beginning? 
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According to Perez’s model of technological revolutions, the final phase before the next 
paradigm shift is marked by accumulations of idle capital, saturation of markets, mergers and 
acquisitions, maturing technologies and shorter product life-cycles.   It’s a matter of opinion as 
to how closely they match the state of ICT today but one can certainly see a resemblance.   The 
model also tells us that each revolution lasts approximately fifty years.   There are strong 
indicators, therefore, that the ICT revolution is coming to a close and some other technology, 
such as biotechnology, is likely to come to the fore. 
 
We can, however, take a different view if we look beyond Perez or Schumpeter in terms of their 
classification of technologies.  The wheel is the most significant technology ever invented.   
Every machine up to the time of the early computers was dependent on the rotary power of the 
wheel as was electricity generation and distribution.    Electronics is the first innovation to 
replace the wheel in a range of mechanisms.   ICT marks the culmination of the development 
of electronics.  The question is, therefore, are we at the end of a Perez or Schumpeter revolution 
in ICT or is ICT just part of a much larger revolution to replace a paradigm which has lasted 












5.2 ANALYSIS – DEMOCRACY 
5.2.1 Politics 
As the art of the possible, politics is the last resort before engaging in physical coercion or 
violence to obtain a solution to any social problem.   It is through politics that compromises are 
worked out and decisions are reached.  If there are protocols, they may have to be bypassed and 
if there are rules they may have to be broken.  The decision, however, will be reported by the 
participants in terms that will accord with the protocols and rules.   It is not that everyone, or 
even anyone, will believe the full report but the mythical element will be invoked to reconcile 





For Luhmann the political system is “a means of producing collective binding decisions” and 
democracy is “a structural innovation emerging from this as a result of mere historical chance.” 
(Luhmann, 1990, p.234) He considers the evolution of democracy as an unlikely achievement 
but one we should celebrate.   Politics as a functional system is defined through its binary code 
of government/opposition and Luhmann questions the ability of this model to be flexible 
enough to cope with the scale and variety of the major problems that will have to be addressed 
politically ranging from genetic engineering to climate change, equality and peace (p.239). He 
is pessimistic about the future of democracy if it tries to accommodate these issues, but he is 
pessimistic about the future of the world if we don’t find some system that can address them. 
 
Many definitions of democracy have been outlined in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 above.  There is little 
or no direct conflict between what is explicitly stated in them but they emphasise different 
aspects of democracy.   There is, however, an ongoing argument between theorists as to whether 
democracy is of instrumental value or intrinsic value or whether there is any distinction between 
them and many of the individual arguments themselves are confusing. 67 For example, 
Schumpeter insists that democracy is merely a method and cannot be an ideal which implies 
that it is of instrumental value only but he also says that there are ideals such as free speech and 
justice etc. which are above democracy but which democrats believe will be guaranteed by 
democracy.   Hayek also insists that democracy is simply a method for determining 
governmental decisions and that it does not prescribe any values but he adds that it is an ideal 
worth fighting for and he links it through his ‘Great Society’ with the values of the open market 
and with peace, freedom and justice.   Luhmann’s definition is clearly an instrumental one. 
 
The fact that  there is no single, clear, and comprehensive definition of democracy is what 
makes it adaptable to varying situations and is therefore its main strength provided its most 
essential, clear, and inviolable principle or ‘bottom line’ is never forgotten.   This has been 
summed up in Gearty’s comment (Gearty, 2007) that one of the greatest features of democracy 
is that every few years, the electorate, “no matter how stupid they are” can get rid of the existing 
government and replace it with another.   Hayek expresses similar sentiments when he says that 
“as a convention which enables any majority to rid itself of a government it does not like, 
democracy is of inestimable value.” (Hayek, 1978, p.152) This feature, of course, is relevant 
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only to representative democracy.   Both Hayek and Davies, as mentioned earlier, consider 
democracy to be the ultimate bulwark against tyranny. 
 
Not alone is it very difficult to be definitive about democracy but democracy, in theory and in 
practice, presents us with more than a few paradoxes, conflicts, and apparent contradictions.   
For example, while democracy is seen as a bulwark against tyranny, many liberals fear the 
tyranny of the majority within democracy.   It is to protect against this that Schumpeter insists 
on democratic self-control where everyone should be reasonable and must not take advantage 
of situations to press their case without some consideration for others.  For Hayek, the problem 
can be addressed by ensuring that the majority response to any situation is based on abstract 
and just rules such that it cannot favour any particular situation but applies equally to all and is 
as likely to affect the majority as the minority. 
 
While in practice liberals will advocate and defend democracy, strictly speaking democracy 
and liberalism are in direct conflict.  Democracy is about community, about consensus on 
elements of the common good.   The primary emphasis of liberalism is on individualism, on 
‘me’ and my rights. It deprives us of “the potential strength of mutuality, cooperation, and 
common being.” (Barber, 1984, p.75)  Liberalism started out, and remains to some extent, the 
“sworn enemy of serious forms of democracy” according to Geuss (Geuss, 2001, p.153) who 
says its particular objective was as a protection against the tyranny of the majority (p.131).  
Despite this, liberals generally favour democracy since the only real alternative for them is to 
push for whatever further freedoms only anarchy would provide.    
 
 
5.2.3 Functional Differentiation  
While not recommending a return to a stratified differentiation of society, Luhmann recounts 
what was lost in the move to functional differentiation where there is no centre or no apex.  
Previously, “politics and religion competed for primacy” in guiding society and the nobility 
played a role in representing the outcome of this within society (Luhmann, 1990, pp.31-32).   
Today, society is “without a spokesman” and one searches “in vain among the social function 
systems for an a priori.” (p.32)   Individuals engage with a number of specific functional 
systems related to their mode of living.   Because of the intense focus of attention required by 
these, anything outside or beyond them is treated with indifference so there is a lack of 
awareness “of the greater issues or concerns that transcend the self” which, for Taylor, defines 
individualism (Taylor, 1991, p.14).   Luhmann observes a reaction to these developments in the 
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revival “of political regionalism, […] self-help groups, [and] in returning to relatively simple, 
natural and local preferences.” (Luhmann, 1990, p.33)   
 
Functional differentiation supports democracy since, in theory, it provides each individual with 
equal access to each function system.  It is in accord with liberalism since it allows freedom of 
choice for the individual but the basic philosophy of liberalism, i.e. individualism, is in conflict 
with the ideal of community which is one of the hallmarks of democracy.  Law and money 
facilitate the open access across the differentiated systems with law providing the disciplinary 
function and money providing the distribution function (p.90).  For these purposes they have 
the advantage that they “can be used abstractly – i.e. without a very precise pre-determination 
of the situations in which they are used concretely.”(p.82) This reflects Hayek’s vision of the 
means for providing equality of opportunity.  
 
In theory, the function systems operate independently although they can be structurally coupled 
so that one system can chose to respond to irritations from another system.   But one has to 
question how this is possible since every system requires resources and is therefore dependent 
on the economic system just as the biological autopoietic systems have to compete for 
resources.  The economic system can then exercise control over the other systems and 
dedifferentiation sets in.    Despite Luhmann’s claim that “our society tries to include the 
population in all the function systems, e.g. as the democratization of politics”,(p.19)  a large 
proportion of the population is barred from full access to the economy and as a result from full 
access to law, education, medicine, etc.  The problem starts with the dominant position of the 
economy and, within that, what Habermas alluded to as the failure to redistribute wealth and 
disband the class structure of wealth (Habermas, 1989b, p.57). Luhmann appears to contradict 
himself elsewhere when he states that “function systems became independent of stratification, 
organizing their own boundaries, their own modes of inclusion and exclusion of persons, their 
own way to transform equality into inequality and freedom into restraint.” (Luhmann, 2002, 
p.11) 
 
A system, according to Luhmann, endeavours to manage its environment by reducing the 
complexity of the environment and thereby increasing its internal complexity. (King & 
Thornhill, 2005, p.50)   However, the environment of a system comprises all of the other 
systems.  If each system increases its internal complexity, this contributes to increasing the 
complexity of the environment overall.   This reflects the paradoxical experience of modern life  
-  an unending stream of new services and new technologies, each of which simplifies a 
particular task but all of which together make life ever more complex.   It has to do with 
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management, management in all areas of life, management of oneself, of the home, in business, 
the professions, sport etc.  Much of the complexity is due to competition within systems. 
 
In Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic social systems, each system is fully enclosed.  Society is 
ramified into separate functional systems which protect their boundaries.   This rationalisation 
marks a shift from the generalists to the specialists or experts who protect their knowledge, 
often with a view to exploiting it in the market.  This is in conflict with any democratic objective 
that functional differentiation might claim to uphold but it is a feature of the professional closed 
shops that operate within many functional systems.   However, as noted earlier, within large 
organisations the power of the expert is often controlled by the bureaucrat due to the latter’s 
control over the resources required by the former. 
 
Another aspect of specialist knowledge is associated with the phenomenon of the black box.   
The black box is a feature of differentiated systems where the concept allows one system to 
connect to, or observe, another system without knowledge of the inner workings of that system 
other than its inputs and outputs.  This means that the internal workings of the black box are 
not transparent.  According to Luhmann “an increase in differentiation increases [the] 
necessity” to create black boxes (Luhmann, 1990, p.52).  Familiarity with the black box concept 
grew with the development of computer programming since programs within one application 
could be used as subroutines or modules within programs for another application and this 
allowed for the acceleration of application software development.  Use of the concept is 
widespread today in any field where systems are being connected. 
 
While the use of the black box concept has accelerated systems development, it has diminished 
inquisitiveness quite considerably. All that matters is the what, not the why. The acceleration 
of systems development is due to the fact that it is not being obstructed by people asking ‘why?’  
As we progress the development of the various systems on which we now depend, without 
having a grasp of the internal mechanisms and their sequence or ‘genealogy’ from which the 
systems have emerged, we are being immersed in an increasingly abstract environment.   
Context is lost and we lose our bearings so we are less clear as to where we are going.   
Knowledge is relinquished and power is surrendered. 
 
In recent years there have been frequent campaigns attempting to address the perceived lack of 
interest in science among young people.   I would suggest that this is partly due to the influence 
of the black box approach resulting in a ‘dumbing down’ of the subject because of a reduced 
emphasis on first principles.   Young people are naturally more inquisitive and are usually open 
to the challenge of working out the ‘why’ or the ‘how’.   It is ironic, therefore, that in teaching 
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and learning, one of the few areas where the ‘means’ should take precedence over the ‘ends’, 
the greater emphasis is on the ‘ends.’  
 
5.2.4 The Welfare State 
Many, if not most of the political controversies in national democracies can be linked back in 
one way or another to the relative size of the welfare state.  It is their stance in relation to this 
issue that identifies the Right and Left in political terms and which today provides the major 
grounds for conflict which, according to Barber, is central to the political process so, ultimately, 
it is the idea of the welfare state and the issues flowing from it that sustain political debate.  
 
Few theorists disagree with the basic principle of the welfare state, that is that everyone should, 
in so far as is possible, get an equal start in life and that compensation should be provided for 
those who are disadvantaged due to negative consequences of their particular situation.   
Theorists disagree, however, as to how this should be done.  Hayek is against the idea of ‘social 
justice’ where a specific effort is directed towards specific people to achieve a particular result.   
This is too much like a socialist planned economy and undermines the spontaneity of society 
and of the market.   He sees a role for the voluntary sector in supporting those suffering severe 
deprivation and this provides the added benefit that an active voluntary sector ensures a 
healthier society.   Drucker would have a similar view of the voluntary and the non-profit 
sectors each of which derives its strategy from their very clearly defined mission rather than 
centring it on financial returns. 
 
Drucker’s difficulty with the welfare state is that it is managed by the state bureaucracy.  It 
would be much more efficient and accountable if it were run by a business, a cooperative or 
even by government administrators once they are given autonomy for this purpose.  There isn’t 
convincing evidence, however, of significant improvements in costs and efficiency whenever 
the delivery of state services are transferred to the private sector.    Bureaucracy is seen as the 
problem and it is sometimes overlooked that bureaucracy is not confined to the public sector.  
Every organisation which maintains records or other paperwork is, or has, a bureaucracy and 
in many cases the private sector bureaucracies will prove to be less effective than the state 
bureaucracies because of the generations of experience the latter have had to fine tune their 
operations. 
 
For Luhmann, the problem with the welfare state arises from the functional differentiation of 
society where each individual ultimately has a right of access to each functional system which 
gives rise to much more complex arrangements than when each person was assigned to just one 
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stratum of society.   Entitlements are not as clear in the functionally differentiated society.   With 
the development of the welfare state, Luhmann perceived a change in attitude from help to 
compensation, from benefits to claims.  There will always be differences in the economic and 
social needs of people and at one level the welfare state strives to compensate for these 
differences.   But compensation in one area will frequently create disparities in other areas and 
these will then be compensated and/or the bureaucracy will attempt to rectify the situation 
through additional regulation.    
 
Other significant factors identified by Luhmann as giving rise to problems in the welfare state 
are the principles of political inclusion and universalisation.  But for Habermas, the efforts 
involved in addressing these have been a failure since the welfare state has not achieved any 
effective redistribution of wealth other than a horizontal reshuffling within the respective bands 
of poverty and wealth. 
 
The growth of the welfare state is facilitated by the bureaucracy which tries to control it through 
rationalisation by additional regulation rather than through rationalisation by simplification and 
refinement.   While at the micro level bureaucrats might believe they are streamlining the 
system, at the macro level they are, unwittingly or otherwise, using the increased internal 
complexity to expand the bureaucracy. 
 
Hayek, as one of the most influential liberals of modern times, advocates democracy as one of 
the two cornerstones of his Great Society - the other cornerstone being the open market 
economic system.  In this he was following Aristotle who was not an advocate of democracy 
but who saw it as providing the best chance of political freedom for the individual.   In Hayek’s 
view, the way to provide equality of opportunity for everyone is through the free market with 
money as the medium of exchange and price and income being the indicators of the direction 
to take within the economy.   The idea is very plausible and attractive.  Contrary to what one 
would expect in practice, however, the ‘free market’ is not unplanned.  It is subject to 
agreements and regulations.   One of the most significant trade agreements was the GATT/WTO 
Uruguay Round which was negotiated by 123 governments through the period from 1982 to 
1994 when it was signed.   The agreement is documented in 34 volumes of rules and 
regulations68 which were shown subsequently to be very much to the disadvantage of 
underdeveloped and developing countries, particularly in relation to IPR.  For trade to be free, 
it cannot be regulated.  Or perhaps we have to accept the paradox that freedom of any sort must 
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be protected by regulation.  But the ‘enforcement’ of regulations is dependent on power - which, 
in the case of the market, is wealth -  and the most effective enforcement will be provided by 
those with most power which undermines the equality which is necessary for freedom.  If the 
market is to be free, then a single declaration to the effect that there will be no barriers to free 
trade is all that is required. Any addendums are negations of freedom.  
 
There are other problems with the market.  For example, does the principle of the free and 
equitable market still hold when money is virtual and its production can be virtual and when 
the use of the Earth’s resources are not accounted for, at least in the way supply and demand is 
normally accounted for? 
 
It might have been possible until recently to implement Hayek’s model if it were done on a 
national basis.   However, we are now in the age of globalisation which militates against such 
a project.   States have little power on their own to face the challenges from the global problems 
facing us in relation to climate change, international finance, terrorism, migration etc., yet 
paralysis sets in when they try to act collectively.   Globalisation is presenting problems even 
for the welfare state since there is a belief that migrants choose their destination on the basis of 
the welfare payments available.   Whether or not this is exaggerated, it arouses fears for the 
future.   As mentioned already, Castells is concerned about the global bureaucracy that is 
developing around international and global organisations such as the IMF, WTO, EU, and the 
UN to name just a few.  There is a significant increase in complexity which merely allows the 
“de facto global bureaucracy” to garner more power to itself.   Much of the power is also leaking 
out to the major multinationals, fifty-one of which are among the top one hundred economies 
in the world, the other forty-nine are countries.69 
 
5.2.5 Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy exists in any organisation where there are formal records and documented 
procedures.  It is essential in a democracy as it provides the means for ensuring that government 
policies are applied fairly and objectively and, in Weber’s words, “according to calculable rules 
and without regard for persons.”  The bureaucracy is meant to serve all the citizens - a civil 
service - and serve them equally.  As bureaucracy develops, however, the resulting cold 
objectivity in which the bureaucrat interacts with the citizen very often antagonises the latter 
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who sometimes looks to the politician to act as intermediary which is a reversal of roles between 
the politician and the bureaucracy.   
 
As a consequence of its dehumanised or abstract nature, the bureaucracy is often referred to as 
‘a machine’, a description which is validated by the fact that it “is easily made to work for 
anybody who knows how to gain control over it.   [It] continues to function smoothly after the 
enemy has occupied the territory; he merely needs to change the top officials.” (Weber, 1978, 
pp.988-989)   This is why, with the development of bureaucracy, we see more coups d’état than 
actual revolutions.   More significantly, the bureaucratic ‘machine’ allows for the smooth, 
efficient and peaceful transfer of power during the change of government in a democracy - the 
government changes but the administrative work continues uninterrupted. 
 
The rational and objective basis of bureaucracy should make it very attractive to liberals.  
However, liberals would strongly disapprove of other aspects of bureaucracy, particularly the 
autopoiesis phenomenon which is very evident in it.   The more rules and regulations the 
bureaucracy has to implement, the more additional gaps it identifies so regulation begins to 
multiply, or grow exponentially, and this results in more resources providing further growth for 
the bureaucracy.   Even when the bureaucracy fails to deliver or under-achieves, it usually 
pleads a shortage of resources to which, in many cases, it gets a positive response.   For example, 
following the banking crisis in Ireland in 2008, the Central Bank blamed its lack of effective 
regulation on a staffing shortage and quite quickly it received an additional three hundred staff 
while resources were being cut in almost all other areas of the economy.  Another example was 
given above where the implementation of freedom of information legislation, which was meant 
to exercise an element of control over the state bureaucracy, has been used by the bureaucracy 
to further increase its resources.  Bureaucracy is based on rationality.   Rationalisation within 
an organisation normally involves streamlining and a reduction in staffing.  Where 
rationalisation in one part of a bureaucracy results in a reduction in resources, it is likely that 
resources in another part of the bureaucracy will be increased because it is very difficult to 
reduce the overall complexity.   The bureaucracy finds ways of reproducing itself 
autopoietically in both good times and bad.   
 
The above examples illustrate the operationally closed nature of the state bureaucracy.  This is 
further exemplified by the safeguards provided to ensure that the bureaucracy maintains its 
objectivity and therefore its independence from political interference.  But as Drucker noted 





Bureaucracy is organised hierarchically and tends towards centralisation, two attributes which 
are at variance with the principles of democracy of which, it must be emphasised, bureaucracy 
is an essential element.  Bureaucracy gets its power through its manner of organisation, its 
control of information and its expertise.  These, together with its clearly specified regulations 
and procedures, make it ideal for the deployment of ICT to further enhance its dominance.  The 
rational process and the logic machine provide virtually limitless power to one another to 
maintain an enormous rate of growth.   Luhmann illustrates the phenomenon, particularly as it 
occurs within the welfare state.   In introducing computerisation “we cannot always foresee 
what will happen; and when something does, it is usually too late to withdraw the innovation.  
Still, we can always invest in dealing with the resulting problems.” (Luhmann, 2012, p.295) In 
addition, Luhmann notes that the goals of bureaucracy are often focused on the bureaucracy 
itself.    He quotes an example of the “improvement of the working conditions of the [internal] 
personnel” as an indicator of success (Luhmann, 1990, p.86)70 
 
5.2.6 Technocracy 
At the centre of the bureaucracy is the technocracy where the high-level technical expertise is 
concentrated and protected.   At one end of the bureaucracy spectrum we have democracy since 
the purpose of bureaucracy within the political system is to enable democracy.  At the other 
end of the spectrum we have the technocracy which monopolises power and subverts 
democracy.  There is a tendency for “all those intangible things [e.g. privacy] which augment 
purely formal freedoms […] to disappear.”(Wilson, 2009, p.337)  We live in what is called the 
information age or the knowledge economy but while there is far more information available, 
much of it is accessible only to the expert or the technocrat and knowledge is not free in the 
sense of Hayek’s open market.  
 
Democracy is about opening up participation in decision-making.   The technocracy, whether 
in the public or the private sector, seeks to confine decision-making as much as possible to itself 
and generally people lack the confidence to question or challenge the expert.  The media, part 
of whose role is to observe and explain the actions of the technocrats, tend more to glorify than 
to challenge them so that they’re looked on with awe by the public.  This was exemplified by 
the attempted overlap of democracy with technocracy in the appointment in 2011 of Mario 
Monti as Prime Minister in Italy and Lucas Papademos as Prime Minister in Greece.  Both were 
economists and were appointed  -   neither was elected to public office.   They were appointed 
as technocrats - this wasn’t incidental.   Papademos was out of office after approximately six 
                                                            




months and Monti was gone after approximately eighteen months.   They had been appointed 
on the basis they would have the expertise to rescue their respective countries from the debt 
crisis.  But it wasn’t economic expertise that was primarily required.   There wasn’t any great 
mystery about what the problem was.  It was a political problem rather than an economic one.   
It was a matter of getting a binding decision as to what section or sections of society or the 




Because of the fluidity of the market which developed with the consumer society through the 
last century, the economy has penetrated most of the other social systems and this has led to 
significant dedifferentiation between systems.   This means that the benefits of differentiation, 
i.e. democracy and equality, are being gradually eroded and the semblance of a class system is 
reappearing as differentiation by wealth begins to take over from differentiation by function.  
Services such as education, medicine, and law are no longer as freely available to everyone or 
certainly the same level of service is not provided for everyone.   What is even more evident is 
the extent to which the welfare state has already effected a significant level of dedifferentiation 
between the political and economic systems due to the large share of the economy that is now 
influenced by the level of state expenditure. Because of this dedifferentiation, the government 
often shows more concern about the economic impact of its services than it shows about their 
intrinsic effectiveness. 
 
While money is the medium of the economic system, truth is the medium of science and this 
has been reasonably well protected by the independence afforded most scientists because they 
worked in the universities and research institutes which were, by and large, non-profit 
institutions.  While technology belonged to the economic system and was to be found in the 
market, science had its own system and was found in these institutions. The work of the 
scientists was assessed mainly on the basis of their publications.  Today there is an increasing 
tendency to assess them on the basis of the research funds they bring to their institutions.     
Taking Luhmann’s biological analogy of autopoietic systems, it is as though the economy has 
developed into a parasite on the other systems.  Müller compares it to a virus which in human 
cells substitutes its “own genetic instructions for those of the cell” and she asks if “economic 
considerations [could] be seen as a virus that changes the programmes of other subsystems?” 
(Müller, Anne Friederike;  Some Observations on Social Anthropology and Niklas Luhmann’s 





5.2.8 Participation in Democracy   
Luhmann is very concerned about why, today, we have so many decisions to make.   He has 
argued, contrary to what many people would believe, that the planning process provides too 
much information which complicates and delays the decision making process.  He also 
illustrates, as outlined above, the difficulty if not the futility in making decisions due to the 
decision paradox.   But the planning and decision making proceeds and enables the bureaucracy 
to grow autopoietically, and this, together with the bureaucracy’s expertise and its possession 
of official information allows it to extend its control and power.   To keep this power in check 
requires an opening up of the decision making processes to allow more participation by the 
public but increasing participation has the potential to cause other problems.   It would increase 
the complexity of the decision making process resulting in a requirement for more time and 
resources and, while the resulting decisions should have greater democratic legitimacy, they 
are likely to be less effective as a decisions. 
 
There is much concern about the lack of engagement of people generally in the democratic 
process.   There is a perception that the level of apathy has been increasing over the last three 
or four decades and evidence of this can be seen in the voting trends over that period.   The 
decrease in voter turnout figures for Irish general elections between 1973 and 2002 was 
approximately 15%, almost double the average European drop for the same period.  There are 
many likely causes for the lack of engagement or even lack of interest in politics.   There is the 
feeling of powerlessness of the individual among the masses within the state and this has 
increased as the European Union strengthens its influence over national governments and is 
increasing further as globalisation develops.  Athenian democracy is held up as the ideal to be 
emulated but less attention is  paid to the very different circumstances between the Athens of 
over two millennia ago and the world of today.   As noted earlier, Constant highlighted some 
of the major differences in 1816 which are still relevant today.  These included the abolition of 
slavery; the replacement generally of war, which tends to be intermittent and involves the 
authorities, by commerce which is continuous and does not require the intervention of the 
authorities.   This allows the individual greater independence.   Here, already, we see the traits 
of liberalism developing. 
 
The mass media are partly responsible for the disenchantment with politicians and the 
democratic system among citizens.  As first-order observers of the political system, the mass 
media have a significant role in ensuring the accountability of politicians.  But the almost 
exclusively adversarial approach adopted when undertaking this role puts politicians on the 
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defensive so this is how we usually see them and hence the negative overall impression of them 
and of the political system.   Also, driven by consumer demand, sensational headlines, 
soundbytes and superficial coverage with high-level, and sometimes biased, statistics rather 
than rigorous analysis, tend to dominate political reporting as discussed in the example of the 
Irish health services above. 
 
There is a widespread belief that ICT will facilitate the regeneration of democratic politics by 
providing the means for greater participation by all citizens through electronic and perhaps 
online voting and for enhanced access to information, and facilities for online discussion and 
deliberation.  To accept this belief is to disregard, or to misunderstand, the subtleties and 
intricacies of the democratic system.  It might be that politics and democracy will be utterly 
transformed, will undergo a paradigm shift, to align them in terms of methods and values with 
the transformations taking place in other areas of life due to the electronic revolution.   
However, the Athenian model has survived wars, as well as cultural, political, and industrial 
revolutions, and while many of its practices may have changed, its principles are still valued 
almost two and a half millennia after they were first articulated by Pericles.  
 
In a drive for greater democracy, an inchoate Irish political party made a demand for full 
transparency of decision making in the Cabinet.71 This would seriously restrain, if not inhibit, 
decision making at cabinet level.  No minister would wish to be associated with negative 
decisions.  It would be starting at the wrong end.   Democracy must be built from the ground 
up. To be successful it should follow the principle of subsidiarity which is summed up by Mill 
where he says “that those who have any interest in common which they do not share with the 
general body of their countrymen, may manage that joint interest by themselves.”(Mill, 1998, 
p.415) Barber’s model, which suggests starting with local assemblies at community level, is 
useful. These assemblies would be confined initially to discussing and deliberating on local and 
national issues, a process which would engender civic competence.   They could then develop 
over time through more active engagement in local issues, keeping a watching brief, for 
example, on the accountability of public officials etc.  They could also take on board Hind’s 
proposals for public commissioning of public journalism.   What is most significant about 
Barber’s proposals, however, is his assertion that conflict is central to politics.   Politics is a 
process which transforms conflict into cooperation by enabling the building of mutual respect, 
trust and eventually cooperation and consensus.   Conflict is the motivator which provides the 
citizen with Schumpeter’s ‘pungent sense of reality’ and ‘effective volition’.   Involvement in 
political deliberations and decisions at local, national or any other level requires a significant 
                                                            
71Eddie Hobbs of Renua in a television interview on RTE1;  13th April 2015  
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commitment and engagement from the citizen.  The rhetoric from politicians in support of such 
involvement is rarely matched in practice since the natural tendency of government is to reduce 
complexity in the environment and this is best achieved through rationalisation and 
centralisation as has been happening in Ireland since 1977.72    
 
The more focused type of participation by citizens is in voting in elections and there has been 
much concern in the media and more generally in the perceived falloff in such participation 
over the years.   The turnout figures have shown a downward trend as indicated above but it is 
significant that there have been a number of occasions when the figures have gone against the 
trend.  The highest turnout recorded in an Irish election was 81% in the 1933 general election.   
The turnout fell gradually with the figure for 1951 at 75% but thirty years later, in 1981, it was 
76% before falling to one of its lowest figures, 63%, in 2002 and at the election in 2011 it was 
70%.  The elections of 1981 and 2011 took place during a period of severe recession while the 
2002 election coincided with the strongest economic boom the country has experienced.   
Caution is required when interpreting turnout figures because so many factors come into play.  
Nevertheless, the figures do provide some evidence that more voters are motivated, or 
provoked, to vote in times of recession or when things are bad but are quite happy to forego the 
opportunity when things are good.   
 
There is a somewhat similar pattern with referendums of which there have been 38 since the 
Irish Constitution was adopted in 1937 by referendum with a voter turnout of 76%.  Other high 
turnouts included 71% for the 1972 referendum on joining the EEC; 68% for the 1992 
referendum on abortion; 66% for the 1968 poll on abolishing the PR system of election; and 
62% for the 1995 referendum on divorce.   At the other end of the scale, there was a 29% turnout 
for a referendum to regularise the position of the Adoption Board and another to change the 
university representation in the Seanad, both of which were held on the same day.   In 1996 a 
referendum to change the bail laws had a turnout of 29%.   
 
It is no surprise that, as the figures above show, the turnout is high when significant, contentious 
or what are perceived as moral issues, are proposed and turnout is low when the issues are such 
that most people feel very removed from their possible impact.   This was probably best 
represented by the referendum on Scottish independence in 2014.  While the turnout in Scotland 
for the 2010 UK general election was 64% and for the general election to the Scottish 
                                                            
72 Following the general election in 1977, the incoming government abolished rates on private property and  
         car tax as promised in its election manifesto.   These were the main funding sources for local government  
         for which subventions from central government were now substituted. 
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Parliament in 2011 was 50%, the turnout for the independence referendum was 85%.73  This 
followed what is widely regarded as one of the best, most intensive and cleanest political 
contests. 
 
The relatively high turnout for the Irish referendum on abolishing the PR system was also 
significant. The proposal was defeated with a 61% vote against it.   There was another 
referendum on the same day on a proposal to change the rules governing the formation of 
constituencies and the vote against it was almost exactly the same as for the PR proposal.   This 
would indicate that there are a lot of people who will not tolerate any tampering with the 
electoral system despite the fact that they themselves do not use it regularly. 
 
Democratic elections, in practically all cases, produce definitive results of equal value 
regardless of turnout.  The method works and considering the complexities, confusions and 
paradoxes that are encountered in democratic politics, it is important that the overall system is 
underpinned by such a simple and effective method.  It is adequate to satisfy the positions of 
Luhmann and Schumpeter on the electoral process.   
 
Democracy is valued because of the freedom and relative stability it has provided which, in 
turn, has resulted in significant economic development as both Luhmann and Sen have 
observed.  Democracy is about power - about the citizens having political power both 
individually and collectively.  If the citizens don’t protect it and use it through active 
participation, they can lose the power. It will be readily appropriated by others at the centre 
such as the technocracy and then democracy will fade away.   If, on the other hand, they are 
over-protective and fanatical in their use of it, they could destroy it and, as Held has argued, 
anarchy or totalitarianism can take its place.  ICT could well be the vehicle through which such 
fanaticism could evolve.   
 
It is worth noting here that the federal election in Germany in March 1933 had a turnout of 
89%.   The election was won by the Nazi Party which got 44% of the vote and although they 
did not get an overall majority, their closest rivals were the Social Democratic Party with only 
18% of the vote.74   Again, caution is needed in interpreting these figures since, among other 
factors, there was widespread intimidation in the period before the election.   Nevertheless, 
participation was very high and totalitarianism won with over 17 million people voting for the 
Nazi Party. 
                                                            
73  www.ukpolitical.info/turnout45.htm [Accessed: 17th September, 2016] 




Pericles set out the principles and Athens provided the model for democracy.  Constant 
explained how many of the conditions facing Athenian citizens in the 5th century BC no longer 
applied in Britain at the time he was writing in 1816 as is the case in most democracies today.   
We are too busy to partake in politics to any great extent and our main preoccupation is 
commerce which requires our continuous attention.  The main preoccupation for Athenian 
citizens was war which was sporadic leaving long intervals during which the citizens had little 
else to do other than attending the Assembly.   Commerce, according to Constant, also supplies 
our needs and gives us the freedom which today’s liberals espouse.   In addition to commerce, 
we have other tasks to undertake for which the Athenians retained slaves which allowed them 
to attend the Assembly whereas today we elect people to represent us.   Compared to the modern 
state, particularly in the age of globalisation, Athens was compact and manageable and citizens 
could identify closely with the issues on which they were deliberating which, of course, could 
still apply to regional and local politics today.   What Constant does not mention is that the 
Athenian citizens were paid for carrying out their various duties such as attendance at the 
Assembly, jury duty, various administrative duties etc.  “Political pay […] was a key means of 
enabling many thousands of Athenians to be active politically when they wouldn’t have been 
otherwise.”(Cartledge, see Portillo, ‘Democracy on Trial’) 
 
Another side of democracy, although not exclusive to democracy, is taxation.   A reasonably 
equitable or democratic taxation system provokes “citizens into demanding accountability.” 
(Collier, see Portillo, ‘Democracy on Trial’)  In some smaller, less developed countries which 
receive large revenues for oil and other natural resources as well as foreign aid, there is less, if 
any, requirement for taxation and patronage takes the place of accountability with leaders 
holding onto power “just through personal patronage networks.” (Collier)  India is a rare 
example of a democracy which is poor. It has been a successful democracy because of its size  
-  it is the largest democracy in the world. It is too big to cultivate personal power based on 
widespread patronage networks (Collier). 
 
For today’s citizens, political participation is not as critical nor as rewarding as it was for the 
minority comprising the Athenian citizens.   In general, they have a better standard of living, 
they have more work and leisure interests and they can partake in many more functional systems 
than just the political system.   As indicated above, they are protective of the electoral system 
and once affairs of state are being managed and the provision of services is being maintained, 
a substantial proportion of the electorate has no strong wish to get involved in political 
deliberations or even in elections.  Although not active, it could be argued that they are not 
totally passive regarding political affairs since the mass media is keeping them up to date with 
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information round the clock on political developments should they wish to receive it and if they 
do they will respond on relatively rare occasions when they sense some cause for alarm. 
 
Most theorists, as discussed above, are not in favour of maximising participation in democracy.   
They even regard it as dangerous due to the possibility that it could develop into totalitarianism 
with which participation was identified by many until a few decades ago.   Luhmann is 
concerned about the difficulty in making decisions when too many people are involved but he 
exaggerates the difficulty and his argument overlooks the fact that, as Barber emphasises, 
conflict, and conflict resolution through collective binding decisions, are the essence of politics.  
Taking Luhmann’s view to the extreme would take one towards dictatorship.   Generally in 
politics, the more complex the decision, the better the learning process for all involved and the 
greater the political achievement.   It must be accepted, however, that this has to be 
counterbalanced by the effectiveness of the process in arriving at any decision at all. 
 
Berelson (p.18 above) says that the democratic system requires both stability and flexibility 
with political traditions and loyalties in families and other groups providing stability while the 
floating voters among the less committed provide the flexibility.   Pateman adds that the apathy 
among the majority maintains the stability of the system, presumably by not partaking in 
deliberations or voting.  There is also a view that a significant proportion of those who do not 
participate tend to hold anti-democratic views.  But making differentiations like this 
undermines at least the theory of democracy since inclusiveness, as an element of equality, is 
the essence of democracy.  Add to this the idea that the effectiveness of the democratic system 
diminishes as participation increases, then we are dealing with a very significant paradox. 
 
Voting is compulsory by law in twenty-three countries although the law is strictly enforced in 
only ten.75   In Australia, which has mandatory voting laws, there was a 94% turnout in the 
2010 federal election although opponents of the system claim that this figure misrepresents the 
overall commitment of eligible voters since 10% are not registered.   Liberals tend to be strongly 
opposed to compulsory voting because, they say, it is anti-democratic.  Some argue that 
compulsory voting is in conflict with the principle of free speech since free speech entitles one 
to refuse to speak.  One of the main arguments of those supporting compulsory voting is that 
the people least likely to vote are the poor and the marginalised and there is a critical need for 
these to be represented. 
 
 
                                                            
75 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23810381  [Accessed: 15th September 2016] 
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5.3 The Mutual Dependency between Democracy and ICT 
Democracy, as a method of politics, involves communication, deliberation, and decision-making and 
all three of these can be greatly enhanced through the application of ICT but, as a medium, ICT can 
also be used to undermine democracy.  Since democracy is a balance between anarchy and 
totalitarianism, it can be destroyed by pushing it to either extreme.  It is a particularly delicate balance 
if we take Barber’s assertion that conflict is a central feature of strong democracy so it can also be 
damaged by those who are over-zealous in their support for, and protection of, the system and who 
might not be as close to the centre of balance as they assume.  In many instances they are people, or 
institutions such as governments, that have received their power through the democratic system.  
 
The negative or antidemocratic potential of ICT is usually exercised through the clandestine gathering 
of information while the positive potential tends to be exercised to disseminate information.  State 
authorities and criminals are usually the ones responsible for hostile use but while the latter tend to be 
targeted in their use, the state authorities tend towards blanket coverage although in most cases they 
would claim to be doing this in defence of democracy.  Businesses, like state agencies, have an interest 
in building profiles of their customers so they can market a personalised service although, as with ICT, 
the rationale behind personalised services is to streamline the business operations so that staff resources 
can be reduced leaving less people to serve the customers.  There are benefits for customers but they 
might not regard them as worthwhile if they were fully aware of the detailed shopping patterns, and 
indeed life patterns, that the shops and other businesses have been able to construct from details of their 
transactions. (Duhigg, 2012)76  
 
Many people would view the market and consumerism as strong manifestations of democracy and this 
would be supported by Hayek.  It would be true if the market was free but, as I have shown (p.182 
above), it is not.   Also, the type of marketing just mentioned and the manner in which the ICT industry 
creates the demand for its products through the teenage market undermines the argument. 
 
Data collection is a relatively easy task for state agencies since they have the power to demand certain 
information from citizens and to identify each citizen with a Personal Public Service Number (PPSN) 
or similar identity code which allows them to link various different databases and, if necessary, build 
profiles of citizens.   In some cases the databases may include DNA records.   State agencies also engage 
in covert data collection operations relating, for example, to telephone records, email records and mobile 
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In one  case, a father became aware of his daughter’s pregnancy through the unsolicited offers arriving in the 




phone tracking.   It is very likely that we will soon see data collection extended to tracking our 
movements and spying on us generally via drone technology, somewhat similar to what Google are 
doing already and they are making the information available to everyone on the Web.  The problem for 
the state agencies is coping with the volumes of information collected, particularly in the larger states 
such as the US where the surveillance activities of the National Security Agency were exposed by 
Edward Snowden in 2013. The greater the volume of information, the greater the security problem.   
Also, as the volume increases beyond a certain point it begins to lose meaning and it must be processed 
using some analytics to provide information that is of practical use.   What was information reverts to 
being data before being reprocessed to produce information again. 
 
Bureaucracy and ICT have a relationship whereby they feed off one another in a manner which provides 
for exponential growth in the volumes of information and the spread of ICT.   Bureaucracy is essential 
to protect the equal rights of all citizens in a democracy but when taken to the extreme, it becomes just 
as essential for the preservation of dictatorships. 
 
Democracy is about the distribution of power. Activities which concentrate power are antidemocratic 
although they have to be accommodated to some extent provided they do not upset the balance by 
veering too much from the centre towards anarchy or totalitarianism.   Information is power but the 
citizens are virtually powerless when faced with the manner in which the state and private organisations 
can utilise ICT to collate information about them.   In many cases the activities outlined above extend 
themselves far beyond the democratic centre of balance.   The philosophy behind the separation of 
powers should be applied also to the separation of information.   Data protection and freedom of 
information legislation exists in many countries but it falls far short of addressing the scale of the 
problems outlined here and the difficulties with security mentioned above are unlikely to be addressed 
without a major transformation in our approach to ICT.   It is also unlikely that such a transformation 
will take place anytime soon. 
 
Electronic voting, or e-voting has been introduced in many countries.  There are various different types 
of e-voting methods ranging from machines within polling stations to online voting.  The pilot project 
using voting machines in three constituencies in the 2002 Irish general election was regarded as a failure 
and the proposal to roll out the system to all constituencies was abandoned.   E-voting is a very efficient 
process with results available almost instantly once polls close.  It should also have a much higher level 
of accuracy than paper-based voting.   However, the transparency of the system was questioned since 
it would have been regarded as a ‘black box’ replacement for tallymen.   But the instant production of 
results was seen as the greatest disadvantage since it replaced the manual counts which lasted for one, 
or in some cases, two or more days and it is during this period that the engagement of the electorate is 
at its most intense as a very high proportion of the people follow the results.  In the process, they become 
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more familiar with the politicians, the parties, and the policies and political practicalities of forming a 
government.  This engagement is sacrificed for e-voting. 
 
On the positive side, ICT has made information on state services and activities readily available to 
citizens and it also allows for business with government agencies to be conducted online which makes 
transactions much easier.   Official information is usually provided by all government agencies via the 
web and this distribution of information is a distribution of power to citizens and is, therefore, a most 
significant democratic development.  Very important also is the availability of unofficial information 
about state services, the conduct of government and other political topics, from discussion forums, blogs 
and newsfeeds etc. on the web. 
 
ICT is seen as a means for developing participative democracy.  As shown already, many theorists 
including Luhmann, Schumpeter and Pateman would not necessarily subscribe to this since, in their 
view, too high a level of participation by citizens would be detrimental to democracy as it would make 
decision-making more complicated if not impossible in many cases.   It would be extremely difficult to 
conduct what is often now referred to as e-consultation with even a small proportion of the population 
of most democratic states.   If the Irish government were to receive submissions from just 5% of the 
voters, this would result in approximately 100,000 submissions which would be very difficult to process 
without an expansion of the bureaucracy.    
 
As discussed earlier, participation could be developed on the basis of subsidiarity where issues are 
discussed by those most affected by them.   It is only through such issues that people will engage 
seriously in political deliberations which can be filtered upwards, or mediated, through the subsidiarity 
model.  Once people are engaged in the process and meet face-to-face regularly, then they can 
complement their work very effectively via ICT.   If the deliberations are solely via ICT, then there are 
likely to be many more participants but with far less commitment overall and there is the risk of 
individuals using false identities to mislead or act irresponsibly in some other way.   Another problem 
with the web, although it applies also to the mass media to a lesser extent, is that we search out material 
that reinforces our already strongly held views which leads to polarisation and does not help political 
discussion.  
 
As shown above in the Castells et al. case study, mobile technology is very effective in mobilising even 
very large groups to respond, perhaps spontaneously as a flash mob, to some political development.     
While it is not very suitable for deliberating, mobile technology can be very useful for micro-
coordination of meetings and other political activities.   Mobile communications tend to be horizontal 
rather than top-down and are more reliable since there is less likelihood of spoofing than on email.   The 




We saw in the case study also, how groups of mobile users in underdeveloped countries as well as 
migrants throughout the world are very innovative in leveraging the mobile systems to develop new 
services and businesses. 
 
Macintosh mentions some tools that can help to support active participation in e-democracy.   They 
include “Issue Based Information Systems (IBIS), a language and graphical representation scheme for 
visualizing argumentation.”77   This type of tool can be very useful provided one maintains an awareness 
that in trying to fit such activities into system models, one can be restricting the political scope or 
reducing the perspectives of political discussion.  
 
Having considered how ICT can influence or impact on democracy, I will now consider the  impact 
democracy can have on ICT.  If the development of ICT can be influenced by democracy, then it cannot 
be fully deterministic or autonomous.  Yet, we feel we have little or no control over the direction of 
technological development generally.   This is because, unlike the standalone tools of earlier times, 
modern technology comprises systems of interconnected machines and instruments and the systems 
themselves are also interconnected. Systems are sets of dependencies.  Dependency is a negation of 
freedom, particularly structural freedom.  In theory, we are free to reject modern technology and live as 
people did prior to the Industrial Revolution but it would be difficult to find anywhere that one could 
survive independently of the infrastructural ‘shadow systems’ of roads, electric lighting, the noise of 
airplanes, processed food, etc.   In most, if not all, cases where people opt for the simple life close to 
nature, they are still dependent either directly or indirectly on the products of modern technology 
somewhere back along the supply chain.  
 
Heidegger’s assertion that technology is a way of revealing; that it is something deep within our 
common psyche, is a theory which, instinctively, I find very difficult to accept but since it 
accommodates all the evidence, it is even more difficult to refute and he was particularly prescient with 
regard to our focus on the exploitation of energy resources.   What Heidegger was saying is effectively 
that technology is autonomous although it was Ellul, who came after him, that is most associated with 
the term.   Kelly’s theory about the technium also supports the idea of autonomous technology but his 
theory is so general that it would be difficult to provide a falsification test.  The same might be said 
about Heidegger’s theory but his claim about energy exploitation goes some way towards providing 
such a test.   When considering the development of autonomous technology, we could bear in mind 
                                                            
77 Macintosh, Ann; Characterizing E-Participation in Policy-Making; Proceedings of the 37th 





Steiner’s comment who, on questioning the direction of some scientific research and using the analogy 
of Bluebeard’s Castle, suggests that “It may be […] that the coming door opens on to realities 
ontologically opposed to our sanity and limited moral reserves.” (Steiner, 1971, p.104) 
 
If technology is completely autonomous and deterministic, then we have no choices and democracy 
becomes an irrelevant ideal.   But we have choices.  It is not essential that we have a car; we could 
adjust our lifestyle so that all our needs can be provided for within walking distance but we would have 
to tolerate the noise, pollution and dangers of other people’s cars.  Similarly with ICT.   We could decide 
to live without it but we would be missing out on many services some of which, such as online banking, 
are becoming more and more essential.   We have freedom of action in that we can live without having 
to use any ICT systems or services but as individuals we cannot prevent or inhibit the widespread 
deployment of ICT applications which eventually affects our lifestyle - for example, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to get personal service in a bank or from many other services.   
 
Amish communities have proved that it is possible, when acting together, to control the deployment of 
ICT and other technologies within their own districts.  Most Amish today employ some technologies to 
a very limited extent.   What cannot be achieved easily by individuals can be done by communities as 
the Amish have shown, but they have a non-consumerist culture so it’s a moot point whether it’s an 
example of democracy or of culture/religion in action. Whichever it is, Feenberg’s synthesis approach 
and Hill’s dialectical78  approach to the development of technology and culture are very relevant.   Hill 
sees culture and technology influencing one another and developing in tandem while Feenberg accepts 
the determinist view of technology but advocates modification through ‘subversive rationalisation’ by 
the community to bring about a synthesis.        
 
We have freedom of action, or surface freedom, with regard to our use of ICT on a daily basis but we 
do not have the deeper, or structural, freedom to prevent it, should we so wish, from influencing, or 
indeed controlling, in the long term the environment in which we live.   The compatibilist view between 
free will and determinism best sums up the situation.   It is similar to Hirsch’s concept of “the tyranny 
of small decisions” (Hirsch, 1987, p.37) or Schumpeter’s view that history “consists of a succession of 






                                                            












Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.1 Discussion 
We live in the ‘Information Age’.   The value of information and the benefits of information technology 
constitute the zeitgeist.   Critical comment or misgivings about any innovations in ICT are reduced to 
whispers by the chorus of praise in the media, government and business sectors welcoming such 
innovations. In this environment, success from a business perspective, comes easily to the ICT sector. 
 
In this thesis I have challenged much of the conventional wisdom regarding the development of ICT.    
The most significant factor, I have argued, is the primacy given to means over ends.  In many cases 
there is a greater emphasis on the technology than on the applications and this bears out Heidegger’s 
enframement theory.   It also demonstrates a failure generally to stand back and observe the overall 
context within which the technology operates.   For this reason, and taking a lead from Luhmann, I have 
endeavoured, in the thesis, to adopt the role of a second or higher-order observer so as to get a more 
complete understanding of how we relate to ICT. 
 
‘Ends’ in the context of this discussion correspond with needs.  Using Castells’ case study, I have 
outlined how people with minimal resources in underdeveloped countries have exploited mobile 
technology in truly innovative ways.   They are more innovative because their needs are greater.   With 
the mobile phone they identified not just one but many needs or ends.    If the development and use of 
ICT were based on needs, then the technology would no longer be deterministic. 
The emphasis on means, or more specifically, the lack of emphasis on ends arose from the tendency of 
the ICT industry and many of the ICT practitioners to characterise the technology as disruptive.  This 
emphasised the negative nature of the ICT revolution and was influenced, to some extent, by the 
counterculture of the 1960’s hippie revolution near what later became known as Silicon Valley.   
Existing practises and processes are disrupted without full consideration being given to the needs of 
users or to the fact that the disruption could destroy existing businesses and industries.  
It often happens that criticism of the ICT sector is misdirected.  To illustrate this I have provided the 
example of the PPARS project for the Health Services Executive (HSE) which is regarded as a classic 
ICT project failure whose budget overran by 25 times the initial budget.   But what was regarded as an 
ICT project was, in fact, part of a major and very complex change management programme.  If the 
nature of the project had been understood correctly at the start, the outcome would probably have been 
regarded as a success or at least not as such a huge failure.  What happened in this case is not an 
uncommon occurrence and I believe there is scope for further research in this area.  
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I have highlighted the tendency among the user community to accept substandard products and service 
from the ICT industry.   The poor quality of such products manifests itself in the need for regular 
software patches and updates and is usually an indication of poor software engineering.  The fact that 
these updates and patches, though unsolicited, are installed by the software supplier on the user’s 
computer means that the industry never yields full control of the machines to the customers who pay 
for them.   
The provision of virtually countless ‘personalisation’ options on many ICT products is evidence of a 
failure or a reluctance to engage in anything other than minimal user interface design and many 
suppliers fail to conform to standard design principles of restraint and simplicity.  I have shown how 
poor quality or poor performance in some products and applications can increase the demand for more 
ICT products.   These examples, and the fact that the suppliers of online services such as Google and 
Facebook, among others, are freeloaders on the networks of the telecommunications industry, 
demonstrate that the ICT industry is not subject to all of the normal constraints of the market.  As a 
result, the motivation for improved quality in the industry is diminished.   Enchanted by the technology 
or confused by its complexity, many users fail to recognise the shortcomings in many of the products 
and services provided by the ICT industry.    
Rarely, if ever, are these quality issues questioned.  Much of the time they appear to be welcomed as a 
challenge by users more concerned about the technology than its applications.  This illustrates the point 
that the ICT industry has always put more effort into forcing users to adapt to the technology than 
adapting the technology to the needs of users.    
Among the latest innovations in ICT are Big Data and the Internet of Things (IOT).  These, I have 
argued, are not in response to user needs.  They are crude ‘cover all’ concepts which will accelerate the 
demand for more technology to process large volumes of data derived possibly from several generations 
of other data and therefore far removed from the source.   This leads to greater complexity and 
abstraction.   Data abstraction implies a loss of context and this can lead to problems, particularly in 
areas such as the humanities. 
Most, if not all, data is used for decision making in one way or another, if it is used at all.  An excess of 
data or information can impede the process by making it over-complex.    Luhmann favours the use of 
trust and uncertainty absorption as a means of simplifying the decision making process.   His work 
focuses mainly on social systems but much of it is relevant to organisation and management and it could 
provide a valuable source for further research on management. 
I have highlighted in the thesis how governments support the ICT industry principally because of the 
employment it provides.    Considering how robots are likely to be commonplace in factories and other 
areas of business and manufacturing within a few decades or sooner, ICT will be instrumental in 
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increasing unemployment very significantly.   Fighting against this trend would have little effect.   I 
would argue that one of the most pressing issues now is to define or redefine the role of work and leisure 
with regard to meaning, identity and self-fulfilment.  
Regarding democracy, and its relationship to ICT, the most significant finding from the literature was 
that while it was necessary to have a reasonable level of participation in the democratic process, too 
high a level of participation in elections, for example, could  prove counterproductive and even 
damaging to the political system overall.  Democracy is a balance between anarchy and totalitarianism 
and for that reason it is essential to maintain that balance.  Not unrelated is the necessity to maintain a 
balance with regard to participation in deliberative politics, that is a balance between apathy and 
obsessive zeal.   I have also demonstrated the role of myth which is often used, knowingly or 
unknowingly, as a cloak to protect our political and democratic systems.   
Bureaucracy is an essential element of democracy and in recent decades it has become very dependent 
on ICT.    While it is no surprise that bureaucracies wield great power, the sheer scale of that power, 
which I have tried to illustrate in the thesis, is far beyond most expectations.   Bureaucracies keep 
regenerating themselves to garner more and more power and it is difficult to see how this can be 
controlled.   A major part of their task is regulation but the answer to the question ‘who regulates the 
regulators?’ is not as obvious as it may seem.   
In these conclusions and the preceding analysis I have provided the evidence to prove the two theses 
below and which, to my knowledge, have not been proposed before: 
 
• The development of ICT is one of the two most significant and transformative technological 
revolutions since the invention of the wheel six thousand years ago (the other being the development 
of electricity distribution networks on which ICT is dependent).   But in this development the ICT 
industry has adopted a disingenuous business model which leaves no room for democratic input 
from users. 
 
• There are negative attributes of ICT which are anti-democratic.   The positive attributes can 
contribute much to the peripheral aspects of democracy but achieving consensus in situations of 
conflict in order to steer a middle course between anarchy at one extreme and totalitarianism at the 
other, which is the essence of democracy, requires sagacity which only humans, rather than the cold 






The following is a list of issues discussed in the thesis and which, based on my literature review and 
over four decades experience working in the ICT sector, I believe are new contributions to knowledge. 
• The answer to the question whether or not ICT is deterministic, is that it’s compatibilist.  We have 
a certain amount of freedom in relation to the less significant decisions relating to our ICT use on 
a daily basis but we do not have the deeper structural freedom to prevent it from influencing, or 
indeed controlling, in the long term the environment in which we live.   This does not conflict with 
the view,  that ICT is determinist, that it drives the course of history.    
 
• The primacy of means over ends (or the technology over the application) tends to be a feature of 
ICT projects and tasks, large and small, although it is likely to be much more pronounced in the 
smaller tasks such as those using a mobile phone.  However, if the use of ICT were based on actual 
needs, then the technology would no longer be deterministic and the outcomes would be much more 
successful. 
 
• The standard of software engineering in the ICT industry is very poor since there can be no other 
reason for the software updates, patches and fixes which the suppliers issue on a frequent basis.   
The updates are unsolicited.   There is unlikely to be any other business where the supplier regularly 
modifies the product which they sold to a customer, without the customer’s permission. 
 
• The ICT industry uses a business model in which there is an inverse relation between the profit 
from a product and the quality of the product.   For example, if a system is updated frequently its 
performance is likely to deteriorate as the updates monopolise the memory.   Eventually the owner 
may have to purchase a new computer because of the updates and the supplier makes a profit due 
to the inferior software on the previous machine.   Some of the ICT companies (e.g. Google and 
Facebook) also make huge savings by refusing to pay towards the cost of the traffic their 
applications generate on the telecommunications networks. 
 
• The ICT industry benefits significantly from the extensive free publicity in the mass media covering 
the launch of new products. 
 
• Practitioners in the ICT industry and in the wider sector often speak of ICT in positive terms as a 
disruptive technology and of applying it as such without having a clear, or any, idea of the outcome.  
It suggests a move from order to chaos which could be categorised with protest or war.   This is 
another example of means taking precedence over ends and it is an irresponsible approach which is 
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at variance with the rigid standards the same practitioners insist on for individual applications 
development. 
 
• I have highlighted the use of self-justifying circular arguments by the industry, governments and 
the education sector to promote ICT.  These include demands, for example, that we should invest 
in more digital technology and have everyone equipped to overcome the problems caused by it.   
Also, claims about productivity improvements were undermined by revelations in the U.S. that a 
major portion of the improvement was within the ICT industry itself which because of its size,  
contributed hugely to the overall productivity improvement figures for the U.S. 
 







6.3 Implications for Research 
 
The following are topics which I have considered in the thesis and which, I believe, warrant further 
research. 
 
• The concept of the ‘black box’ came into use in the early days of computing and I have suggested 
that the concept is, to some extent, responsible for the increasing lack of interest in science among 
young people and the ‘dumbing down’ of the school curriculum because of a reduced emphasis on 
first principles.    Somewhat ironically, education is an area where means should take precedence 
over ends but the ‘black box’ puts the emphasis on ends.    There is scope in the philosophy of 
education or philosophy of science area for research on this and it might also enlighten us on our 
relationship with, and our understanding of, technology 
 
• Bureaucracy is a baffling phenomenon.  It is an essential element of any political democracy, yet it 
is seen to be very autocratic.   It survives under every regime whether democratic, autocratic or 
military and it survives changes of regime.   It can benefit from its successes and its failures  -  the 
latter usually being attributed to a shortage of resources, which can be quickly addressed.   It 
regenerates itself autopoietically and protects itself under the ‘separation of powers’ principle. 
Bureaucracy is not confined to the public service.   Most large organisations in the private sector 
generate bureaucracies and much of their effort involves the application of the procedures and 
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regulations of the state bureaucracies so they form an overall complex system which in many 
instances extends itself to the global bureaucracy.   Research by a political philosopher that would 
provide some insights to help in regulating the growth of bureaucracy without undermining its 
service to the public would be very valuable. 
 
• There is scope for some management research based on Luhmann’s ideas, especially those directed 
at simplifying organisation management and decision-making and it would also provide for a more 
constructive assessment of ‘big data’. 
 
• I have criticised the business model used in the ICT industry where, in my opinion, there is an 
inverse relationship between product quality and profit.   Empirical research on this by a business 
or financial analyst would be worthwhile. 
 
• There is a need for empirical research by an IS practitioner on the reasons behind having so many 
frequent unsolicited software updates on our computer systems. 
 
• I suggested that one of the most pressing issues now is to define or redefine the role of work and 
leisure with regard to meaning, identity and self-fulfilment as we head towards the next stage of 
automation and robotics.    Research on this should also consider how governments view work 
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